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1
Introduction
Wei-Chiao Huang and Huizhong Zhou
Western Michigan University

It is a market economy, it is a nonmarket economy. It is capitalist, it
is communist. It is a superpower, it is a developing country. It is a world
factory, it is a global polluter. It is a nation of innovation, it is a nation
of imitation. Its people are thriving, its people are suffering. It brings
wealth to us, it takes jobs away from us. Such are the varied perceptions of a nation called China. In spite of frequent and ever-growing
exchanges between the United States and China in business, culture,
tourism, and almost all other aspects of social activities, in spite of overwhelming media coverage about China and extensive research, to many
Americans, China is still a dragon behind a mist curtain.
Diverse, even diametrically opposed views of China reflect China’s
multiple, complicated, and ever-changing facets on the one side, and
lack of understanding and historical and ideological biases on the other.
In addition, like any bilateral and global trade, China’s rise and its relations with the United States will inevitably create winners and losers,
although the gains outweigh the losses for both China and the United
States. For example, while large amounts of imports have made abundant goods and services available to Americans at affordable prices for
the last two decades, they have replaced some domestic manufacturing
businesses and jobs. The different experiences or prospects of the consequences of U.S.-China relations will certainly affect the perceptions
and views of China.
The 2010–2011 Werner Sichel Economics Lecture Series, “Dragon
versus Eagle: The Chinese Economy and U.S.-China Economic Relations,” invited six prominent scholars to deliver lectures on China’s
economic development and power, the driving forces of its growth,
its trade relations with the United States, and the impacts on the U.S.
economy. We are pleased to present the edited version of their lectures
in this collection.
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The primary concern from the U.S. perspective is, unsurprisingly,
U.S.-China relations, especially as they relate to economics. The economic relationship between the United States and China is crucially
important for both countries because they depend on each other; they
are integrated. The United States relies on China for cheap consumer
products and for financing the U.S. debt, while China relies on the
United States for export markets, technology, and foreign direct investment. China is the second-largest trading partner of the United States,
with a total volume of imports and exports of $457 billion in 2010. The
long-term trend in the U.S. trade deficit remains a key policy concern
for the United States and its global trading partners. The overall U.S.
merchandise trade deficit increased to $915.6 billion in 2006. China’s
share in the merchandise trade deficit raised particular concern. The
deficit with China increased rapidly and reached $235 billion in 2006
and $273 billion in 2010. In addition, China is the largest creditor of the
United States, holding $1.12 trillion in U.S. Treasury bills, according to
the U.S. Federal Reserve.
Robert B. Koopman, in his chapter titled “U.S.-China Economic
Relations and Value Chains in Global Production Networks,” points out
that while much attention has been paid to the increasing merchandise
trade imbalance with China, it is useful to consider this trade relationship in a broader context. He brings our attention to the changes in the
composition of the United States with a number of its main trading
partners. In 1989, imports from the United States’ largest Asian partners
(Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore) accounted
for 43.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. By 2007, the same share had
dropped slightly to 41.5 percent. During this period, the U.S. share of
imports from many of its other Asian partners declined. Between 1989
and 2007, the combined share of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and other Asian countries in U.S. non-oil imports dropped from
41.1 percent to 20.9 percent. Thus, much of China’s increasing share of
U.S. non-oil imports came at the expense of other Asian countries, particularly Japan, which dropped from 22 percent to 8.9 percent of U.S.
non-oil imports during the same period.
To fully understand what was happening in global trade flows,
Koopman’s research delves further into value-added components of
trade. By focusing on gross values of exports and imports, traditional
trade statistics give us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between
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countries. Value-added trade statistics help reveal the real economic
impacts of global trade on domestic and foreign countries. The valueadded approach demonstrates that many countries may add value to a
particular good or service in a global supply chain, and that attributing
the entire export value to the last exporting country can provide a misleading picture of the sources of value in trade.
China is often the final assembler in a large number of global supply
chains, and it uses components from many other countries to produce
its exports. Since processing exports have accounted for more than 50
percent of China’s exports every year since 1996, imported intermediate
inputs used in production for exports are contributed by other countries,
including the United States. Accounting for value added, the contribution of China to the U.S. trade deficit differs substantially from what the
traditional trade data suggest. The U.S.-China trade deficit on a valueadded basis is considerably smaller (by about 40 percent in 2004) than
on the commonly reported basis of official gross trade. By contrast,
Japan exports parts and components to countries throughout Asia; many
of these components are eventually assembled into final products and
exported to the United States. Thus, the U.S.-Japan trade balance on
a value-added basis is larger than the comparable gross trade deficit.
The U.S. value-added trade deficits with other major trading partners
(Canada, Mexico, and the EU-15) differ by smaller amounts from their
corresponding gross trade deficits.
Koopman also identifies three major factors that contribute to the
growing trade imbalance between the two countries and to China’s
more recently growing trade surplus with the world. The first factor is
China’s extensive use of policy instruments to encourage its rapid economic development and transition from a centrally planned economy to
a market-driven economy. These policies include, among others, incentives for foreign investment and export performance, the establishment of special economic zones and substantial infrastructure investment, and a managed exchange rate. A second explanation focuses on
more macroeconomic factors, suggesting that significant imbalance in
the U.S. savings and investment rates, combined with relatively rapid
consumption-led economic growth in the United States compared to
other developed countries, have led to an increased current account and
merchandise trade imbalance. A third factor has been the rapid growth in
fragmented global production processes, as businesses take advantage
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of declining costs in information and communications and international
logistics to distribute pieces of their production chain based on lowest
cost sources. Although fragmentation of global production has developed independently of China’s policy environment and is a widespread
phenomenon, a large part of China’s growth in exports to the United
States has been in processing trade carried out by the foreign-invested
enterprises, which have been encouraged by and benefited from China’s
“imports for exports” policies.
What is the size of the Chinese economy relative to the United
States? Is it an economic superpower or a developing country? What
have been the driving forces behind the unprecedented growth for more
than a decade? In Chapter 3, “China’s Economy from an American’s
Perspective,” Gene H. Chang offers a balanced view of the Chinese
economy and its potential problems.
The true size of China’s economy has been a subject of some debate.
Using the official exchange rate and the figures reported by the State
Statistics Bureau of China, China’s GDP in 2010 was $5.7 trillion, ranking second in the world. This is about one-third of the U.S. GDP, which
is $14.6 trillion. It is slightly larger than third-ranked Japan, which generated $5.4 trillion in GDP.
However, with a population of 1.3 billion people, China is still poor.
Its per capita GDP is only about one-tenth of that in the United States,
ranked the 94th in the world. Its per capita consumption of energy, for
example, is about 15 percent of the United States. In addition, economic
development in China has been quite uneven, with the coastal regions
much more developed than the inland.
To put the development of the Chinese economy in perspective,
Chang compares the sector composition in China with other countries.
Economic theory and history indicate that in the preindustrial period,
agriculture contributes the most value added to a country’s GDP. In the
middle stage of industrialization, manufacturing and industry add the
most value. Finally, in a developed economy, the service sector adds
the most value to GDP. China’s service sector is relatively small, adding value of $2.563 billion, which is about 22 percent of that of the U.S.
service sector. In the industry sector, the value added is $2.751 dollars,
which is 85 percent of the output of the U.S. industry. While agriculture
in China accounts for less than 10 percent of GDP, it contributes a total

Introduction 5

of $564 billion, more than three times as much as that of the United
States.
No one would doubt that China has experienced a remarkable
growth at an annual rate of around 10 percent for three decades, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. As a result, the standing of
the Chinese economy in the world moves upward quickly. In 2000,
China’s economy was behind most large industrial economies. Then
China passed the U.K., France, Germany, and finally Japan in 2010,
becoming the second-largest economy in the world. Based on certain
assumptions, it is projected that China would overtake the United States
to become the largest economy by 2020.
What explains the rapid and sustained economic growth of China
for three decades? Many have suggested reasons ranging from the Chinese culture and system to purely timing and luck, but none is uncontroversial. Chang focuses on some obvious economic reasons, namely, the
high rate of capital formation supported by the high rate of savings, and
the political system, where governments have strong influences over
the economy and control the banks.
In terms of fixed capital investment and saving as percentages of
GDP, China is ranked near the top of the world. China spends 45.6
percent of its GDP on fixed capital formation. The country has been
enthusiastically pouring money into infrastructure, residential housing,
and equipment. The local governments are even more zealous in capital
spending because large projects are symbols of their performance; they
get credits for big building projects in their local areas, but they are
not actually held accountable for the costs of these projects. The funds
for the investment often come from the loans by the local state-owned
banks. If the loans finally go bad, it is hard to pin down who was responsible for the bad decision, and the state eventually picks up the tab. The
true scales of construction and other investment projects are even larger
than the reported figures in the official statistics, as the local officials
always underreport their investment to avoid the discipline from the
central government’s macroeconomic contractionary measures.
The money for capital investment comes from public and private
savings in China, which accounts for more than half (52 percent) of
the GDP. For each yuan the Chinese made, they spent less than half in
consumption. Why is the savings rate so high in China? Scholars give
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a list of explanations in line with conventional theories, which include
the following:
• Rapid growth in income. As personal income rises rapidly, old
habits remain, hence consumption increase lags behind income
increase.
• A relatively younger population composition, so the larger working population provides a “demographic dividend.”
• The influence of the Confucian culture and thrifty habits by the
older generations.
• Lack of social security and high medical costs and costs of education for children, so households have to engage in a lot of precautionary saving.
Politicians and news media in the United States often blame undervalued Chinese currency for the huge U.S. trade deficit with China,
though the majority of economists would consider a lower gross savings rate as a more important factor for the U.S. trade deficit. Is the
Chinese RMB undervalued? Chang, based on his own research, estimates that the Chinese currency is 25 percent undervalued against the
U.S. dollar, but 17 percent undervalued against the global balance equilibrium value, because the U.S. dollar is about 10 percent overvalued
against its global balance equilibrium value. China’s trade surplus with
the United States is particularly large because, unlike the Euro zone
and Japan, China keeps the RMB relatively stable with the U.S. dollar,
thus reducing the foreign exchange cost in trade between China and the
United States. Another reason is that China’s export involves mostly
processing, which employs goods and services produced in other countries, as is detailed in Koopman’s chapter.
While China has the potential to be a great power, it faces serious
challenges in both the economic and political arenas. With a population
of 1.3 billion people, China is still poor in terms of per capita income.
In other vital measures, in per capita terms, China appears weak, too.
For example, China’s per capita renewable water resources are only 20
percent of those of the United States, and per capita energy consumption is about 15 percent. To curb the population growth, China’s fertility
rate dropped to 1.54 in 2010. The population will age quickly in the
coming years. This sets up a “demographic time bomb” for the future.
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By the year 2050, the elderly would make up more than 30 percent of
the population, and the dependency ratio would reach 80 percent.
To sustain its growth, China clearly has to move away from the
current labor-intensive mode of development to a more technologyintensive economy, and it needs to increase highly skilled human capital.
Yet, the current state-controlled education and science and technology
systems do not promote creative thinking and research and development, which are crucial for sustained growth. Under the current system,
science and technology rewards and research grants are often allocated
based on who has political influences or personal connections rather
than on merit. Intellectual property rights are not effectively protected,
discouraging costly but valuable inventions and original innovations.
China’s technology right now is far behind the United States. With such
an inefficient and even corrupted system, the gaps in advanced areas are
not likely to close in the near future.
China’s income gap is widening, frequently causing social and political conflict and unrest. The Gini index, a common indicator of inequality (to be explained in Chapter 4 by Terry Sicular), reaches 0.469 for
China, which is higher than most countries in the world. The Chinese
Communist government lacks the legitimacy to rule because it is not
elected by people, and the people have little confidence in it. There is no
independent legal system or channel where people can vent their grievances or trust that they will be treated fairly. Hence, there exists widespread hostility and distrust among people toward the governments and
their officials, resulting in many protests and plenty of unrest. China is
politically unstable under the current system, and a large-scale protest
that topples the government is not entirely impossible in the future.
The Communist political authoritarian system is an inherently and
intrinsically unstable system under which China lacks rule of law. The
party determines everything, hence impeding not only creativity and
independent thinking, but also entrepreneurship. Even worse, private
property is still not genuinely protected. If the Communist authoritarian
system were to collapse, the resulting political upheaval and economic
crisis could dwarf any scale of economic recession.
As Chang points out, the income gap between the rich and the poor
has been widening and has become an important factor for social instability. Terry Sicular’s chapter, “Winners and Losers in China’s Eco-
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nomic Reform,” addresses this issue in greater detail, especially recent
trends in inequality in China.
China has undoubtedly become more prosperous during the past
three decades. However, dramatic policy and structure shifts, while
bringing about tremendous benefits and wealth, inevitably create winners and losers. Economists have long thought that economic development is initially accompanied by rising inequality, but that eventually various forces emerge that will cause inequality to decline. This
“inverted U” relationship between growth and inequality was first
proposed by Simon Kuznets (1955) and is called the Kuznets hypothesis. The reasoning is that initially growth begins in certain sectors and
regions, and the benefits of early growth therefore go to a small subset of the population, causing inequality to increase. As development
continues, however, under the right conditions growth will spread to
other sectors and regions. Employment will expand, and the benefits
of growth will be shared more widely. In the long term, inequality can
decline. Rising inequality is therefore not necessarily a permanent feature of growth in general, or growth in China.
A commonly used measure of inequality, as explained in Sicular’s
chapter, is the Gini coefficient, an index that takes a value of between
0 and 1. A Gini of 0 would mean perfect equality—all members of the
society have identical, equal income. A Gini of 1 would indicate perfect
inequality—one person has all of the society’s income, and everyone
else has zero income. The Gini coefficients for actual countries mostly
range from 0.20 to 0.70.
Between 1995 and 2002 inequality in China remained roughly constant. Rural off-farm employment became more widespread, contributing to a decline in rural inequality. Macroeconomic growth during this
period was widely shared. Nevertheless, other disequalizing factors—
the urban-rural gap and education-based income disparities—continued. From 2002 to 2007 inequality resumed its upward trend. It appears
that China had not yet reached the Kuznets turning point. By 2007,
in fact, inequality in China had reached a level that was quite high by
international standards; China’s Gini coefficient was 0.497, which was
near that of Mexico and Zambia, two countries that are considered to
be high inequality.
Several factors appear to have contributed to the upward trend in
inequality between 2002 and 2007. The gap between urban and rural
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incomes continued to widen, although within rural and urban areas, levels of inequality did not increase substantially. In 2007 urban incomes
per capita on average were 4.1 times rural incomes. This ratio was up
from 3.3 in 2002, which was already high by international standards.
A second factor contributing to increasing inequality has been
the household income derived from assets and property. In the 1990s
major property rights reforms were implemented that gave households
opportunities to own property. These reforms included the privatization of urban housing, the development of the urban real estate market,
enterprise ownership reforms, and the expansion of stock and financial
markets. In the wake of these and other measures, household income
from assets and property, including imputed rents from owner-occupied
housing, rose to 10 percent of household income in 2002 and to 15
percent in 2007. Asset income in China is unequally distributed, and its
contribution to inequality has increased. A decomposition of income by
source reveals that the contribution of income from assets and property
to national inequality increased considerably from 9 percent in 2002 to
20 percent in 2007.
The rise in inequality between 2002 and 2007 implies that some
households benefited more and others less from growth during this
period. Who, then, were the winners and losers? Sicular examines the
growth in household income by decile groups in the population. All
decile groups, from the poorest 10 percent of the population at the far
left to the richest 10 percent at the far right, enjoyed positive growth in
income between the two years. Growth in income of the poorest decile,
however, was much smaller (in both percentage and absolute terms)
than that of the richest decile. Income of the poorest decile increased
by 406 yuan, less than 50 percent of 2002 income. Income of the richest decile roughly doubled, with an increase of nearly 16,000 yuan. For
intermediate deciles, growth in income was correlated closely to their
position in the income distribution.
Both the number of poor and the poverty rate declined dramatically
between the early 1990s and early 2000s. In 1993 the poverty rate was
40 percent, but by 2002 it had fallen to 15 percent. The poverty rate
declined further between 2002 and 2007 to about 4 percent. Most of
this decline is due to a steep reduction in rural poverty. China’s success in reducing poverty is outstanding by international standards. As
a consequence of these trends, China has changed from a high-poverty
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country to a moderately low-poverty country. Moreover, China’s share
of world poverty has declined substantially, from nearly 40 percent of
the world’s poor in 1990 to only 15 percent in 2005. In conclusion,
China’s economic reforms have had many “winners” and few absolute
“losers.” Yet, challenges to China’s harmonious society remain acute
and ongoing.
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has been fueled by a
large-scale migration from the countryside to the cities. As China relies
on cheap labor and labor-intensive manufacturing as key factors for
development, tens of millions of migrant workers pour into coastal
developmental areas looking for factory jobs, which pay wages higher
than they can earn in the countryside. The most recent census (2010)
estimates that there are now nearly 200 million rural migrants in urban
China. The sheer scale of the migration has brought about profound
changes in the economic, social, and demographic structures of the
nation. Migrant workers bring back to their rural hometown not only
earned wealth, but also experiences and expectations they gain while
living in the urban areas. These experiences will change their frame
of reference, especially that of their children. They will no longer be
content with earning higher income—they want the same comfortable
and rich life that the urban residents do. Mary Gallagher, in her chapter
titled “Changes in the World’s Workshop: The Demographic, Social,
and Political Factors behind China’s Labor Movement,” offers insights
on changes of the frame of reference of migrant workers, especially the
younger generation, and the social and political impacts.
Gallagher explains that China’s labor markets are highly segmented
by institutional barriers to labor mobility across regions and across
sectors. The hukou system, a restrictive residency registration system,
is still fundamental in placing barriers between the labor markets of
urban and rural citizens. There are also important social and cultural
expectations about employment that further segment labor markets.
Unemployed college graduates and unemployed rural migrants rarely
compete in the same labor markets. There are some jobs that urban
youth simply do not consider. Conversely, few employers in laborintensive manufacturing would want to hire urban youth, who might
not work hard enough or be able to withstand the harsh conditions.
Barriers to labor mobility and segmentation based on hukou status and
education level continue to exist in China, to the extent that sometimes
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labor shortages and labor surplus can coexist. For example, there were
reports in the Chinese media in 2003 of a “migrant labor shortage” in
development zones in China’s south. Although this shortage ebbed during the global financial crisis and China’s export crisis of 2008–2009,
these shortages began to reappear soon after.
Migration, together with the one-child policy, has had transformative effects on the social and cultural characteristics of China’s new
generation of migrants. Gallagher finds that migrant workers born in
the 1980s and after are markedly different in basic characteristics, in
political socialization, and in life experiences from that of their parents. This generation is the first to be affected by the strict one-child
policy that was implemented in the late 1970s. While in their parents’
generation a family might have several children, even rural children in
this generation generally share at most one sibling. In urban areas, the
majority of children born are the only child in the family. Given their
greater importance to the family’s economy and long-term success,
these “little emperors” have been lavished with attention and opportunity. Even rural children, who do not have the same educational and
economic opportunities of their urban counterparts, have been given
more attention and more protection from hard agricultural labor than
in previous generations. Many rural parents understand that education
is still the key to upward social mobility for their children. This focus
on education has spared children from backbreaking manual labor and
allowed them to focus on their studies. Although rural children do not
attain the same level of education as urban children, they now have
much higher rates of middle school and high school completion. Even
if they take manufacturing jobs in the urban areas, they take it as part of
their “going out” strategy for the transition to urban life.
The post–1980s generation, both rural and urban, is also markedly
different from the previous generation in terms of political socialization and life experiences under socialism. As children of the reform era,
they have little familiarity with the mass political campaigns of the high
Mao Era. Their primary years of education and political socialization
coincided with post–Tiananmen China, when economic growth was the
major goal. The private sector was allowed to expand, and the “rule by
law” campaign was disseminated in the media, encouraging people to
protect their legal rights.

12 Huang and Zhou

These different demographic characteristics and life experiences
have helped create a new generation of migrants who are challenging
traditional barriers and identities that have existed in China since the
Maoist hukou policy was put into place in the late 1950s. Three main
characteristics of this new generation are worth examining here: 1) their
frame of reference, 2) their long-term expectations, and 3) their potential capacity to organize their interests and grievances collectively.
Surveys and interviews show that young rural migrants are increasingly better integrated and familiar with global youth culture and Chinese urban culture. Their frame of reference is increasingly not what
would have happened to them if they had stayed in the countryside
but what is possible for them as young urban citizens. This change in
their reference point translates into higher expectations on the job and
some tendency to value work that offers future opportunity even at the
expense of current lower pays.
Given the higher levels of education in the current generation, better access to technology, and increased integration into urban culture,
there is greater potential for this generation to articulate collective interests and to act collectively to promote and press for their interests and
rights, vis-à-vis employers and the government alike. In the strikes of
2010, analysts pointed to workers’new abilities to organize within single
workplaces and to design institutions to allow for leadership selection
and representation. The increased potential for young migrants’ collective power has been recognized in the media and by the governments.
Since 2003, the party-state has been much more concerned about the
conditions and long-term development of China’s urbanizing citizens.
Migrant workers, mostly young adults, earn higher incomes than
when they were in the countryside and substantially improve their lives,
but what happens to those who stay behind in the rural areas, mostly
older peasants? Would the movement of young rural adults to urban and
coastal areas for higher-income-earning opportunities leave the older
residents remaining in rural areas at greater risk of falling into poverty?
John Giles addresses this issue in his chapter, “Left Behind in Old Age?
Sources of Support for China’s Rural Elderly in a Period of Growth,
Migration, and Demographic Transition.”
In general, rural residents lack access to pension support when they
are of retirement age, and they must rely on either their own labor income
or support from family members. In rural China, financial support for
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the elderly remains the responsibility of adult children and is even codified into laws governing the family. As the population of potential care
providers continues to shrink as a result of both China’s demographic
transition and the availability of attractive migrant employment opportunities for the young, many observers have expressed concerns for the
well-being of the rural elderly.
Giles points out that major differences exist in the primary sources
of support for China’s urban and rural elderly, and between men and
women from both groups of elderly. While pensions are the single most
significant source of support for the urban elderly, they remain a very
minor source of support for the rural elderly. Labor income is the primary source of support for 37.9 percent of the rural elderly. Support
through antipoverty programs does not figure prominently, because the
rural dibao (benefits for low-income residents) was not an important
source of income support for rural elderly households. Also notable is
the inability of the elderly to earn income from property. The elderly in
China have not grown old in an environment in which they could accumulate land wealth. Lack of land wealth limits the ability of the elderly
to earn income from rents and may also limit the scope for encouraging
intergenerational transfers from their children (who would be prospective heirs).
Giles further examines the sources of support by gender among the
rural elderly. Family support is more important for rural elderly women,
and labor income remains more important for men. His research finds
that 68.5 percent of rural women over 60 report that financial support from family members is their most important source of support,
whereas only 27.5 percent report that labor income is most important.
By contrast, 48.5 percent of rural elderly men report that labor income
remains their most important source of support, and only 39.3 percent
report support from family members. When distinguishing the importance of pension by gender, a significantly higher share of rural men
(8.1 percent) than women (1.3 percent) report that pension income is
their most significant source of financial support. The gap between men
and women reflects historical differences between genders in employment in local government and the military.
Given the structure of elderly support, Giles finds that the effects of
lost farm income and uncertainty about land tenure likely dominate the
effects of increased income from remittances in labor supply decisions
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of the rural elderly. Nonetheless, this effect is not statistically significant for men or for women under 70. Women over 70, however, are 8
percent more likely to continue working (most likely in agriculture) if
the household has a migrant child. The elderly have to work more to
make up the income loss. Women over 70 with a migrant child work
411 hours more during a year, or the equivalent of 10 40-hour workweeks. For regions of the country planting two crops a year, this would
amount to full-time work during the agricultural busy season.
Overall, migrant children continue to provide remittance support to
their parents. On average, the predicted transfer from adult children is
sufficient to maintain elderly incomes above the poverty line. However,
as the range of potential transfers is wide, elderly people with migrant
children face greater risk of falling below the poverty line. Migration
of adult children may also have a significant impact on the work status of elderly women. Having a migrant child in the family raises the
probability that a woman over 70 will still be in the labor force and
work longer hours. For men and women under 70, a migrant child has a
positive but statistically insignificant effect on participation in incomeearning activities.
What is the long-term outlook of the Chinese economy? Can China
maintain the momentum and sustain this phenomenal growth well into
the next several decades? A team of elite World Bank economists projects that China’s yearly growth rate will “slow down” to 5.9 percent in
2021 and further down to 5 percent in 2026 (World Bank 2012). This
projection is remarkably close to Dr. Zhiwu Chen’s one-man projection when he delivered the lecture “China in 2049” in 2011 at Western
Michigan University. The final chapter of this volume is a short transcribed version of his lecture.
Chen presents a “big picture” of a possible future GDP path for
China in comparison to the United States from 2011 to 2049, the centennial of the founding of People’s Republic of China. He depicts three
phases of China’s growth path: an annual growth rate of 8.5 percent
from 2011 to 2016 in the first phase, a drop in growth by 12 percent in
2017 in the second phase (a bold projection with reasons given in the
chapter, unlike projections by other agencies such as IMF), followed by
a resumption of a steady growth rate of 5–6 percent per year through
2049 in the third phase. Chen predicts that in 2049, when PRC is 100
years old, China’s nominal GDP will surpass the United States, and if
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purchasing power parity is taken into account, China’s GDP will surpass the United States much earlier, in 2027, 15 years from now.
Chen gives a very long-run historical perspective of China’s per
capita GDP over 2000 years and notes that the high growth actually
only occurred in the last 40 years. He gives an insightful analysis of
China’s rapid growth and ascent in the recent decades. He refutes the
conventional wisdom that the main driving factor of China’s rise is an
abundant and low-cost workforce (reasons given in the chapter). He
convincingly argues that China has ascended by “riding the tide,” benefiting from the world’s encouraging trade environment because of
increasing globalization and dispersion of technological progress as a
result of industrial revolution. Chen concludes by pointing out some
challenges and concerns for China’s sustainable growth, such as overreliance of growth on state capitalism, that is, government dominance
in the past and current growth of the economy.
The chapters in this volume reflect the opinions of six leading
experts on certain important aspects and issues of the Chinese economy
and its economic relations with the United States. While these chapters
can cover only part of the complex pictures, they all contain insightful
analyses of the issues concerned. The analytical frameworks and the
insights presented in this volume will be valuable for understanding
and evaluating the Chinese economy, its growth, and its relations with
the United States, which hopefully will help guide policymakers in this
ever-integrated global economy.
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U.S.-China Economic
Relations and Value Chains in
Global Production Networks
Robert B. Koopman
U.S. International Trade Commission

During the past 15 years trade between the United States and
China has grown substantially. This trade growth has increased the
economic interdependence between the two countries, resulting in benefits for both, while also creating some economic tensions. China has
experienced rapid economic growth and development with substantial
decreases in poverty and increases in per capita GDP, which many academics attribute to China’s market-driven economic reforms and its
related integration with the world economy. Up until the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. economy experienced a long period of relatively
strong growth through increased productivity and improved integration
of information and computer technologies, as well as strong consumption growth accompanied by a declining national savings rate. While
U.S. consumption-led growth benefited from inexpensive goods from
China such as consumer electronics and textiles, it has also resulted in
growing bilateral imbalances.
U.S. import growth from China has slowed over the last several
years because of weak U.S. economic growth, a drop in the value of the
dollar, and a decline in imbalances. This chapter focuses on the period
prior to the financial crisis, as it aligns well with recent research on
value-added trade, which is discussed in a later section.
Researchers and policymakers have focused on three broad areas
to explain the increasing trade imbalance between the two countries
and, more recently, China’s growing trade surplus with the world. The
first area is China’s extensive use of policy instruments to encourage its
rapid economic development and transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market-driven economy.1 These policies include, among
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others, incentives for foreign investment and export performance, the
establishment of special economic zones and substantial infrastructure
investment, and a fixed exchange rate. A second explanation focuses on
more macroeconomic factors, suggesting that significant imbalance in
the U.S. savings and investment rates, combined with relatively rapid
consumption-led economic growth in the United States compared to
other developed countries, have led to an increased current account and
merchandise trade imbalance.2 A third area has been the rapid growth
in fragmented global production processes, as businesses take advantage of declining information and communications technology costs,
and international logistics costs to distribute pieces of their production
chain based on lowest cost sources (Dean, Fung, and Wang 2011; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; Yi 2003). Although fragmentation of global
production has developed independently of China’s policy environment
and is a widespread phenomenon, a large part of China’s growth in
exports to the United States has been in processing trade carried out by
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), many of which have benefited from
China’s pro FIE and pro “imports for exports” policies.3
In this chapter I present a summary of the U.S.-China trade relationship prior to 2008 and describe some of the driving factors underlying
the rapid growth in U.S.-China trade. I then present data on the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and U.S. import injury cases that support
the notion that, from the U.S. perspective, trade relations with China
are treated much like those with our long-term historical economic and
political partners such as the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. Finally, I discuss current research on value-added trade that could be important from a future
policy perspective in understanding global value chains and China’s
position in them.

AN OVERVIEW OF ThE U.S.-ChINA TRADE RELATIONShIP
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarize U.S. merchandise trade shifts with
the world and with China between 2002 and 2006. The overall U.S.
merchandise trade deficit increased to $915.6 billion in 2006. The longterm trend in the U.S. trade deficit remains a key policy concern for the
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United States and its global trading and financial partners. China’s rapidly increasing share in the merchandise trade deficit—it reached $235
billion in 2006—has raised particular concern. The factors and trends
driving U.S. merchandise trade were numerous. Economic growth in
the United States and its major trading partners contributed to increased
bilateral merchandise trade flows in 2006, while strong growth in consumer spending, business structures investment, and exports supported
the economic performance of the United States.4 The rate of increase in
the U.S. merchandise trade deficit slowed from 17 percent in 2005 to
7 percent in 2006, even as the deficit grew from $858.4 billion in 2005
to a record $915.6 billion in 2006. Total U.S. exports increased to a
record $929.5 billion, a 16 percent increase. Aircraft, spacecraft, and
related equipment; motor vehicles; and petroleum products recorded
the largest sector increases for a combined $33.5 billion (27 percent)
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of export growth, although export increases are recorded in every merchandise sector. Meanwhile, U.S. imports for all merchandise sectors
increased by 11 percent to a record $1.8 trillion. The energy products,
minerals and metals, and transportation equipment sectors accounted
for over half of the increase. The crude petroleum, motor vehicles, and
petroleum products commodity groups recorded the largest increases in
2006, accounting for a third of import growth.
The U.S.-China trade relationship continues to evolve quickly. The
U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China rose for the fifth straight year,
increasing by 16 percent to $235.4 billion, reflecting the continued U.S.
demand for goods produced in China. China is the fourth-largest export
market for the United States and the second-leading import source in
terms of absolute value. The continued rapid economic growth in China,
coupled with China’s increasing role as a low-cost production location,
contributed to the expansion in U.S.-China trade in 2006. U.S. exports
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to China rose at a greater rate than the preceding years, by $12.8 billion, or 33 percent. The most significant increases in U.S. exports were
in electronic products ($3.2 billion), transportation equipment ($2.5
billion), and minerals and metals ($2.5 billion). Increased demand for
computer and telecommunications products by U.S. consumers contributed to continued growth in U.S. imports from China, increasing by
$6.3 billion (16 percent) and $3.7 billion (26 percent), respectively. In
2006, the U.S. telecommunications market grew at the fastest rate since
2000, with demand for services such as broadband leading to increased
demand for telecommunications and network equipment.
Changes in the Composition of U.S. Trade
While much attention has been paid to the increasing merchandise
trade imbalance with China, it is useful to consider this trade relationship in a broader context. Table 2.1 shows the changes in the composition of U.S. non-oil imports with a number of its main trading partners between 1989 and 2007. China’s share of U.S. imports increased
from 2.8 percent to 20.6 percent, displacing Japan as the United States’
second-largest import source after NAFTA. During this period China
became the largest single import source country for the United States.
In 1989, imports from the United States’ largest Asian partners
(Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore) accounted
for 43.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. By 2007, the same share had
dropped slightly, to 41.5 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. During this
period, the U.S. share of imports from many of its other Asian partners
declined. Between 1989 and 2007, the combined share of Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and other Asian countries in U.S. nonoil imports dropped from 41.1 percent to 20.9 percent. Thus, much of
China’s increasing share of U.S. non-oil imports came at the expense
of other Asian countries, particularly Japan, which dropped from 22
percent to 8.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports during the same period.
While the total value of non-oil imports from Asia grew substantially, its share of total non-oil imports remained fairly constant, reflecting substantial growth of imports from other regions as well. This phenomenon is particularly interesting because the composition of U.S.
imports from Asia changed substantially, as more and more of the share
of U.S. non-oil imports from Asia came from China.
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Table 2.1 U.S. Import Shares by Country, 1989–2007
Year Rest of world NAFTA Rest of Asia Japan
China
1989
10.9
24.0
19.1
22.0
2.8
1990
11.0
24.3
18.5
20.8
3.5
1991
11.0
24.4
18.6
21.1
4.4
1992
11.3
24.5
18.4
20.1
5.5
1993
11.4
25.2
17.8
20.2
6.2
1994
11.7
26.2
17.5
19.3
6.5
1995
11.7
27.0
17.9
17.8
6.8
1996
11.9
28.3
17.4
15.9
7.3
1997
12.4
28.4
16.8
15.1
8.0
1998
12.6
28.7
16.0
14.1
8.5
1999
12.2
29.4
15.8
13.7
8.9
2000
12.6
29.1
16.1
13.4
9.5
2001
12.7
29.3
14.7
12.3
10.3
2002
12.8
28.5
14.5
11.5
12.3
2003
13.3
27.0
14.0
10.6
14.2
2004
13.7
26.5
13.7
10.1
15.9
2005
13.9
25.8
12.9
9.8
17.9
2006
14.1
25.3
12.7
9.6
19.2
2007
13.7
25.1
12.0
8.9
20.6

EU15
21.1
21.9
20.6
20.2
19.2
18.7
18.7
19.2
19.3
20.2
20.0
19.3
20.7
20.5
20.8
20.1
19.8
19.2
19.6

NOTE: U.S. imports, except Chapter 27, in percentage of total.
SOURCE: USITC and author’s calculations.

A similar pattern arose in U.S. non-oil export shares (see Table 2.2).
The NAFTA partner countries held a fairly constant share of U.S. nonoil exports between 1989 and 2007, while large Asian countries’ shares
declined from 29.2 percent to 25.7 percent of U.S. non-oil exports.
As with imports, a fairly substantial shift occurred between exports to
Japan and China. In 1989, Japan accounted for 12.1 percent of U.S.
non-oil exports and China 1.7 percent. By 2007, Japan had dropped to
5.7 percent and China climbed to 6.0 percent.
Driving Factors in U.S.-China Bilateral Trade
In general, bilateral trade between the United States and China was
driven by FIEs, and more recently from a growing role by private firms
operating in China (see Figure 2.3). Electronic machinery (HS-84) con-
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Table 2.2 U.S. Export Shares by Country, 1989–2007
Year Rest of world NAFTA Rest of Asia Japan
1989
17.4
28.5
15.4
12.1
1990
16.7
28.3
15.2
12.3
1991
17.9
28.0
15.6
11.5
1992
18.9
29.1
15.6
10.8
1993
19.4
30.2
16.2
10.5
1994
17.7
31.8
16.9
10.6
1995
18.0
29.0
18.4
11.2
1996
18.7
29.9
17.9
11.0
1997
19.0
31.5
17.4
9.7
1998
18.9
33.5
14.7
8.7
1999
16.6
35.2
15.5
8.5
2000
15.6
35.6
16.4
8.6
2001
16.9
34.9
15.1
8.1
2002
16.0
36.0
15.7
7.7
2003
15.6
35.3
15.9
7.6
2004
16.5
34.9
15.9
7.0
2005
17.9
34.9
15.0
6.5
2006
19.3
33.4
14.7
6.1
2007
21.7
31.4
14.0
5.7

China
1.7
1.3
1.6
1.7
2.0
1.9
2.2
2.1
2.0
2.2
2.0
2.2
2.7
3.3
4.2
4.6
5.0
5.7
6.0

EU15
24.9
26.1
25.4
23.9
21.7
21.0
21.2
20.5
20.5
22.2
22.2
21.6
22.3
21.2
21.5
21.1
20.6
20.7
21.1

SOURCE: USITC.

stituted the largest and fastest growing product category for both imports
and exports (see Tables 2.3A and B). In addition, China’s government
incentive schemes, such as Economic and Technological Development
Zones and other specialized zones, played a dominant role in China’s
imports from the United States (see Figure 2.3 and Tables 2.3A and
2.3B).5
China’s trade pattern with the United States differs in some respects
from its trade pattern with the world. Yao (2008) finds that while China
ran a large trade surplus with the United States in machinery and electrical products, it ran a substantial deficit with the rest of the world
in these products, and that China’s special economic zones played an
important role in these trade flows. This, along with the general realignment of U.S. import shares from Asia discussed above, supports the
argument that China is playing an important role as an assembly platform for Asia by importing electronic components and shipping final
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Figure 2.3 Disaggregating China-U.S. Trade by Enterprise Type,
Customs Regime, and Incentive Scheme
China’s Exports to the U.S. by Incentive Scheme
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Figure 2.3 (continued)
China’s Exports to the U.S. by Enterprise Type
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Figure 2.3 (continued)
China’s Exports to the U.S. by Trade Mode
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Table 2.3A Decomposing China’s Top 20 Traded Products with the
United States: U.S. Exports to China ($, millions)
Rank
(2006) HSa Product

1995
% of
Value total

2006
% of
Value total

1

85

Electrical machinery and associated
parts

1,270

11

10,178

18

2

84

Machinery and associated parts

2,190

19

7,704

14

3

88

Aircraft, spacecraft, and associated
parts

1,176

10

6,090

11

4

90

Optical/photographic, medical, or
surgical instruments and parts

450

4

2,941

5

5

39

Plastics and articles thereof

351

3

2,716

5

6

12

Oil seeds, grains, and fruits

56

0

2,585

5

7

52

Cotton, including yarns and woven
fabrics

834

7

2,082

4

8

72

Iron and steel

141

1

1,800

3

9

74

Copper and associated articles

146

1

1,774

3

10

76

Aluminum and associated articles

147

1

1,735

3

11

47

Wood pulp; recovered (waste and
scrap) paper and paperboard

184

2

1,474

3

12

29

Organic chemicals

263

2

1,418

3

13

87

Vehicles, nonrailway

172

1

1,291

2

14

41

Raw hides, skins, and leather

111

1

876

2

15

28

Inorganic chemicals; organic or
inorganic compounds of precious
metals

39

0

687

1

16

81

Base metals, cermets, and
associated articles

10

0

677

1

17

38

Miscellaneous chemical products

105

1

669

1

18

44

Wood and articles of wood; wood
charcoal

29

0

551

1

19

98

Special classification provisions,
nesoi

148

1

483

1

20

48

Paper and paperboard; articles of
paper pulp, paper or paperboard

142

1

466

1

7,963

68

48,198

87

Subtotal
Total

11,748

55,224
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Table 2.3B Decomposing China’s Top 20 Traded Products with the
United States: U.S. Imports from China ($, millions)
1995
Rank
(2006) HSa Product

2006

Value

% of
total

Value

% of
total

1

85

Electrical machinery and associated
parts

7,886

17

64,906

23

2

84

Machinery and associated parts

3,624

8

62,266

22

3

95

Toys, games, and sports equipment

6,222

14

20,892

7

4

94

Furniture; bedding, cushions, and
lamps

1,979

4

19,358

7

5

64

Footwear

5,824

13

13,890

5

6

62

Articles of apparel and clothing
accessories

3,277

7

11,858

4

7

73

Articles of iron or steel

556

1

8,367

3

8

61

Articles of apparel and clothing
accessories

1,376

3

8,010

3

9

39

Plastics and articles thereof

1,623

4

7,465

3

10

42

Articles of leather

2,536

6

6,835

2

11

87

Vehicles, nonrailway

12

90

Optical/photographic, medical, or
surgical instruments and parts

501

1

5,134

2

1,274

3

4,787

2

13

63

Textile articles

645

1

4,628

2

14

44

Wood and articles of wood; wood
charcoal

225

0

2,997

1

15

83

Miscellaneous articles of base metal

324

1

2,982

1

16

71

Natural or cultured pearls, stones,
precious metals

248

1

2,564

1

17

99

Special import reporting provisions,
nesoi

202

0

2,502

1

18

40

Rubber and articles thereof

138

0

2,472

1

19

29

Organic chemicals

360

1

2,258

1

20

72

Iron and steel

198

0

2,176

1

Subtotal

39,018

86

256,348

89

Total

45,555

287,773

HS = Harmonized system code.
SOURCE: USITC Dataweb. This is an update from a table in Hammer (2006).
a
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assembled goods to the United States. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001)
and Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) show that a significant share of China’s export values reflect content imported from other countries and
reexported after some transformation.
There has been a broad debate on the driving factors behind the rapidly growing U.S.-China trade relationship (Ahearne et al. 2007; Fosler
and Bottelier 2007; Branstetter and Lardy 2006; Dean, Fung, and Wang
2011; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; and Yi 2003). An extensive discussion of that debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead I will
discuss how this rapidly growing economic relationship generated trade
tensions between the two countries, as represented by the United States’
use of international WTO dispute settlement panels and national antidumping (AD) cases, and then present a summary of a novel method for
looking more closely at this trade relationship that better reflects global
supply chains.
The United States, China, and the WTO
As part of an internal U.S. political economy debate and compromise, Congress and the president agreed to changes in U.S. import
safeguard mechanisms such as AD and import surge protections, as the
United States committed to reduced tariffs in the Kennedy Round of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in 1967.
As a result of that round and later GATT and WTO rounds, bilateral
free trade agreements, and nonreciprocal tariff preference agreements,
the U.S. average trade weighted tariff rate dropped significantly from
roughly 12 percent to 5 percent between 1967 and the mid 1970s, and
continued to drop to 1.3 percent for 2007 (Irwin [2005] and author’s
calculations). With the creation of the WTO in 1995, the United States
has also made use of, and been the recipient of, formal dispute panels
to resolve disagreements with its trading partners. These mechanisms
are viewed as integral components of normal U.S. trade relations. In the
next section I summarize data regarding the United States’ use of WTO
dispute panels and national AD cases during this period to illustrate the
fact that trade disputes between the United States and China are not
much different from those between the United States and its other large
trading partners.
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It is important to note some important differences between WTO
dispute panels and the AD mechanism discussed below. World Trade
Organization dispute cases are brought by one or more governments
against another government, and the cases are heard in Geneva, Switzerland, by WTO dispute panels with three members chosen by the
WTO. Antidumping cases in the United States are brought by one or
more U.S. firms, or other nongovernmental interested parties, against
one or more foreign firms. The cases are argued by private parties in
Washington, DC, before two U.S. government agencies—the Department of Commerce to determine whether dumping is occurring, and the
U.S. International Trade Commission to determine whether that dumping injures the U.S. firms. Thus it is inaccurate in the AD context to
refer to U.S. cases against China, as the cases are brought by private
parties before U.S. government panels.
U.S.-China Trade Tensions
The growing bilateral trade deficit between the United States and
China has generated concern among policymakers in both countries.
Numerous sources in China have expressed concern that the U.S. government is making extensive use of WTO dispute panels, that U.S. firms
are making extensive use of AD injury cases, and that the use of these
mechanisms has a negative impact on the two countries’ “harmonious trade relations” (see, for example, China State Council [2005] and
China Daily [2007a,b]). Many U.S. lawmakers and interest groups have
called for the government to make more extensive use of WTO dispute
panels and to make import injury mechanisms, such as AD, easier for
U.S. firms to file, or to prove, and thus help slow the bilateral deficits’
growth.6
Below I briefly review the use of these mechanisms in the United
States vis-á-vis China and its firms and put them in a broader context
for U.S. trade relations. Through 2008 the U.S. government’s use of
WTO cases and private firms’ use of import injury cases (and the U.S.
government’s determinations in those cases) appear to not single out
China or its firms. Instead, the broad data appear to show that China
and its domestic firms were treated similarly to the United States and
its other major trading partners and general political allies, such as its
NAFTA partners and the EU.
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WTO Dispute Settlement Cases
Between 1995, when the WTO was created, and 2008, the United
States was a complainant in 86 dispute settlement consultations (see
Table 2.4). The top five respondent countries are the European Economic Community, Mexico, Korea, Japan, and Canada—countries long
considered U.S. political and economic partners. China ranks sixth, followed by India, Brazil, and Argentina. The pattern that emerges from
this data is that the United States views WTO consultations as part of
its normal trade relationship with its major political and economic partners, and that China and other developing countries with significant
U.S. trade relations are treated similarly. This suggests that from a U.S.
perspective, utilizing the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a natural part of a robust economic relationship.
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, it has ranked second to the EU
in terms of number of panels with the United States as a complainant,
followed by Canada and Mexico (see Table 2.5). This probably reflects
a combination of China’s rapid growth to become a major trading partner for the United States. Recall that China’s share of U.S. imports has
risen dramatically, roughly doubling since its accession to the WTO,
and surpassing the EU as the United States’ second-largest trading partner. If we compare the rankings in Table 2.5 with the import shares in
Table 2.1, the data suggest that from a U.S. perspective our trading
tensions with China appear normal and on par with our main economic
and political allies. While China has expressed that it desires harmonious trade relations with its partners, including the United States, from
the U.S. perspective it would appear that through 2008, at the WTO,
the United States has treated China as it would any other large trading
partner.
Import Injury (AD) Cases
Firms in China remain a major target for AD cases around the world.
According to the Global Trade Protection Report, 2,007 firms in China
were the main target of AD cases between 1995 and 2006, with 540
investigations. Interestingly, U.S. firms ranked fourth being targeted in
172 cases, behind the EU and member states at 502 cases and South
Korean firms with 228 cases.
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Table 2.4 WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations, since WTO
Established with the United States as Complainant, through
2008
Rank
Respondents
Total number of cases
% of total cases
1
EEC
16
18.4
2
Mexico
6
6.9
3
Korea
6
6.9
4
Japan
6
6.9
5
Canada
6
6.9
6
China
5
5.7
7
India
4
4.6
8
Brazil
4
4.6
9
Argentina
4
4.6
10
Philippines
3
3.4
11
Ireland
3
3.4
12
Belgium
3
3.4
13
Australia
3
3.4
14
Turkey
2
2.3
15
Greece
2
2.3
16
France
2
2.3
17
Venezuela
1
1.1
18
United Kingdom
1
1.1
19
Sweden
1
1.1
20
Romania
1
1.1
21
Portugal
1
1.1
22
Pakistan
1
1.1
23
Netherlands
1
1.1
24
Indonesia
1
1.1
25
Egypt
1
1.1
26
Denmark
1
1.1
27
Chile
1
1.1
Totals
86
98.9
SOURCE: WTO. Data generated by Ted Wilson, Office of Economics, USITC. Percentage does not equal 100 due to rounding.
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Table 2.5 WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations, since China’s Accession
with the United States as a Complainant, through 2008
Rank
Number
Percent
1
EEC
6
30.0
2
China
5
25.0
3
Canada
2
10.0
4
Mexico
2
10.0
5
Egypt
1
5.0
6
India
1
5.0
7
Japan
1
5.0
8
Turkey
1
5.0
9
Venezuela
1
5.0
Totals
20
100.0
SOURCE: WTO. Data generated by Ted Wilson, Office of Economics, USITC.

I do not discuss or estimate the economic effects of AD actions,
as that is beyond the scope of this chapter, but for a discussion of the
potential economic impacts of AD actions see Blonigen and Prusa
(2003). Examining U.S. AD data, we can see whether China’s rapid
trade growth with the United States led to a disproportionate number of
AD investigations on firms in China, and/or a disproportionate amount
of China’s trade affected by AD findings. Table 2.6 shows that between
2001 and 2006, firms in China were respondents in 20 percent of all
U.S. AD cases (more than any other country, but roughly in line with
China’s share of total U.S. non-oil imports), and that firms in China
accounted for 31 percent of the affirmative determinations. Thus, while
firms in China were named in new AD filings in proportion to China’s
U.S. import share, they were more likely than firms from other countries to be found causing injury to U.S. firms. For the longer 1980–2006
period, firms in China were a party in only 10.5 percent of the cases, so
the share of cases involving China had definitely risen (see U.S. International Trade Commission [2008]).
The above discussion focuses on the injury determination of the
AD process. The long-run average since 1980 is 37 percent of all AD/
countervailing duty (CVD) cases (42 percent for AD alone) being found
in the affirmative, affecting 0.3 percent of total imports. Thus, China’s
recent experience is not out of line with the long-term findings for all
countries. Also note that the dumping determination is handled by the
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Table 2.6 Number of U.S. Antidumping Cases and Affirmative Findings,
China and Total, 2001–2006
Antidumping cases
Affirmative findings
Year
China
Total
China
Total
2001
9
92
5
40
2002
8
35
6
12
2003
9
35
6
14
2004
9
34
8
20
2005
3
10
2
6
2006
4
8
2
2
Totals for
42
214
29
94
period
Percent
20
31
China
SOURCE: USITC data and author’s calculations.

Department of Commerce, and its long-run average for affirmative
findings of dumping is nearly 90 percent, while the ITC injury determination rate is much lower.
Another way to look at the treatment of firms from China in U.S.
trade is the share of China’s imports to the United States affected by AD
cases. Irwin (2005) finds that rising U.S. AD activity on an aggregate
level is related to the increase in import penetration, among other factors, and that the rise in import penetration is largely associated with
falling U.S. import tariffs.
Figure 2.4 shows U.S. imports from the world plotted against those
affected by new AD/CVD cases. Since 1980, there have been occasional spikes of around 1 percent of the value of imports affected by
new AD/CVD duties; the long-run average, despite rapidly growing
imports, is around 0.16 percent.
In Figure 2.5 we see that China’s historical trade volume subjected
to new U.S. AD duties tracked fairly closely with that of the world.
Since 1980, there have been occasional spikes in activity of nearly 1
percent, thus similar to the world total, however the average over the
period is 0.16 percent, which equals the world total for that period.
Figure 2.6 shows that, as with Irwin’s findings, during the 1989–
2007 period U.S. import tariffs for the world continued to decline, from
3.4 percent to 1.3 percent. Duties on imports from China fell from 8.5
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Figure 2.4 U.S. Imports from the World, and Percentage Affected by
Affirmative AD/CVD Findings
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SOURCE: USITC data and author’s calculations.

percent to 3.1 percent, representing the biggest decline among the countries and regions covered.7 Such a decline in tariff rates and increased
penetration is consistent with historical U.S. experience of rising AD
activity.
U.S. imports from China have grown rapidly since its WTO accession, but in the aggregate firms in China appear to be treated in a quite
similar respect to those in the rest of the world (see Figures 2.4 and
2.5). Between 2000 and 2006, less than 0.19 percent of total imports
from China were subject to new affirmative determinations in the
United States, while the world average was 0.14 percent. Both of these
numbers represent a small fraction of U.S. imports. It is true that in
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the period 1980–1999, imports from China were much less affected
by new AD cases in the United States than the world average. Imports
from China during the pre-WTO accession era (1980–1990) averaged
only 0.11 percent of import value subject to a new affirmative decision,
while imports for the world over the same period averaged 0.18 percent.
Thus, since WTO accession and 2006, China moved more in line with
the average treatment in terms of U.S. imports subject to AD duties.
Thus, in terms of two measures of trade tensions, the numbers of
WTO dispute settlement panels and the share of imports affected by
import injury findings, we see that the United States largely treated
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Figure 2.6 U.S. Average Duty Rates, by Country or Region, 1989–2007
0.09
Rest of world

0.08

NAFTA
Rest of Asia

0.07

Japan
China
EU15

0.06

World
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

SOURCE: USITC and author’s calculations.

China and its firms as it did any other major trading partner, including its main political and economic allies. In the United States, as in
other countries, the number of AD cases brought against firms in China
has been increasing, and the number of cases involving firms in China
found affirmative in the injury phase has risen above the world average.
These data suggest that China’s concerns that U.S. actions in the WTO
and in its national import injury cases indicate that the United States
does not care about harmonious trade relations may be misplaced and
simply reflect a difference in culture and expectations as to how each
side defines harmonious and normal trade relations.
Apart from growing trade tensions, the rise of China as a supplier
to the world is remarkable. The next part of this chapter focuses on a
methodology to better understand how globalization—and the development of global value chains that appear to focus on China—may affect
traditional gross trade values often used to describe bilateral trade relations. These insights, based on the domestic and foreign value embed-
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ded in gross trade data, suggest that the trade relationship between the
United States and China is more complicated than traditional data suggest, and that Japan and other Asian countries export indirectly to the
United States through China.

VALUE ADDED IN ChINESE ExPORTS
Recently, Pascal Lamy, director general of the WTO, suggested that
“. . . by focusing on gross values of exports and imports, traditional trade
statistics also give us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between
countries.” He argues that value-added trade statistics help reveal that
the macroeconomic imbalances present in the current global economy
are not likely to be corrected through focus on bilateral trade deficits
(Lamy 2011).
In the United States there has been great political and press attention paid to the long-term current account deficit, and particularly
the bilateral trade deficit with China. At the U.S. International Trade
Commission, beginning shortly after China’s accession to the WTO in
the early 2000s, we started receiving requests from our governmental
customers regarding the growing trade imbalance with China. We first
gathered data similar to that seen in Figure 2.7, traditional import values
showing rising imports from China, and much of the rest of the world in
value terms. Of course, when the questions first came in we had not yet
experienced the recession of 2008 related to the financial crisis, so the
path of import growth was fairly steadily upward, except for the 2001
recession. We next transformed the data into shares as seen in Figure
2.8, which plainly shows that something important was going on in
Asia, and that much of it was related to Asian supply chain realignment
and a focus on China as a point of final assembly in those chains. However, we had no way of clearly showing these links in the aggregate data
at that time. Groups highly critical of trade referred to data such as that
in Figure 2.7 and generally focused on China for keeping its currency
artificially low in order to increase exports to the United States, among
other countries. Critics argued that since other Asian countries continued to expand exports to the United States, China’s increased exports
were essentially completely offsetting domestic production, not substi-

Figure 2.7 U.S. Imports from Asia, NAFTA, and the World, 1989–2009
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tuting for other Asian exports. Further, trade critics often pointed out
that low prices from China, due to the currency undervaluation, stimulated demand in the United States for Chinese imports, and were then
generating a growing current account deficit. To better address these
kinds of comments we then developed data similar to that presented
in Figure 2.9, which suggest that macro factors, particularly relatively
strong economic growth—exhibited in this figure through a stable, low
unemployment rate through most of the period, and relatively robust
economic growth in the United States compared to other developed
countries, combined with a low savings rate—were the main contributors to growing trade deficits. Despite the various forms of data presented, there was no clear “smoking gun” linking other Asian countries
to Chinese exports. Similar arguments and concerns were expressed
regarding NAFTA trade flows.
Methods for Understanding Domestic and Foreign Value Added
in Trade
These efforts to inform our customers and the need to more fully
understand what was happening in global trade flows led us to delve
fairly deeply into value-added trade issues.8 How would one assess
foreign versus domestic content in a country’s exports? In one of the
literature’s most influential papers, Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001; HIY
in subsequent discussion) propose a method to decompose a country’s
exports into domestic and foreign value-added (FVA) share based on a
country’s input-output (IO) table. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi make a key
assumption that the intensity in the use of imported inputs is the same
between production for exports and production for domestic sales.
However, this assumption is violated in the presence of processing
exports, a prevalent part of China’s export and import markets. Processing exports are characterized by imports for exports with favorable tariff treatment: firms import parts and other intermediate materials
from abroad, with tariff exemptions on the imported inputs and other
tax preferences from local or central governments, and, after processing or assembling, export the finished products. The policy preferences
for processing exports usually lead to a significant difference in the
intensity of imported intermediate inputs in the production of processing exports and that in other demand sources (for domestic final sales
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Figure 2.9 Current Account Deficits, U.S. Unemployment, and the
RMB-$ Exchange Rate
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and normal exports). Since processing exports have accounted for more
than 50 percent of China’s exports every year at least since 1996, we
felt that the HIY formula was likely to lead to a significant underestimation of the share of FVA in its exports. In fact, most economies offer
tariff reductions or exemptions on imported intermediate inputs used in
production for exports. By ignoring processing exports, one is likely to
incorrectly estimate domestic and foreign content in trade, especially
for economies that engage in a massive amount of tariff/tax-favored
processing trade, such as China, Mexico, and Vietnam.
In Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008; KWW in subsequent discussion), we aim to make two contributions to the literature. First, we present a formula for computing shares of foreign and domestic value added
(DVA) in a country’s exports when processing exports are pervasive.
We develop this formula because we believe the production technology
and input sourcing differs for goods produced for domestic consumption and normal exports compared to those produced under export processing regimes. We show that the HIY formula is a special case of this
general formula. Second, we applied our methodology to China using
data for 1997, 2002, and 2007. We estimate that the share of FVA in China’s manufactured exports was about 50 percent in 1997–2002 before
China’s WTO membership—almost twice as high as that implied by the
HIY formula—and has risen to over 60 percent in 2007 after five years
of its WTO membership. Our method and data also allow us to examine
sectoral level results, and we find interesting variations across sectors.
Those sectors that are likely labeled as relatively sophisticated, such as
computers, telecommunications equipment, and electronic devices, had
particularly low domestic content (about 30 percent or less).
The approach in KWW is an accounting exercise and does not thoroughly examine the determinants, driving forces, and consequences
of changes in domestic contents in China’s gross exports. However,
we believe we produced a solid methodology to estimate and account
domestic and FVA in developing countries exports as a necessary first
step toward a better understanding of these issues.
Besides HIY and related papers on vertical specialization, KWW is
also related to the input-output (IO) literature. In particular, Chen et al.
(2008) and Lau et al. (2007) are the first to develop a “noncompetitive”
type IO model for China (i.e., one in which imported and domestically
produced inputs are accounted for separately) and to incorporate pro-

44 Koopman

cessing exports explicitly. However, we believe that these papers do not
describe a systematic way to infer separate IO coefficients for production of processing exports versus those for other final demands. As a
result it is difficult for others to replicate their estimates or apply their
methodologies to other countries. In addition, KWW use an aggregated
version of China’s 1995 and 2002 IO tables, respectively, to perform
their analysis, with 20 some goods-producing industries. We provide a
more up-to-date and more disaggregated assessment of FVA and DVA
in Chinese exports with 83 goods-producing industries. Finally, they
imposed an assumption in estimating the import use matrix from the
competitive type IO table published by China’s National Statistical
Bureau: within each industry, the mix of the imported and domestic
inputs is the same in capital formation, intermediate inputs, and final
consumption. We relaxed this assumption by refining a method proposed in Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) that combines China’s processing imports statistics with the United Nations Broad Economic Categories classification.
The KWW Methodology
In this section we summarize the methodology developed in KWW.
As the reader will see, the method is particularly innovative and generates very useful insights regarding domestic and foreign content of
Chinese trade. This method has also been applied to Mexico’s exports
in De La Cruz et al. (2010), and more recently extended in a substantial
way to examine global trade in value added in Koopman et al. (2010).
In KWW we use very detailed information on China’s trade regimes,
bilateral and at the tariff line, to modify China’s economy-wide IO data
to reflect the substantial technology differences between its processing
sectors and nonprocessing sectors. Our goal was to build on existing literature to split China’s IO table into two parts, processing and nonprocessing, which would more accurately reflect the fact that the processing sector intensively used imported components that did not enter the
domestic economy for other uses in final demand. Table 2.7 provides a
sense of what we are trying to accomplish. We are essentially trying to
estimate the values in the columns of the IO matrix for production for
domestic use and normal exports and production of processing exports.
A mathematical description of the approach follows.

Table 2.7 Input-Output Table with Separate Production Account for Processing Trade
Intermediate use
Production for
Production
domestic use and of processing
Final use
normal exports
exports
(C+I+G+E)
DIM
1,2,…, N
1,2,…, N
1
Domestic
1
Production for domestic
ZDD
ZDP
YD − EP
intermediate use and normal exports (D)
.
inputs
.
.
N
Processing exports (P)
1
0
0
EP
.
.
.
N
Intermediate
1
ZMD
ZMP
YM
inputs from imports
.
.
.
N
Value-added
1
VD
VP
Gross output

X − EP

EP

M

EP
45

SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008).

1

Gross output
or imports
1
X − EP
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We use superscript P and D, respectively, to represent processing exports and domestic sales and normal exports. This expanded IO
model can be formally described by the following system of equations:
P
D
P
− ADP   X − E  Y − E 
=
  P


I   E P
  E


(2.1)

 I − ADD

 0

(2.2)

AMD ( X − E P ) + AMP E P + Y M = M

(2.3)

uADD + uAMD + AvD = u

(2.4)

uADP + uAMP + AvP = u

The analytical solution of the system is
(2.5)

 X − E P   I − ADD
=
 P
 E
  0

− ADP 

I 

−1

Y D − E P 

 P
 E


The generalized Leontief inverse for this expanded model can be computed as follows:
(2.6)

 I − ADD
B=
 0

−1

 B DD
− ADP 
=

 PD
I 
B

B DP   I − ADD
=
B PP  
0

I − ADD
I

ADP 



(I − ADD ) −1 (I − ADD ) −1 ADP 
=

0
I


Substituting Equation (2.6) into Equation (2.5), we have
(2.7)

X − E P = (I − ADD ) −1 (Y D − E P ) + (1− ADD ) −1 ADP E p

Substituting Equation (2.7) into Equation (2.2), the total demand for
imported intermediate inputs is
(2.8)

M − Y M = AMD (I − ADD ) −1 (Y D − E P ) + AMD (1− ADD ) −1 ADP E P + AMP E p
+ AMP E p

It has three components: the first term is total imported content in final
domestic sale and normal exports, and the second and third terms are
indirect and direct imported content in processing exports, respectively.
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We can compute vertical specialization (VS) or foreign content
share in processing and normal exports in each industry separately:
(2.9)

VSS D

T

=

VSS P

T

uAMD (I − ADD ) −1
uAMD (1− ADD ) −1 ADP + uAMP

The total foreign content share in a particular industry is the sum of the
two weighted by the share of processing and nonprocessing exports sp
and u−sp, where both s and u are a 1 by n vector:
(2.10) VSS = (u − s P , s P )

VSS D
VSS P

The foreign content (or FVA) share in a country’s total exports is
(2.11)

TVSS = uAMD (I − ADD ) −1

E − EP
+ (
te

+ u( AMD (1− ADD ) −1 ADP + AMP )

MD

(1−

DD −1

)

DP

+

MP

)

EP
te

where te is a scalar, the country’s total exports. Equation (2.11) is a
generalization of Equation (2.1), the formula to compute industry-level
share of vertical specialization. Equation (2.11) is a generalization of
the formula for country-level share of vertical specialization proposed
by Hummels et al. (2001, p. 80). In particular, either when ADD = ADP
and AMD = AMP , or when EP/te = 0, Equation (2.11) reduces to the HIY
formula for VS.
Similarly, the domestic content share for processing and normal
exports at the industry level can be computed separately:
(2.12)

DVS D
DVS P

T

−

= Av B = ( AvD

(I − ADD ) −1 (I − ADD ) −1 ADP 
A pv ) 

0
I



AD (I − ADD ) −1
= D v DD −1 DP
Av (I − A ) A + AvP

T

The total domestic content share in a particular industry is a weighted
sum of the two:

EP
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(2.13)

P

P

DVS = (u − s , s )

DVS D

DVS P
The domestic content share in a country’s total exports is

E − EP
+(
(2.14) TDVS = A (I − A )
te
D
V

DD −1

+ ( AVD (1− ADD ) −1 ADP + AVP )

D
V

(1−

DD −1

)

DP

+

P
V

)

EP
te

Either when ADD = ADP and AvD = AvP or when EP/te = 0, Equation (2.14)
reduces to the HIY formula. We can easily verify that for both processing and normal exports, the sum of domestic and foreign content shares
is unity.
However, statistical agencies typically only report a traditional IO
matrix, AD, and sometimes AM, but not ADP, ADD, AMP, and AMD separately. Therefore, a method to estimate these matrices, based on available information, had to be developed. In KWW we accomplish this
through a quadratic programming model by combining information
from trade statistics and conventional IO tables. The basic idea of this
model is to use information from the standard IO table to determine
sector-level total imports/exports, and information from trade statistics
to determine the relative proportion of processing and normal exports
within each sector, and thus use up all available data to split the national
economy into processing and nonprocessing blocks, each with its own
IO structure. Using the data from the IO table to determine sector-level
total imports/exports helps to ensure that the balance conditions in the
official IO account are always satisfied, and that the IO table with separate processing and nonprocessing accounts estimated from the model
always sums to the published official table. Such a method is a formalization of the calibration methods widely used in macroeconomics
and CGE modeling when the number of endogenous variables is larger
than the number of equations (see KWW, pp. 9–14, for details of the
method).
Estimation results
Table 2.8 presents the results from KWW for the decomposition of
aggregate FVA and DVA shares in 1997, 2002, and 2007. For compari-

EP
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son, the results from the HIY method that ignores processing trade are
also reported. The estimated aggregate DVA share in China’s merchandise exports was 54 percent in 1997 and 60.6 percent in 2007. For manufacturing products, these estimated shares are slightly lower in levels
but trending upward significantly at 50 percent in 1997 and 59.7 percent
in 2007, respectively. In general, the estimated direct DVA shares are
less than half of the total DVA shares. However, the estimated indirect FVA share was relatively small; most of the foreign content comes
from directly imported foreign inputs, especially in 1997 and 2002. The
indirect FVA increase over time and reach about a quarter of China’s
directly imported foreign inputs in 2007, indicating that the share of
simple processing and assembling of foreign parts is declining, while
more imported intermediates are being used in the production of other
intermediate inputs that are then used in the production process.
Relative to the estimates from the HIY method, our procedure produces estimates of a much higher share of FVA in Chinese gross exports
and with a different trend over time. To be more precise, estimates from
the HIY method show that the foreign content share (total vs. share)
increased steadily from 17.6 percent in 1997 to 28.7 percent in 2007
for all merchandise exports, and from 19.0 percent to 27.1 percent for
manufacturing only during the same period. In contrast, our estimates
Table 2.8 Shares of Domestic and Foreign Value Added in Total
Exports (%)
The HIY method
The KWW method
1997 2002 2007
1997 2002 2007
All merchandise
Total foreign value added
17.6 25.1 28.7
46.0 46.1 39.4
Direct foreign value added
8.9 14.7 13.7
44.4 42.5 31.6
Total domestic value added
82.4 74.9 71.3
54.0 53.9 60.6
Direct domestic value added 29.4 26.0 20.3
22.2 19.7 17.1
Manufacturing goods only
Total foreign value added
19.0 26.4 27.1
50.0 48.7 40.3
Direct foreign value added
9.7 15.6 16.3
48.3 45.1 32.4
Total domestic value added
81.1 73.6 72.9
50.0 51.3 59.7
Direct domestic value added 27.5 24.6 24.6
19.6 18.1 16.5
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008).
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suggest a trend in the opposite direction, with the share of FVA in all
merchandise exports falling from 46 percent in 1997 to 39.4 percent
in 2007, and a similar decline for the share in manufacturing exports,
which fell from 50 percent in 1997 to 40.3 percent in 2007. The decline
occurs mainly during the 2002–2007 period, which corresponds to the
first five years of China’s entry to the WTO. Our estimates indicate that
the HIY method appears to incorrectly estimate both the level and the
trend in domestic versus foreign content in the People’s Republic of
China exports.
What accounts for the difference between our and the HIY
approaches? There are at least three factors that drive the change of
foreign content of the country’s gross exports: 1) the relative proportions of its total imports used as intermediate inputs in producing processing exports and domestic sales and normal exports; 2) the share of
processing exports in its total exports; and 3) the sector composition of
its exports. Because processing exports tend to use substantially more
imported inputs, and processing exports account for a major share of
China’s total exports, the HIY indicator is likely to substantially underestimate the true foreign content in China’s exports. This explains why
the level of domestic content by our measure is much lower than that of
the HIY indicator. On the other hand, as exporting firms (both those producing for normal exports and those for processing exports) gradually
increase their intermediate inputs sourcing from firms within China, or
multinationals move their upstream production to be near their downstream production, the extent of domestic content in exports rises over
time. This is exactly what has happened since China joined the WTO.
However, because exports from industries with relatively lower domestic content often grow faster due to dramatic inflow of foreign direct
investment, the composition of a country’s total exports may play as
an offsetting factor to reduce the share of DVA in the country’s gross
exports and thus slow down the increase of DVA share in a country’s
total exports. As the Chinese government starts to reduce the policy
incentives for both FIEs and processing exports at the end of 2006,
we are observing a trend of increasing domestic contents in Chinese
exports as China continues its industrial upgrading in the years to come.
Our interpretation is confirmed by DVA shares for processing and
normal exports estimated separately (Table 2.9). There is a more than
10 percentage point increase in the total FVA share for domestic sales
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and normal exports between 1997 and 2007, which is consistent with
the trend indicated by the HIY measure. However, in processing exports
we see that more domestic-produced inputs were used, and DVA share
increased from 20.7 percent in 1997 to 37.0 percent in 2007, up more
than 16 percentage points. Because processing exports still constitute
more than 50 percent of China’s total exports in 2007 the weighted
average total DVA share went up over the decade.
There are conflicting forces at work. On the one hand, as domestic input suppliers increase their quality over time, and multinationals
move more and more of their upstream production into China, exporting firms may decide to increase local sourcing of their inputs. On the
other hand, the reductions in the country’s trade barriers also encourage
exporting firms to use more imported inputs. These two opposing forces
partially offset each other. However, on net, the domestic content share
in China’s exports appears to be on the rise. Looking ahead, the share of
imported content in exports could fall or rise, depending on the relative
speed with which domestic input suppliers and multinationals can step
Table 2.9 Domestic and Foreign Value Added: Processing vs. Normal
Exports (% of total exports)
Normal exports
Processing exports
1997 2002 2007
1997 2002 2007
All merchandise
Total foreign value added
5.2 10.4 16.0
79.0 74.6 62.7
Direct foreign value added
2.0
4.2
5.0
78.6 73.0 58.0
Total domestic value added
94.8 89.6 84.0
21.0 25.4 37.3
Direct domestic value added 35.1 31.9 23.4
11.7 10.1 10.9
Manufacturing goods only
Total foreign value added
5.5 11.0 16.4
79.4 75.2 63.0
Direct foreign value added
2.1
4.5
5.2
79.0 73.6 58.3
Total domestic value added
94.5 89.0 83.6
20.7 24.8 37.0
Direct domestic value added 31.5 29.5 22.4
11.7 10.0 10.9
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) and author’s estimates based on China’s
1997, 2002, and 2007 benchmark input-output table published by the Bureau of
National Statistics and Official China trade statistics from China Customs.
NOTE: The HIY method refers to estimates from using the approach in Hummels,
Ishii, and Yi (2001). The KWW method refers to estimates from using the approach
developed in this paper that takes into account special features of processing exports.
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up their quality and variety versus the extent of additional reductions in
the cost of using imported inputs.
Sectoral results
To see if there are interesting patterns at the sector level that help
explain the decline trend of imported contents in China’s total exports,
and further assess whether the increasing DVA share reflects actual
upgrade of Chinese industrial structure, Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report, in
ascending order on domestic content share, the value-added decomposition in China manufacturing exports by industry in 2002 and 2007,
respectively, together with shares of processing and foreign invested
enterprises exports in each sector’s exports as well as the sector’s share
in China’s total merchandise exports. We choose to report the results
from 2002 and 2007 not only because we would like to use the latest IO
table released, but also because these two benchmark tables are consistently classified on most recent Chinese industry classifications, which
simplifies issues involved in overtime comparison. Similar results for
1997 are omitted to save space.
Among the 57 manufacturing industries in Table 2.10, 15 have a
share of DVA in their exports less than 50 percent in 2002, and collectively account for nearly 35 percent of China’s merchandise exports
that year. Many low-DVA industries are likely to be labeled as relatively sophisticated, such as telecommunications equipment, electronic
computer, measuring instruments, and electronic devices. A common
feature of these industries is that processing exports account for over
two-thirds of their exports, and foreign-invested enterprises played an
overwhelming role. In 2007, the number of industries with less than
50 percent domestic contents in their exports declined to 10, but their
exports accounted for more than 32 percent of China’s total merchandise exports, and these low-DVA industries are more concentrated in
high-tech sectors. There are 11 industries in the top 15 low-DVA industries in 2002 that maintained that ranking in 2007.
The next 18 industries in Table 2.11 have their share of DVA in the
range of 51–65 percent; they collectively accounted for 28 percent of
China’s total merchandise exports in 2002. Several labor-intensive sectors are in this group, such as furniture; toys and sports products; and
leather, fur, and down products.
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The remaining 24 industries have relatively high shares of DVA.
However, as a group they produced less than 30 percent of China’s
total merchandise exports in 2002. Apparel, the country’s largest laborintensive exporting industry, which by itself was responsible for 7 percent of the country’s total merchandise exports in 2002, is at the top
of this group with a share of domestic content at 66 percent. The 12
industries at the bottom of Table 2.10 with DVA share more than 75
percent collectively produced only less than 10 percent of China’s total
merchandise exports in 2002.
The weights of high-DVA industries in China’s exports increased
significantly in 2007. The number of industries with a DVA share of
more than 75 percent increased to 25 in 2007 (bottom of Table 2.11),
and their exports constituted more than 30 percent of China’s total
merchandise exports in 2007. Among these high-DVA industries, we
not only see the traditional labor industries such as furniture, textiles,
and apparel still play a significant role (they account for more than
half of these high-DVA-sector exports), but also the increasing role of
heavy and capital-intensive industries such as automobile, industrial
machinery, and rolling steel (they account for nearly one-third of these
high-DVA sector’s exports). The data clearly indicate China’s industrial upgrade is real and FIEs have played a very important role in this
process.
The groundbreaking work by HIY (2001) on vertical specialization
needs to be interpreted with care, particularly in countries that make
extensive use of processing trade. We find that for China the traditional
HIY method substantially overestimated China’s domestic content in
its exports and underestimated foreign content in its exports as in Table
2.9. The HIY method estimates total DVA in Chinese exports ranging
from 82 percent to 71 percent between 1997 and 2007, and that DVA
was declining. The KWW method estimates that Chinese DVA ranged
from 46 percent to 39 percent during this period, much lower than the
HIY method, and that Chinese DVA was rising.
Further, with our method and data we could provide fairly detailed
sectoral estimates of DVA in exports, as in Table 2.10. From this perspective you can observe that in 2002 China’s DVA in telecommunications, shipbuilding, and electronic computers was less than 20 percent
of exported value. Many high-tech or sophisticated exports contained

Value-added decomposition (%)
Nonprocessing
Processing
Weighted sum
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of
%
% of
value
value
value
value
value
value processing of FIE merchandise
IO industry description
added
added
added
added
added
added
exports exports
exports
Telecommunications equipment
12.6
87.5
94.7
5.3
87.5
12.5
91.2
88.4
3.2
Shipbuilding
17.7
82.3
85.3
14.7
82.5
17.5
95.8
21.0
0.6
Electronic computer
16.4
83.6
81.3
18.7
80.7
19.3
99.1
89.7
7.0
Cultural and office equipment
20.3
79.7
80.7
19.3
76.7
23.3
93.4
71.6
4.3
Household electric appliances
11.8
88.2
93.2
6.8
76.2
23.9
79.1
56.9
1.9
Household audiovisual apparatus
17.5
82.5
78.7
21.3
73.0
27.0
90.6
62.3
5.2
Printing, reproduction of recording media
8.9
91.1
80.3
19.7
68.1
31.9
83.0
62.7
0.3
Plastic
15.6
84.4
89.7
10.3
63.4
36.6
64.5
51.2
2.4
Electronic components
15.4
84.6
67.2
32.8
61.9
38.1
89.7
87.5
3.4
Steelmaking
11.0
89.0
87.2
12.8
55.8
44.3
58.8
86.1
0.0
Generators
14.8
85.2
68.1
32.0
55.7
44.3
76.8
55.8
0.9
Other electronic and communication
2.2
97.8
64.0
36.0
54.7
45.3
84.9
84.9
1.8
equipment
Rubber
9.4
90.6
87.8
12.2
51.1
48.9
53.1
44.4
1.6
Nonferrous metal pressing
13.8
86.2
92.5
7.5
50.7
49.3
46.9
48.7
0.4
Measuring instruments
14.2
85.8
67.1
32.9
50.5
49.5
68.6
51.8
1.8
Paper and paper products
9.2
90.8
87.6
12.4
48.9
51.1
50.7
57.0
0.5
Furniture
11.7
88.3
87.5
12.5
47.5
52.5
47.2
56.8
1.7
Articles for culture, education, and sports
12.5
87.5
61.8
38.2
47.3
52.7
70.6
56.3
3.3
activities
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Nonferrous metal smelting
Smelting of ferroalloy
Synthetic materials
Petroleum refining and nuclear fuel
Metal products
Other transport equipment
Other electric machinery and equipment
Special chemical products
Other manufacturing products
Woolen textiles
Paints, printing inks, pigments, and
similar products
Motor vehicles
Glass and its products
Leather, fur, down, and related products
Chemical products for daily use
Wearing apparel
Chemical fiber
Other special industrial equipment
Boilers, engines, and turbines
Other industrial machinery
Iron-smelting
Railroad transport equipment
Wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and straw
products

11.1
16.5
19.5
20.6
9.7
14.0
11.6
17.1
10.8
8.9
16.5

88.9
83.6
80.5
79.4
90.3
86.0
88.4
82.9
89.2
91.1
83.5

89.4
87.1
62.9
94.5
89.8
87.3
59.9
68.6
68.7
91.2
91.7

10.6
13.0
37.1
5.5
10.2
12.7
40.1
31.4
31.3
8.8
8.3

46.4
45.2
44.8
44.3
44.3
44.2
43.9
41.3
41.0
40.0
38.4

53.6
54.8
55.2
55.7
55.7
55.8
56.2
58.7
59.0
60.1
61.6

45.0
40.8
58.3
32.1
43.2
41.2
66.8
46.9
52.2
37.8
29.1

17.4
13.1
65.4
24.9
45.6
50.5
60.1
48.4
37.6
42.6
44.4

0.8
0.2
0.3
0.8
4.4
1.2
5.6
0.8
1.7
0.3
0.4

10.5
13.2
8.1
14.7
8.7
19.8
10.8
14.1
9.9
13.2
16.2
12.2

89.6
86.8
91.9
85.3
91.3
80.2
89.3
85.9
90.1
86.8
83.9
87.8

90.0
83.5
59.7
73.2
65.7
90.8
68.0
86.9
61.4
89.0
85.4
88.7

10.0
16.5
40.4
26.8
34.3
9.2
32.0
13.1
38.6
11.0
14.6
11.3

38.4
36.4
36.1
36.0
34.4
34.3
33.6
33.5
32.4
31.2
29.9
27.2

61.6
63.6
63.9
64.1
65.6
65.7
66.4
66.5
67.6
68.8
70.1
72.8

35.2
33.0
54.3
36.3
45.1
20.5
39.9
26.7
43.7
23.7
19.9
19.6

48.2
48.8
50.3
43.6
39.2
29.2
44.0
28.4
43.7
3.0
5.9
45.6

0.8
0.5
4.5
0.4
7.0
0.0
1.3
0.4
3.5
0.1
0.1
1.0
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IO industry description
Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry,
and fishing machinery
Pesticides
Hemp textiles
Textiles productions
Cotton textiles
Fire-resistant materials
Metalworking machinery
Medicines
Pottery and porcelain
Other non-metallic mineral products
Fertilizers
Basic chemical raw materials
Rolling of steel
Cement, lime, and plaster
Coking
Total merchandise
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Table 2.10 (continued)
Value-added decomposition (%)
Nonprocessing
Processing
Weighted sum
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of
%
% of
value
value
value
value
value
value processing of FIE merchandise
added
added
added
added
added
added
exports exports
exports
9.4
14.3

90.6
85.7

65.3
86.1

34.7
13.9

27.1
27.1

72.9
72.9

31.6
17.8

34.2
20.8

5.8
0.1

23.0
10.5
9.9
8.2
9.5
12.8
9.8
11.8
9.6
15.6
12.9
9.8
9.0
8.6
10.4

77.0
89.5
90.1
91.8
90.5
87.2
90.2
88.2
90.4
84.4
87.1
90.2
91.0
91.4
89.6

88.5
88.3
71.1
64.5
84.6
81.2
75.7
85.3
83.3
90.3
56.3
59.5
79.8
86.8
74.6

11.5
11.7
28.9
35.6
15.4
18.8
24.3
14.8
16.7
9.7
43.7
40.5
20.3
13.2
25.4

27.1
25.7
24.6
24.3
23.8
21.9
20.9
20.2
19.9
18.9
18.0
17.7
14.0
10.6
46.1

72.9
74.3
75.5
75.7
76.2
78.1
79.1
79.8
80.1
81.1
82.0
82.3
86.0
89.4
53.9

6.3
19.5
24.0
28.7
19.1
13.3
16.9
11.4
14.0
4.5
11.7
16.0
7.0
2.6
55.7

14.4
19.5
31.8
28.8
49.8
27.0
28.7
33.1
35.7
21.7
18.8
16.8
77.7
5.3
51.8

0.2
0.3
1.4
3.3
0.1
0.2
0.7
0.7
0.4
0.1
2.0
0.3
0.1
0.3
92.5

SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008). China 2002 and 2007 benchmark IO tables have 84 and 90 goods-producing sectors respectively; they both concord to China’s 4 digit classification of economic activities (GB/T 4754-2002). This concordance enabled us to
aggregate both year’s estimates to 77 consistent goods-producing industries reported in this table.
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less than 40 percent of Chinese domestic content. On the other hand,
many of China’s historical export sectors, such as apparel, textiles and
fabrics, and many steel or metal-related items, had domestic content in
excess of 60 percent. These estimates suggest that studies that examine
extraordinary sophistication of China’s exports, such as that by Rodrik
(2006) and Schott (2008), might need to be interpreted with some care,
as this sophistication may reflect the embodiment of sophisticated
imported components. Further, if the domestic content in exports from
China is low, especially in sectors that would have been considered
sophisticated or high-skilled in the United States, then imports from
the PRC may still generate a large downward pressure on the wage
of the low-skilled Americans after all (as pointed out by Krugman
[2008]). These are important policy questions and have implications
for both developing and developed countries. A good understanding of
the nature and extent of global supply chains could provide important
insights for economists and policymakers.
The work we did on China, similar work for Mexico (De La Cruz
et al. 2010), and a growing literature on value added in trade led us to
develop a method to look at global value added trade, while incorporating the insights we developed for large single country traders making
heavy use of processing. Thus, in Koopman et al. (2010) we develop
an estimation technique designed to tie, at a global level, value-added
estimates to gross trade flows, which is the most commonly available
trade data and is heavily used to support various policy positions. Thus
we use IO techniques to examine global value chain links using gross
exports as a weighting mechanism. In this chapter we fully characterized value-added contributions from direct and indirect sources in a
country’s gross exports, formally generalizing the concept of vertical specialization to account for all sources of value added in gross
exports in a multicountry, multisector framework. It also connects the
vertical trade literature with value-added trade literature, generalizing
concepts such as DVA that returns home in goods and services after
being processed or finished abroad, denoted VS1* by Daudin, Rifflart,
and Schweisguth (2009). This measure can be sizable for some large
advanced economies.
To do this, we first divide gross exports into final demand and intermediates. Within intermediates, we further divide those goods that are
consumed by the direct importer from those goods that are processed

Value-added decomposition (%)
Nonprocessing
Processing
Weighted sum
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of
% of
% of
value
value
value
value
value
value processing FIE merchandise
IO industry description
added
added
added
added
added
added
exports exports
exports
Electronic component
22.5
77.5
76.9
23.1
67.7
32.3
83.1
89.8
4.9
Household audiovisual apparatus
24.1
75.9
70.4
29.6
67.4
32.6
93.4
79.1
2.5
Electronic computer
24.3
75.7
67.1
33.0
66.2
33.9
97.9
93.3
11.3
Cultural and office equipment
25.9
74.1
66.9
33.1
63.5
36.5
91.7
86.4
1.6
Other electronic and communication equip. 32.0
68.0
65.3
34.7
60.3
39.7
84.8
81.6
1.4
Telecommunications equipment
24.8
75.2
64.7
35.3
56.4
43.6
79.3
83.6
5.9
Shipbuilding
16.1
83.9
60.9
39.1
56.2
43.8
89.4
16.5
1.1
Petroleum refining and nuclear fuel
31.3
68.7
79.9
20.1
55.6
44.4
50.1
27.3
0.7
Measuring instruments
20.0
80.0
62.2
37.8
54.2
45.8
81.2
73.3
2.5
Synthetic materials
23.6
76.4
66.1
34.0
52.4
47.7
67.7
66.1
0.6
Household electric appliances
18.0
82.0
64.4
35.6
48.2
51.8
65.1
61.7
2.7
Other electric machinery and equipment
19.7
80.3
66.3
33.7
47.9
52.1
60.5
65.9
4.9
Rubber
18.3
81.8
73.0
27.0
46.7
53.4
51.8
41.9
1.7
Plastic
19.2
80.8
68.9
31.1
44.9
55.1
51.7
54.7
1.7
Articles for culture, education, and sports
17.0
83.0
54.4
45.6
41.7
58.4
66.0
64.9
2.1
activities
Special chemical products
23.3
76.7
66.0
34.0
38.4
61.6
35.3
51.2
0.8
Chemical fiber
23.6
76.4
48.1
51.9
37.4
62.6
56.2
48.7
0.3
Other special industrial equipment
17.5
82.5
57.0
43.0
34.8
65.2
43.8
54.7
2.7
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19.7
22.3
9.6
14.5
15.0
18.4
21.4
13.5
23.5

80.3
77.7
90.4
85.5
85.1
81.6
78.6
86.5
76.5

48.8
45.9
59.6
42.4
60.4
61.3
43.9
52.0
43.2

51.2
54.1
40.4
57.6
39.7
38.7
56.1
48.1
56.8

33.4
31.0
30.8
30.8
29.9
29.4
28.8
27.7
27.5

66.6
69.0
69.2
69.2
70.1
70.6
71.2
72.3
72.6

47.2
37.0
42.5
58.4
32.9
25.6
32.7
36.8
20.1

50.3
12.2
46.0
62.8
49.5
37.8
41.4
41.5
47.3

0.7
0.1
2.4
0.4
4.4
0.5
1.0
1.6
0.3

26.1
19.2
23.8
19.0
19.2
16.0
19.4

73.9
80.8
76.2
81.0
80.8
84.0
80.6

46.5
41.6
43.6
45.1
57.5
52.6
42.3

53.6
58.4
56.4
54.9
42.5
47.4
57.7

27.1
26.7
26.7
26.2
25.1
24.7
24.4

72.9
73.3
73.3
73.8
74.9
75.3
75.6

4.8
33.5
14.6
27.8
15.6
23.7
21.9

19.5
55.5
19.6
46.5
26.4
42.0
32.7

0.1
0.3
0.8
0.9
1.9
2.0
0.1

16.5
24.1
24.3
13.3
13.6
16.7
10.6

83.6
75.9
75.7
86.7
86.4
83.3
89.4

43.8
49.4
46.7
43.9
39.0
41.0
42.2

56.2
50.6
53.3
56.1
61.0
59.0
57.9

24.4
24.4
24.4
23.8
23.5
23.3
23.1

75.6
75.6
75.6
76.2
76.5
76.7
76.9

29.0
1.1
0.4
34.2
39.0
27.2
39.8

49.9
24.3
8.8
56.0
44.4
46.4
46.8

3.4
0.1
0.4
2.0
0.2
0.6
0.2
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Generators
Railroad transport equipment
Leather, fur, down, and related products
Paper and paper products
Metal products
Boilers, engines, and turbines
Nonferrous metal pressing
Other manufacturing products
Paints, printing inks, pigments, and similar
products
Pesticides
Chemical products for daily use
Nonferrous metal smelting
Other transport equipment
Basic chemical raw materials
Motor vehicles
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry,
and fishing machinery
Other industrial machinery
Iron-smelting
Smelting of ferroalloy
Furniture
Printing, reproduction of recording media
Glass and its products
Woolen textiles

IO industry description
Metalworking machinery
Rolling of steel
Fertilizers
Cotton textiles
Wearing apparel
Medicines
Wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and straw
products
Steelmaking
Pottery and porcelain
Textiles productions
Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles
Other non-metallic mineral products
Hemp textiles
Fire-resistant materials
Cement, lime, and plaster
Coking
Total merchandise

Value-added decomposition (%)
Nonprocessing
Processing
Weighted sum
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of
% of
% of
value
value
value
value
value
value processing FIE merchandise
added
added
added
added
added
added
exports exports
exports
18.8
20.0
19.0
12.0
10.5
12.4
15.4

81.2
80.0
81.0
88.0
89.5
87.6
84.6

43.2
47.2
42.7
54.3
46.1
62.5
41.7

56.8
52.9
57.3
45.8
53.9
37.5
58.4

22.7
22.2
22.1
21.1
21.0
19.7
19.6

77.3
77.8
77.9
78.9
79.0
80.3
80.4

16.0
8.3
13.2
21.5
29.7
14.5
16.1

36.4
22.6
9.5
26.1
36.9
32.3
33.1

0.3
3.8
0.3
2.1
4.6
0.8
1.0

19.2
16.6
11.6
11.8
14.0
13.4
13.5
11.0
10.4
16.0

80.8
83.4
88.4
88.2
86.0
86.6
86.6
89.0
89.6
84.0

48.3
41.9
45.1
48.4
43.4
43.2
44.9
47.1

51.7
58.2
54.9
51.6
56.6
56.8
55.1
52.9

62.7

37.3

19.2
18.0
17.6
17.5
17.0
16.1
15.3
11.6
10.4
39.4

80.8
82.0
82.4
82.5
83.0
83.9
84.7
88.4
89.6
60.6

0.2
5.2
18.1
15.6
10.1
9.0
5.8
1.7
0.0
50.1

7.1
29.9
35.1
25.7
25.1
14.7
51.6
29.6
11.4
55.7

0.3
0.5
1.8
5.7
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.3
96.0

SOURCE: Author’s calculations. China 2002 and 2007 benchmark IO tables have 84 and 90 goods-producing sector, respectively; they
both concord to China’s 4 digit classification of economic activities (GB/T 4754-2002). This concordance enables us to aggregate both
years’ estimates to 77 consistent goods-producing industries reported in this table.
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and exported by the direct importer for consumption or further processing in a third country:
(2.15)

Ers = Yrs + Ars X s =
Yrs


Final goods
exported to s

+

A X ss
rs

Intermediates
absorbed in s

+

rs

+

rs

ss

A X
∑



t ≠r ,s

rs

+

st

Processed and exported
to third countries

+

rs

st

+

rs

A X sr
rs

Processed and
exported back to r

where Xst is the output of country s used to produce goods absorbed in
country t. Note that the last three terms sum to the bilateral gross trade
in intermediate goods, and each may include both intermediates and
final products produced in the importing country s.
In Koopman et al. (2010), we transform the above equation to arrive
at our key decomposition equation that states that a country’s gross
exports to the world is the sum of the following five broad terms:
(2.16)

Er* = DVr + FVr
= Vr Brr ∑ Yrs +Vr Brr ∑ Ars X ss +Vr Brr ∑ ∑ Ars X st +Vr Brr ∑ Ars X sr +
s≠r
s≠r t ≠r ,s

 s≠r

 



 s≠r
(1)
(2)
(4)
(3)
+Vr Brr ∑ Ars X sr + FVr
s≠r

 
(5)
(4)

where,
(1) DVA embodied in exports of final goods and services absorbed
by the direct importer,
(2) DVA embodied in exports of intermediate inputs used by the
direct importer to produce its domestically needed products,
(3) DVA embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct
importer to produce goods for third countries (indirect valueadded exports),
(4) DVA embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct
importer to produce goods shipped back to source (reflected
DVA), and
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(5) value added from foreign countries embodied in gross exports
(FVA used in exports).
This decomposition formula is also shown in Figure 2.10, which
integrates the older literature on vertical specialization with the newer
literature on value-added trade, while ensuring that measured value
added from all sources accounts for total gross exports. The vertical specialization literature emphasized that gross exports contain two sources
of value added, domestic and foreign. The second equation above shows
that a country’s DVA could be further broken down into additional components that reveal the destination of a country’s exported value added,
including its own value added that returns home in its imports.9 The
sum of (1), (2), and (3) equals each country’s value-added exports to
the world; the sum of (1), (2), (3), and (4) equals domestic content in a
country’s gross exports, thus nicely connecting the two major concepts
in the vertical specialization and value-added trade literature on the one
hand, and clearly distinguishing them on the other hand.
In addition, all other measures in the literature can be derived from
a combination of the five basic measures. For instance, the sum of (3)
and (4) equals HIY’s VS1 in gross exports; the sum of (1), (2), and (3)
divided by gross exports equals Johnson and Noguera’s (2010) ratio
of value-added exports to gross exports (VAX ratio); and the sum of
(4) and (5) equals the portion of trade that is double counted in official
trade statistics.10
In Table 2.12 we report the global decomposition by country or
regional grouping in our database for 2004 and map it back to the existing measures in the literature. An interesting insight reported in the
table is our estimate of the double or multiple counting (column 9) in
global trade flows as a result of value added moving across multiple
borders. We estimate that the global average is 25.6 percent. One can
observe a number of interesting insights from this global approach. We
can see that some countries, such as Japan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, are important intermediate suppliers, providing indirect value
added through their exports to third countries. Some countries such
as Brazil, Russia, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand export a lot of
value-added intermediates that are consumed by the direct importer.
Another interesting insight is that the EU and the United States have a
much greater share of their DVA exports return home to them embedded in other countries’ exports.
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Figure 2.10 Decomposition of Gross Exports: Concepts

Gross exports
Domestic
value added
(DVA)

Exported in
final goods
(1)

Exported in
intermediates
absorbed by
direct importers
(2)

Direct valueadded exports
(1) + (2)

Foreign
value added
(FVA)

Exported in
intermediates
re-exported to
third countries
(3)

Exported in
intermediates
that return
home
(4)

Other countries’
DVA in
intermediates
(5)

Indirect valueadded exports
(3)

NOTE: (4) is also labeled as VS1* by Daudin et al. (2009). (5) is labeled as VS, and (3)
+ (4) is labeled as VS1 by HIY (2001). (4) and (5) involve value added that crosses
national borders at least twice, and are the sources of multiple counting of value added
in standard trade statistics. The share of domestic content in a country’s exports equals
(1) + (2) + (3) + (4). (1) + (2) is the VAX ratio for each country’s exports to the world
defined by Johnson and Noguera (2010).
SOURCE: Koopman et al. (2010).

This global approach also allows us to provide interesting policyrelevant insights that otherwise might not have been evident. For example, in the USITC’s recent study (2011) we provide insights on U.S.
trade using value-added trade data.11 Although U.S. imports from China
and Mexico are considerable, these countries contribute less value
added to U.S. imports than Europe, Canada, and Japan, the three largest contributors to value added (Table 2.13). Remarkably, U.S. value
added that returns home after receiving further processing elsewhere
ranks fourth, at 8.3 percent. Among all countries, the United States has
the highest share of its own value-added exports returned home in its
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Table 2.12 Decomposition of Gross Exports, 2004
Basic decomposition
DVA in
DVA in
Indirect
direct intermediates DVA
exports
absorbed
exports
Foreign
of final
by direct
to third Retuned value
goods
importer countries DVA
added
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Advanced economies
Australia, New Zealand
Canada
EFTA
EU
Japan
United States
Asian NICs
Hong Kong
Korea
Taiwan
Singapore
Emerging Asia
China normal
China processing
Indonesia
Malaysia

Connection with existing measures

VAX
ratioa
(6)

VS1b
(7)

GVC
participation
(vertical
Domestic Multiple
trade,
contentb counting
OECD)
(8)
(9)
(10)

27.0
23.5
23.0
38.1
38.4
32.5

33.6
36.2
36.3
29.6
18.5
27.6

27.4
10.9
14.7
13.5
28.0
14.6

0.6
1.3
0.8
7.4
2.9
12.4

11.5
28.1
25.2
11.4
12.2
12.9

88.0
70.5
74.0
81.1
84.9
74.6

27.9
12.2
15.5
20.9
30.8
27.0

88.5
71.9
74.8
88.6
87.8
87.1

12.0
29.5
26.0
18.9
15.1
25.4

39.4
40.4
40.8
32.3
43.1
39.9

27.2
29.5
19.2
11.0

25.8
13.5
12.6
13.1

18.9
22.3
26.4
12.2

0.6
0.9
0.8
0.6

27.5
33.9
41.1
63.2

71.9
65.2
58.2
36.3

19.5
23.2
27.1
12.8

72.5
66.1
58.9
36.8

28.1
34.8
41.8
63.7

47.0
57.0
68.2
76.0

44.2
28.8
20.0
16.7

20.3
10.2
28.1
17.7

19.7
4.1
28.4
24.1

1.2
0.3
0.6
0.9

14.6
56.6
22.9
40.5

84.2
43.1
76.5
58.6

20.9
4.4
29.0
25.0

85.4
43.4
77.1
59.5

15.8
56.9
23.5
41.4

35.5
61.0
51.9
65.5

Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam
Rest of East Asia
India
Rest of South Asia
Other emerging
Brazil
EU accession countries
Mexico normal
Mexico processing
Rest of Americas
Russian Federation
South Africa
Rest of the world
World average

17.6
27.9
32.9
35.3
30.2
48.8

11.1
14.0
15.3
26.9
30.8
19.2

29.0
18.1
14.4
16.1
18.6
10.6

0.4
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.1

41.9
39.7
37.0
21.7
20.1
21.3

57.8
60.0
62.6
78.2
79.6
78.6

29.4
18.5
14.8
16.2
18.9
10.7

58.1
60.3
63.0
78.3
79.9
78.7

42.2
40.0
37.4
21.8
20.4
21.4

71.2
58.1
51.8
37.9
39.0
32.0

27.4
28.7
23.5
20.6
23.8
9.5
23.1
15.0
29.2

40.7
29.2
41.1
10.1
40.6
49.1
34.5
45.6
27.7

19.0
10.4
17.4
5.6
20.4
30.5
24.0
22.4
17.5

0.3
1.0
0.6
0.3
0.7
0.7
0.2
2.5
4.0

12.7
30.8
17.3
63.4
14.4
10.2
18.2
14.6
21.5

87.0
68.3
82.1
36.3
84.9
89.1
81.6
83.0
74.4

19.2
11.4
18.1
5.9
21.2
31.2
24.2
24.9
21.5

87.3
69.2
82.7
36.7
85.6
89.8
81.8
85.4
78.5

13.0
31.7
17.9
63.7
15.2
10.9
18.4
17.0
25.6

31.9
42.1
35.3
69.3
35.6
41.4
42.4
39.5
43.0

Data from Johnson and Noguera (2010).
Data from Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001).
NOTE: All columns are expressed as a share of total gross exports. DVA = domestic value added. Country groupings follow IMF regions
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem).
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

a

b
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imports.12 This high share reflects both the large size of the U.S. market
and its tight integration with Canada and Mexico.
The value-added approach more accurately portrays the origin of the
value in U.S. imports than can standard gross import data. For example,
Japan has an 8.7 percent share of total U.S. imports, but accounts for
10.4 percent of the value added in U.S. imports. Japan’s higher share
of value-added imports indicates that a substantial share of its exports
(26 percent) first journey to other countries and undergo additional processing before being exported to the United States. Specifically, Japan
produces a large volume of high-value components that are shipped
to other Asian countries, particularly China, where they are assembled
into consumer goods and then exported (Dean, Lovely, and Mora 2009).
In contrast, China’s share of U.S. value-added imports (7.7 percent) is
less than its share of total U.S. imports (11.1 percent). China is the final
assembler in a number of supply chains in which Japan and other countries in East Asia supply parts. Similarly, exports from many smaller
East Asian countries pass through third countries, such as China, before
entering the United States. Canada and Mexico also have lower shares
of U.S. value-added imports than their total U.S. imports. U.S. imports
from Canada and Mexico contain many U.S.-produced components,
which contribute to the large share of U.S. exported value that returns
home. Obviously understanding the underlying geographic composition of value added in imports can ensure a deeper understanding of a
large number of policy issues, such as FTA negotiations, supply chain
disruptions, and the impact of currency revaluations.
Various countries and regions contribute value to U.S. imports in
different sectors (Table 2.14). Europe is the largest source of value
added for many sectors, particularly business services. U.S.-returned
value added is most significant in motor vehicles and parts (19.1 percent); much of this represents value added returned home from other
NAFTA countries, as the United States is heavily involved in auto supply chains in this region. Europe and Japan also contribute significant
amounts of value added to U.S. imports of motor vehicles and parts.
U.S.-returned value added is also fairly high for apparel (11.0 percent),
since some rules of origin provide for duty-free imports of apparel
made from U.S. yarns and fabrics. East Asia, which has abundant lowcost labor and is well integrated into supply chains with China, contributed the most value added to U.S. imports of apparel (27.8 percent).13

Table 2.13 U.S. Imports and Value-Added Shares in U.S. Imports, 2004, by Source
Total
Share of
Share of
imports
general imports
value-added
Region
($, millions)
(%)
imports (%)
Europe
393,301
24.7
26.1
Canada
242,170
15.2
11.0
Japan
138,417
8.7
10.4
United States
—
0.0
8.3
China
176,879
11.1
7.7
Mexico
154,571
9.7
4.9
Rest of Americasa
76,183
4.8
4.7
Developing East Asia
79,250
5.0
4.5
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong
73,066
4.6
4.3
Korea
51,707
3.3
3.3
Brazil
23,662
1.5
1.6
Australia and New Zealand
15,717
1.0
1.3
Russia
12,003
0.8
1.3
India
17,486
1.1
1.1
South Asia
9,557
0.6
0.5
Rest of world
120,320
7.6
8.5
Total
1,590,124
100.0
100.0
Including South American, Central American, and Caribbean countries other than Mexico and Brazil.
U.S. average, weighted by U.S. imports from all sources.
SOURCE: Commission estimates. Table 3.2 in the USITC study.

Share of value-added passing
through a third country before
entering the United States (%)
17.6
3.2
26.0
100.0
14.8
4.0
13.2
32.4
36.7
31.8
20.3
33.6
46.4
22.0
10.2
23.5
25.8b

a

b
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SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, Table 3.3).
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Table 2.14 Country or Regional Sources of Value Added on U.S. Imports, Selected Sectors, 2004 (%)
Latin
Sector
China
Japan East Asia Canada Mexico America Europe
Total
7.7
10.4
12.0
11.0
4.9
6.3
26.1
U.S 8.3
Selected sectors
returned
Apparel
11.0
11.2
2.4
27.8
2.4
2.0
10.4
11.4
Chemicals, rubber, and plastics
6.3
5.0
9.7
8.7
12.0
2.5
3.6
42.8
Motor vehicles and parts
19.1
2.5
23.0
7.2
16.0
3.8
1.9
23.1
Electronic equipment
8.6
14.4
19.0
29.6
2.4
9.3
1.3
11.4
Machinery and equipment
11.3
10.1
17.2
9.7
6.9
4.7
2.9
32.1
Business services
1.5
1.3
6.2
12.7
8.8
0.2
2.7
55.5

Others
13.2
21.4
9.4
3.4
3.9
5.1
11.3
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Sectoral insights on value-added imports can again inform FTA negotiations, provide insights on supply chain disruptions, and help identify
potential indirect effects of protection measures.
The value-added shares of U.S. absorption (i.e., the use of intermediate inputs plus consumption of final products, or equivalently total
domestic expenditures on goods and services) provide another view of
the sectors and regions where global value chains are important to the
U.S. economy. Absorption can distinguish the relative U.S. and FVA
shares in products consumed in the United States. Overall, the United
States itself generates a large share (89 percent) of the value of final and
intermediate goods that it uses (Table 2.15). This share is on par with
those of Japan (90 percent) and the EU-15 (88 percent), and is higher
than those of most developing countries.14 The many goods and services produced and consumed in the United States and the large portion
of U.S. value returned in imports contribute to the high share.
Although overall U.S. value in absorption is high, the domestic
value share is typically lower for sectors actively involved in global
supply chains. There is substantial foreign content in electronic equipment, apparel, and motor vehicles. For apparel, consistent with value
added in imports, China and East Asia contribute more value to U.S.
absorption than Mexico and Latin America (largely from Central America). Japan, Canada, and Europe are major participants in supply chains
for motor vehicles and parts, and together account for almost one-third
of the value added in U.S. absorption in the sector. Japan, East Asia,
Mexico, and Europe participate in the supply chain for electronic equipment, which is one of the largest in terms of the number of countries
contributing significant value added. Electronics has the highest share
of foreign content: fully two-thirds of the value of all electronics products used by U.S. industry and consumers originates abroad. Hence,
foreign value in some U.S. industries may be substantially higher than
estimates in previous studies based on gross input use or gross trade.
In business services, a category that includes consulting and computer support, the United States provides a large portion (88.5 percent)
of its absorbed value added, while Europe contributes 5.9 percent.
Despite the high profile of India’s consulting and computer services
and the prominence of some large suppliers, India supplied only 0.1
percent of the value added in U.S. absorption of business services in
2004, though this may have risen in recent years.

SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, Table 3.4).
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Table 2.15 Country or Regional Sources of Value Added in U.S. Absorption, Selected Sectors, 2004 (%)
Latin
Sector
U.S.
China
Japan East Asia Canada Mexico America Europe
Total
89.0
0.9
1.3
1.5
1.3
0.6
0.7
3.2
Selected sectors
Apparel
54.3
4.1
0.6
18.3
2.1
1.8
5.7
2.9
Chemicals, rubber, and plastics 69.1
3.1
4.2
4.2
3.4
0.8
1.4
11.9
Motor vehicles and parts
57.3
1.5
11.3
3.4
10.1
4.6
0.6
10.6
Electronic equipment
33.3
9.3
12.7
23.3
1.8
10.9
0.8
7.0
Machinery and equipment
76.1
2.7
4.5
3.1
2.2
1.6
0.7
8.4
Business services
88.5
0.3
1.4
1.1
1.4
0.0
0.5
5.9

Others
1.4
8.6
1.5
0.5
0.8
0.6
0.8
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In addition, the U.S. trade balance is a frequently discussed trade
issue. The United States has had large trade deficits in recent years (e.g.,
$500 billion in 2010), and it has also had substantial bilateral deficits
with major trading partners. The value-added trade work discussed
here, and in the literature more broadly, has demonstrated that many
countries may add value to a particular good or service in a global supply chain, and that attributing the entire export value to the last exporting country can provide a misleading picture of the sources of value in
trade. While the overall trade balance is not affected by value-added
calculations, examinations of bilateral trade balances on a value-added
basis yield different conclusions about the extent to which specific foreign countries contribute to a country’s deficit, and here we will focus
on the U.S. deficit.
The contribution of China to the U.S. trade deficit differs substantially depending on which of the two measures is used. China is often
the final assembler in a large number of global supply chains, and it
uses components from many other countries to produce its exports. In
Figure 2.11 we see that the U.S.-China trade deficit on a value-added
basis is considerably smaller (by about 40 percent in 2004) than on
the commonly reported basis of official gross trade.15 In contrast, Japan
exports parts and components to countries throughout Asia, many of
which are eventually assembled into final products and exported to the
United States. Thus the U.S.-Japan trade balance on a value-added basis
is larger than the comparable gross trade deficit. The U.S. value-added
trade deficits with other major trading partners (Canada, Mexico, and
the EU-15) differ by smaller amounts from their corresponding gross
trade deficits.
There is significant political debate in the United States regarding
efforts to encourage China to appreciate the Renminbi (RMB) faster.
The logic behind this argument is that if the RMB were to unilaterally
appreciate by 30 percent, then Chinese export prices will increase by
30 percent, raising prices in the United States of Chinese products and
reducing U.S. demand for those imported products. Apparently expectations are that U.S. consumers would then buy other, U.S-made products, or production of those products would shift back to the United
States, and/or U.S. consumers would decide to save the money they otherwise would have spent, resulting in an overall decline in U.S. imports.
Furthermore, a number of commentators have suggested that such an
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Figure 2.11 U.S. Bilateral Trade Deficits with Major Trading Partners,
2004
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SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, box 3.4)

appreciation could raise U.S. employment anywhere from 600,000 to
2.3 million additional jobs.16
However, unilateral RMB appreciation will likely raise the costs of
Chinese content, or value added, in its exports. Thus, if Chinese value
added for electronics products is 15 percent of its exports prices, then
a 30 percent appreciation of the RMB could raise the price of Chinese
electronics products by only 4.5 percent, not 30 percent. Of course, historically, exchange rate pass through has typically been much less than
1.0, perhaps because of value-added content related issues, but also
because of competitive pricing decisions by exporters who may absorb
some of the increase. Further, it appears more likely that U.S. consumers would continue to demand similar products, probably imported from
some other international supplier, at a higher price, though perhaps
priced in a different currency. An excellent overview of these issues can
be found in Arnold (2008). Thus, with a more in-depth understanding
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of value-added trade, one can better understand the potential impact on
country-specific export prices based on a currency appreciation.
Another insight gained from value-added trade is correcting a fairly
standard, though potentially misleading, measure of export’s contribution to GDP growth. In Figure 2.12 we see that export growth as a share
of GDP is not necessarily a good indicator of GDP growth, as Mexico,
a country with a relatively high ratio of export to GDP, has had mixed
GDP growth over the period, while countries such as Brazil and India,
with relatively low shares of export to GDP growth, are experiencing
rather robust and extensive economic growth. McKinsey researchers
illustrated that export growth’s contribution to economic growth in
China using traditional GDP growth decomposition methods was very
misleading (Horn, Singer, and Woetzel 2010). Using traditional methods suggests that exports contributed 40–60 percent of China’s economic growth from 1990 to 2008; however, they recalculate China’s
GDP growth for 2002–2007, 2008, and 2009, adopt the KWW (2008)
method, and find that exports contributed 14–27 percent of overall GDP
Figure 2.12 Gross Exports as a Share of GDP, Selected Countries
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growth and that the role of investment and private consumption are substantially more important. Economists generally view sustained economic growth as being driven by investment and consumption growth
on the demand side.
In sum, the fact that we can now generate single country and global
value-added trade databases now allows the insights generated from a
vast array of product-specific value and supply chain case studies to
be translated into more aggregated data tied to traditional measures of
global trade. The ability to combine product level case studies with sector and country level data is a major step forward in our efforts to more
accurately inform policymakers about the impacts and implications of
trade and trade policy.

Notes
The contributions of Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, and Justino De La Cruz are greatly
appreciated; however, any and all remaining errors in this paper are mine. The views
expressed here are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S.
International Trade Commission or any of its commissioners.
1. For a more extensive discussion on these issues see, for example, Fosler and
Bottelier (2007) and Branstetter and Lardy (2006).
2. Ahearne et al. (2007) presents a nice summary.
3. See Hammer (2006) for extensive discussions on driving factors in U.S-China
trade and Yao (2008) for a similar discussion on trade between China and the
world.
4. This section is drawn from U.S. Trade Shifts found at http://www.usitc.gov/
tradeshifts/2007/default.htm (accessed June 27, 2012).
5. This is a very abbreviated summary of the U.S.-China trade relationship. For more
detailed discussions of U.S.-China and China-world trade patterns, see Hammer
(2006) and Yao (2008).
6. See, for example, testimony from C. Fred Bergsten, of the Peterson Institute of
International Economics, before the Hearing on China’s Exchange Rate Policy,
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, September
15, 2012. http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/transcript/9854.html#trumka
(accessed June 27, 2012).
7. China’s trade-weighted tariff rate reflects the relatively high tariffs remaining
on imports of textiles and apparel. In fact, China’s declining average tariff rate
over the period in the table reflects more of the changing composition of China’s
exports increasingly toward products in lower tariff lines as found in HS 84.
8. De La Cruz et al. (2010); Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2010); and Powers et al.
(2010) are among some of the papers generated from this effort. In the following
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9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

discussions on value-added trade in China and for global value added estimates, I
draw heavily from sections of Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) and Koopman et
al. (2010).
Since Equation (16) decomposes all bilateral exports from country s to country r,
it also simultaneously decomposes bilateral imports.
Component (3) should not be included in double counting because when this value
crosses a border the second time, it becomes foreign value in the direct importer’s exports. For this reason, it is not included as double counting to avoid an
overcorrection.
The discussion surrounding Tables 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14 draws heavily on USITC
(2011).
The world average is 4.0 percent. Other economies with high shares include the
EU (7.2 percent) and Japan (3.4 percent) (Koopman et al. 2010).
Major changes have occurred in global supply chains involving textiles and
apparel since 2004, and China’s prominence in U.S. imports has likely increased.
EU-15 refers to the first 15 countries to join the EU. DVA shares for Japan, the
EU-15, and other countries come from Koopman et al. (2010).
Using a slightly different method, a recent study by the WTO and the Institute of
Developing Economies–Japan External Trade Organization (2011) finds that this
discrepancy was about 53 percent in 2005 and 42 percent in 2008. Johnson and
Noguera (2010) have roughly similar results also, though in their estimates the
bilateral U.S. deficit with Mexico reversed to a surplus.
Bergsten (2010) estimates between 600,000 and 1.2 million jobs from a substantial appreciation, Krugman (2010) estimates the effect at 1.4 million jobs, and
Scott (2010) estimates 2.3 million jobs with a return of the bilateral deficit to 2001
levels. It has been difficult to reproduce employment impacts like this using standard USITC general equilibrium models, even when we restrict the model to force
substitution of forgone imports to U.S. production.
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China’s Economy from
an American’s Perspective
Gene H. Chang
University of Toledo

There have been many discussions about China’s economy throughout the United States. Take an example from the Midwest. Years ago,
the popular media focus was on cheap products made in China being
sold in Walmart and Meijer, a regional grocery chain. Later, it was General Motors’ joint venture and Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants in
China. Most recently, the focus has turned toward China’s purchases
of U.S. assets. It is no longer just about China investing in U.S. government bonds—in Toledo, Ohio, local news reports last year told of
Mayor Michael Bell’s sale of some city-owned properties to Chinese
investors. After two trips to China, Bell succeeded in selling two waterfront real estate properties for a total of $5 million, helping balance the
city’s budget. While the deal did cause some controversy, most people
welcomed the injection of money into the city’s strapped budget; in
similar fashions across the country, people are realizing that China’s
economy has become very relevant not just on the national level, but
also on the local level.
This chapter will focus on China’s economy from an American’s
perspective by focusing on China’s economic size, momentum, and
potential, as well as the possible problems and hurdles China will face
in the near future. Although there have been many discussions about
China, there are also many misunderstandings too. As China is playing
an increasingly important role in global affairs in the new century, the
United States needs to be prepared to meet the challenges from China.
A better understanding about China would help to improve policies of
the bilateral relationship, so we can coexist in the new global economic
order.
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Perhaps the word that best describes China and its economy in the
twenty-first century is dynamic. Here the word has multiple meanings:
it means that the Chinese economy is expected to grow quickly and
reshape the world economic map. It also means that China can impact
the world economy in ways that the rest of the world may or may not
appreciate. It also means that China has the potential to experience
political or economic crises that could cause China’s system to collapse
and its economy to stagnate.
The West has complex views on China’s increasing role in the
world. In a 2011 global survey by the Pew Research Center on international opinions of whether China will overtake the United States as the
largest economy, most Europeans think that China has already done so
or soon will. Americans are equally divided between “yes” or “never”
on this question. People in rival countries such as India and Japan are
more doubtful. Yet, by any measure, there has been a significant change
in the global attitude toward China compared to 10 years ago, when
China’s economic size was only a small fraction of that of the United
States. To a large extent, the world is uncomfortable about a superpower that is under an authoritarian regime and ruled by a Communist
Party. Among the same respondents, most (except for those in African
and Muslim countries) consider China becoming the world’s leading
economic power as a bad thing.
In this chapter, I will discuss some seemingly straightforward
subjects that often result in misunderstandings. They include the size
of China’s economy, trade with China, the kinds of challenges China
poses to the United States, and China’s own problems and weaknesses.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ChINA AND ThE UNITED STATES
China and the United States are similar in physical size and climate
zones, but in terms of topography, China is mostly mountainous and the
United States is mostly flat. The resource endowments of both countries are similar, but China’s population is more than four times that of
the United States. The two countries are the largest economies in the
world; however, in per capita terms, China is much poorer. In terms of
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social and economic development levels, China also significantly lags
the United States. Table 3.1 lists the basic statistics of the two countries.
The economic relationship between the United States and China
is crucially important for both countries because they depend on each
other and they are integrated. The United States relies on China for
cheap consumer products and for financing the U.S. debt, while China
relies on the United States for export markets, technology, and foreign direct investment. China is the second-largest trade partner of the
United States, with a total volume of imports and exports of $457 billion in 2010. Aside from multinational companies’ intracompany, crossborder shipments between the United States and Canada, China is the
United States’ largest trading partner.
China’s trade volume with the United States is 2.5 times the trade
volume that the United States had with Japan (Table 3.2). U.S.-China
trade is continuously expanding and shows no obvious signs of slowing down (Figure 3.1). In addition, China is the largest creditor of the
United States, holding $1.12 trillion in U.S. Treasury bills, according to
the U.S. Federal Reserve. However, scholars estimate that China actually holds an additional $700 billion in U.S. dollar denominated public
Table 3.1 China and the United States: Comparing Statistics and World
Rankings
China
Statistics
World ranking
Population
1330 million
1
Area (sq. km.)
9.6 million
4
Climate
Diverse
but mostly
temperate
Topography
Mostly
mountainous
Renewable water
2,829 cu. km.
6
Economic size (GDP) $6 trillion
3
GDP per capita
4,382
94
Life expectancy at
73.5
105 (of 223
birth (years)
entities)
Human development
0.663
89 (out of 169)
index

United States
Statistics
World ranking
305 million
3
9.8 million
3
Diverse but
mostly
temperate
Mostly flat
3,069 cu. km.
$15 trillion
$47,284
78.1
0.902

4
1
9
50 (of 223
entities)
4 (of 169)
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Table 3.2 Top U.S. Trade Partners, 2010
Country
1
Canada
2
China
3
Mexico
4
Japan
5
Germany

Total trade volume ($, billions)
524.7
456.8
393.0
180.9
130.9

SOURCE: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2010/12/balance.html (accessed
June 26, 2012).

and private assets (such as Fannie Mae’s bonds). These U.S. assets held
by China are equivalent to 13 percent of the U.S. GDP. While the United
States and China depend on each other, the two countries have frequent
disagreements and disputes over a number of issues, such as trade, the
environment, human rights, and military presence in the world.
Why has China become a top U.S. trading partner? The classical
explanation is comparative advantage. China and the United States are
very different in factor endowment: China has abundant cheap labor,
with people willing to work for very low wages, while the United States
has abundant capital and technology. China and the United States are
complementary: China exports labor-intensive products, such as toys
and textiles, to the United States, and the United States exports capitalintensive products, such as airplanes and generators, to China. The
comparative advantage theory, however, does not fully explain the scale
of trade. For instance, it cannot explain why Canada has a great scale of
trade with the United States, as Canada has a similar factor endowment
and thus is similar in comparative advantages to the United States. An
alternative theory, called the gravity model, argues that trading volume
is positively related with the country’s economic size but negatively
related with the spatial distance. Canada and Mexico are top trading
partners of the United States because of the short geographical distance.
China, Japan, and Western Europe are top trading partners because of
their large economic sizes. In addition, unlike Canada, Japan, and Western Europe, China’s industrial structure is more complementary with
that of the United States, according to comparative advantages.
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Figure 3.1 U.S. Trade and Trade Deficit with China, 1985–2011
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ThE TRUE SIzE OF ChINA’S ECONOMy
How large is China’s economy? The answer to this question has been
a subject of some debate. Many scholars think that China’s economy is
actually larger than the number published by the Chinese government.
As the Pew (2011) survey reveals, some people think that China has
already overtaken the United States to become the world’s largest economy. However, some scholars suggest that China’s economy is smaller
than the reported statistics. Admittedly, China’s official statistics are not
very reliable, as they can be influenced or even “cooked” for political
reasons. Hence, let us first discuss the size of China’s economy.
Using the official exchange rate and the figures reported by the State
Statistics Bureau of China, China’s GDP in 2010 was $5.7 trillion, ranking second in the world. This is about one-third of the United States’
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Figure 3.2 Size of China’s Economy as Compared with the Largest
World Economies, 2010
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GDP of $14.6 trillion. It is slightly larger than third-ranked Japan’s GDP
of $5.4 trillion (Figure 3.2).
The regional gap between provinces in China is quite large, with
the coastal areas more developed than the inland. For instance, the
economy of Guangdong province, on the south coast, is equivalent to
the GDP of Indonesia, and the economies of Zhejiang and Jiangsu are
equivalent to those of Austria and Switzerland.
However, the official exchange rate often does not reflect the purchasing power of the currency. For instance, a Big Mac costs $3.73 in
the United States but costs 13.20 yuans in China, which converts to
only about $2.00 dollars. (The official exchange rate is 6.3 yuans to 1
dollar.) That means that the Chinese currency is probably undervalued
by the official exchange rate. The United Nations has conducted studies
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Figure 3.3 China’s Economy Measured by Purchasing Power Parity, 2010
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of the purchasing powers of different currencies, taking into account
their domestic prices. Converted by the purchasing power parity (PPP)
rate, the GDP of China in 2010 is $10.l trillion, more than two-thirds
of that of the United States (Figure 3.3), and more than double that of
Japan.
On the other hand, Rawski (2001) argues that the Chinese economy
size is actually overstated and that the local cadres tend to exaggerate
the outputs for political gains. He uses the change in the number of airline passengers as a proxy for economic growth rate of China and sees
this number decline in 1997, yet the GDP reported by the government
grows by 7.8 percent. Therefore, he argues that China’s growth rate
in 1997 may have only been 2–3 percent, or possibly even negative.
Rawski’s argument is widely cited by the news media but refuted by
many scholars.
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Most analysts, however, consider the Chinese data to be roughly
correct, although few would deny that the official statistics are not independent of the Chinese government. The GDP figures in China are not
systematically biased upward for a variety of reasons. First, local officials have more incentive to inflate the GDP growth rates rather than
the absolute size because the GDP growth rate is a better indicator of
the performance of their leadership. An overstated GDP size one year
would adversely affect the growth rate figures for the following year.
Secondly, the central government does not have an incentive to systematically overstate GDP figures. Sometimes it would even prefer a
smaller growth rate in order to show that it is succeeding in controlling an overheating economy and containing inflation. To prevent the
provinces from overstating the growth rates, the central government
has some techniques to independently calculate and check the national
growth rate using its own sampling survey teams from the state statistical bureau. As is often quoted in Western newspapers, the strange
thing about Chinese statistics is that sometimes every province reports
a higher growth rate than the national average. This is exactly due to
inconsistencies between local and national figures when the central
government does its own independent survey and publishes a smaller
growth figure.
Rawski’s (2001) argument was not supported by later updated GDP
figures, either. Each year in January, the State Statistics Bureau publishes
the preliminary GDP figure for the previous year. Later, when more
updated and comprehensive data are available, the national figure is
revised. The GDP figure is often revised upward, which actually refutes
Rawski’s argument. In 2006, the State Statistics Bureau lifted the GDP
growth rate by an average of 0.5 percent a year between 1993 and 2004
to reflect the updated census results, which found that the economy in
2004 was 17 percent larger than previously reported. The only year for
which the State Statistics Bureau did not revise GDP upward was 1998,
when the bureau left it at 7.8 percent, a tacit admission that this figure at
the time was exaggerated. One major reason for the 17 percent underreported GDP was the missing value of some activities in the service
sector. For instance, the business activities of restaurants, small stores,
vendors, and barbers were often unreported or underreported. Many
scholars, who point out that China’s service sector is much smaller than
other comparable countries, believe that even the current output of Chi-
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Figure 3.4 Value Added by the Service Sector as Percentage of GDP in
China, 2007
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na’s service sector remains undervalued. Figure 3.4 shows a regression
result indicating that in 2007, China’s service sector accounted for only
41 percent of GDP, which was 10 percent lower than the average for
other countries at the same development level.
The GDP figure at PPP by the United Nations is probably a more
reliable and comprehensive indicator of the true economic sizes of the
nations in the world. Rawski’s (2001) use of the number of airline passengers as a proxy of true GDP is not convincing, as airline travel is
more a luxury good and thus not representative. If one has to use a commodity production as a proxy of GDP, economists often use the production of electricity. Electricity is used in production and consumption in
almost every sector, so its production is a more representative indicator
of the GDP size than the number of airline passengers. Figure 3.5 shows
the electricity production by country in 2008. The United States ranks
at the top by producing 4,140 billion kwh, and China ranks second at
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Figure 3.5 Electricity Production by Country, 2008
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about two-thirds of the U.S. level. One can see that electricity production is roughly reflecting the GDP in PPP measures. In 2010, China’s
electricity production further grew to 4,140 billion kwh, matching the
U.S. level in 2008. Hence, extrapolating from electricity production,
Chinese GDP statistics seem generally consistent with its true size.
In terms of raw material and manufacturing industries, China is a
dominant player in the world market. It has a great share of the world
production in major raw materials, accounting for 50 percent of the
global steel and cement production (Figure 3.6), which are mainly used
for construction. Ten years ago, China produced about 2 million automobiles, much less than Japan, the United States, Germany, or South
Korea. In 2010, China produced more than 18 million automobiles,
roughly the sum of the total productions for both second-ranked Japan
and third-ranked United States (Figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.6 World Steel Production, 2009
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WhO WILL FEED ChINA?
Another controversial topic about China’s economic capability is
agricultural production. In 1995, Lester Brown wrote Who Will Feed
China?, a book that spawned hundreds of conferences and seminars. He
took a neo-Malthusian view about the prospects of the world food supply as China’s income grows: “To feed its 1.2 billion people, China may
soon have to import so much grain that this action could trigger unprecedented rises in world food (shortage) and prices” (p. 170). Now, nearly
20 years later, this scenario has not happened. China is still capable of
feeding its population, although it imports corn and wheat, mostly as
animal feed.
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Figure 3.7 Automobile Production
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Let us look at the agriculture sector and compare the sector composition and production in China with other countries. Economic theory
indicates that in the preindustrial period, agriculture contributes the
most value added in a country’s GDP. At the middle stage of industrialization, manufacturing and industry add the most value. At the developed stage, the service sector adds the most value in GDP. Table 3.3
illustrates the sector composition and production for China as compared
with other countries. Its service sector is relatively small, adding value
of $2.56 trillion, which is about 22 percent of that of the U.S. service
sector. As previously mentioned, the value added in the service sector in China is undervalued because many small businesses were not
reported. Supposing it is undervalued by 10 percent of GDP as predicted in the regression in Figure 3.4, China’s service sector production
would be $3.15 trillion, or 28 percent of that of the United States. In the
industry sector, the value added is $2.75 trillion, which is 85 percent of
the output of the U.S. industry. While agriculture in China accounts for
less than 10 percent of GDP, it contributes a total of $564 billion, the
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Table 3.3 Nominal GDP Sector Composition, 2010
Industry
Nominal Agriculture
Country
GDP
% $, billions % $, billions
United States 14,658
1.2
176
22.2 3,254
China
5,878
9.6
564
46.8 2,751
Japan
5,459
1.1
60
23.0 1,256
Germany
3,316
0.8
27
27.9
925
India
1,538 16.1
248
28.6
440

Services
% $, billions
76.7 11,243
43.6
2,563
75.9
4,144
71.3
2,364
55.3
850

SOURCE: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_sector_composition
(accessed June 26, 2012).

largest in the world, and 320 percent of that of the United States. Yet,
because of the large population size, China’s agricultural output per
capita ranks lower.
Most scholars dismissed Lester Brown’s argument, although
recently Brown has changed the tone to emphasize the need for a “wakeup call” about the deterioration of the global environment. During the
past two decades, China’s agriculture as well as its food supply continued to grow. Indeed, food production outpaced population growth in the
past three decades (Figure 3.8). So far, the domestic supply and demand
for food is basically balanced.

WILL ChINA OVERTAKE ThE UNITED STATES AS ThE
LARGEST ECONOMy?
Since the beginning of the reform in 1978, China has experienced remarkable growth at an annual rate of around 10 percent for
three decades, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. Figure 3.9
shows the average annual economic growth rate during the period of
1980–2009.
The global ranking of China’s economy also moves upward quickly.
In 2000, China’s economy was still behind most large industrial economies. In the following years, China has passed the U.K., France, Germany, and Japan, one by one, and in 2010, it became the second-largest
economy (Figure 3.10). While it is still smaller than the United States in
terms of GDP, because of China’s faster growth, China now contributes
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Figure 3.8 Food Production Outpaces Population Growth in China
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more to global growth than the United States. Multiplying the GDP size
by the growth rate, in 2010 China contributed $574 billion while the
United States contributed $393 billion.
If this trend continues, China will overtake the United States to
become the largest economy by 2020 (Figure 3.11). We can attribute
this rapid change in China’s ranking to two previous events, but we have
to assume that they continue in the next 10 years: 1) economic growth
continues at around 9–10 percent, and 2) China’s currency appreciates as income increases, due to both the elimination of the existing
misalignment of the undervalued Chinese currency renminbi (RMB)
and the diminishing Balassa-Samuelson effect. Taking into account the
factors for currency appreciation, RMB has the potential to appreciate 5 percent each year for another 10 years. Measuring China’s GDP
by PPP rather than the market exchange rate would also contribute to
this change in ranking. When China’s economy grows, the price level
will gradually approach that of the developed countries; in other words,
the difference between nominal GDP and PPP GDP would diminish.
China’s GDP by PPP is about two-thirds of the U.S. GDP right now.
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Figure 3.9 Average Annual GDP Growth Rate, 1980–2009
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Assuming the U.S. economy grows at a rate of 3–4 percent, and China
grows at 10 percent, one can calculate that China’s PPP GDP would
catch that of the United States by the end of this decade. Of course, if
China’s growth slows down in the coming years, it would take a longer
time to catch up with the United States.
What explains the rapid and sustained economic growth of China
for three decades? Reasons range from Chinese culture to purely timing, and none are uncontroversial. Below, I will focus on some obvious
economic reasons, namely, the high rate of capital formation (investment in fixed capital), supported by the high rate of saving. In terms
of fixed capital investment and saving as percentages of GDP, China is
ranked near the top of the world (Figure 3.12).
China spends 45.6 percent of its GDP on fixed capital formation
(Figure 3.12). The country is enthusiastic in spending on infrastructure,
residential housing, and equipment, and it is never timid about pouring
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Figure 3.10 GDP by Country, 1998–2010
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money into huge projects, which is partially due to the authoritarian
regime that does not need taxpayers to approve the spending. Local
governments are even more zealous about spending because large projects are symbols of their performance; they get credits for building big
projects in their local areas, but they are not actually held accountable
for the cost. The investment funds often come from loans by local stateowned banks. If the loans finally go bad, it is hard to determine exactly
who was responsible for the bad decision. Ultimately, the state picks up
the tab. Kornai (1980) calls this behavior under such a system the “soft
budget constraint.” The true scales of construction and other investment
projects are even larger than the reported figures in the official statistics,
as the local officials tend to underreport their investment to avoid the
discipline from the central government’s macroeconomic contractionary measures. As a result, construction is everywhere in China. A common impression of a foreign visitor to China is that the entire country
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Figure 3.11 Projections for GDP
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looks like a construction site, and construction cranes become the symbol of the national bird.
Ironically, the zealous drive for investment helps the Chinese
economy in special situations. In the economic recession following the
financial crisis of 2008, the love for investment helped the economy to
recover. In 2008, when the financial crisis spread to China, exports and
production dropped, and many factories closed. In Guangdong and its
neighboring provinces, more than 20 million workers lost their jobs.
In December 2008, China’s Politburo convened a meeting, and within
two days, the country announced a US$600 billion equivalent stimulus
package for the following two years. The package included a nationwide high-speed rail system project with a 10-year plan of $300 billion,
and 50 nuclear power projects (one-third of the global total planned) in
addition to the 27 already under construction. Then, the stimulus package of the central government was further amplified by the local governments. One calculation is that the local governments’ spending plans
together added another $2.4 trillion. It was also implemented quickly;
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Figure 3.12 Fixed Capital Investment and Saving as Percentage of
GDP, 2009
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several days after the announcement and before the beginning of 2009,
the money started to distribute through the nationwide banks. Despite
the waste and corruption that was involved in the process, the stimulus
worked. Most of the laid-off workers from closed factories in Guangdong found jobs in railroad construction or other projects. The private
sector also followed the government’s lead, particularly by expanding
residential housing construction and providing supplies to the statesponsored projects (Figure 3.13). Within several months, the economy
started to recover as the Keynesian multiplier predicts. The economy
turned around and growth reached 8.7 percent in 2009. By 2010, the
economy was fully recovered from recession, and inflation became the
main threat instead.
In contrast, the U.S. government had difficulties reaching an agreement on spending. Many believed the U.S. stimulus package was too
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Figure 3.13 New Residential Building Construction, 2010
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little, too conservative, and too late. Since the stimulus was announced,
there has been little money spent on new infrastructure projects or other
fixed capital investments. Thus, the economic recession continues and
high unemployment remains even today.
The money for capital investment comes from public and private
saving in China, which accounts for more than half (52 percent) of the
GDP (Figure 3.12). For each yuan the Chinese made, they spent less
than half in consumption. Why is the savings rate so high in China?
Most scholars would give the following list of explanations, in line with
conventional theories:
• Rapid growth in income. As personal income rises rapidly, old
habits remain, hence consumption increase lags behind income
increase.
• A relatively younger population composition, so the larger working population provides a “demographic dividend.”
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• The influence of the Confucian culture and thrifty habits by the
older generations.
• A lack of social security and high cost of education for the children, so households have to save a lot to take precaution.
There are also some unconventional arguments for the high saving
in China. Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that it was due to the one-child
policy and preference for boys. As a result, illegal abortion of female
fetuses still happens often in rural China, causing a shortage of girls.
This leads to a competitive marriage market and rapidly rising marriage
costs. Parents must save a lot in order to purchase an apartment for their
sons, as it has become a prerequisite for marriage (apartments are very
expensive in China and typically cost US$500,000 in large cities for a
three-bedroom unit).

TRADE AND ThE ChINESE CURRENCy ISSUE
Among all the U.S.-China relationship issues, the trade deficit
with China has produced the most media headlines. China has been
the largest trade deficit source for the United States for years. In 2010,
the United States had a trade deficit of $273 billion with China—the
largest ever recorded. The trade deficit with China is even larger than
the deficits the United States has with the next four ranked countries
(Mexico, Japan, Germany, and Canada) combined (Table 3.4). Further,
the trend of the growing total trade volume and trade deficit with China
is continuing and does not seem likely to reverse in the near future (see
Figure 3.1.)
It should be noted that China’s trade deficit with the United States
is a special case, as China runs much fewer trade surpluses with other
countries. China’s global trade surplus in 2010 is $183 billion, which
means that once the surplus with the United States is excluded, China
is running an aggregate deficit with other countries. In the first quarter
of 2011, China even ran a global trade deficit. In 2010, China overtook
Germany as the world’s largest exporter, but it is still a greater importer
than Germany (China is the second-largest importer behind the United
States). Hence, the global trade surplus of China is smaller than Germany ($183 billion versus $204 billion in 2010).
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Table 3.4 Top Countries with which the U.S. has a Trade Deficit, 2010
($, billions)
1
China
273.0
2
Mexico
66.4
3
Japan
59.8
4
Germany
34.5
5
Canada
28.2
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2010/12/
balance.html (accessed January 3, 2011).

U.S. politicians and news media often blame undervalued currency
for the deficit with China, though most economists would consider a
lower gross saving amount as a more important factor for the U.S. trade
deficit. Germany has an overvalued euro, but it is running a trade surplus with the United States and even a large trade surplus with China.
The Canadian dollar is overvalued against the U.S. dollar, but it ran a
trade surplus with the United States in 2010.
From my calculation (Chang 2011), China’s currency is indeed
undervalued. The Chinese currency is 25 percent undervalued against
the U.S. dollar, but 17 percent undervalued against the global balance
equilibrium value because the U.S. dollar is about 10 percent overvalued against its global balance equilibrium value. China’s trade surplus
with the United States is particularly large, partly because unlike the
Euro zone and Japan, China keeps the RMB relatively stable with the
U.S. dollar, thus reducing the foreign exchange cost in trade between
China and the United States. Hence, American importers particularly
prefer to trade with China due to lower and predictable transaction costs.
Another reason is that China has become the major processing zone
for the U.S. market with the help of many Taiwanese, Japanese, and
U.S. companies. These companies import inputs from other countries,
process in China, and finally export to the United States. This largely
explains why China runs an overall trade deficit with other countries but
runs a huge trade surplus with the United States.
China also has an overwhelming presence in the international monetary market due to its huge foreign exchange reserves and its possession of an increasing amount of U.S. debt. China had $3.1 trillion in
foreign reserves as of June 2011. According to the Fed’s records, China
owns about $1.12 trillion of U.S. government securities. In addition,
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China owns other American dollar assets worth about $800 billion. The
main reason for the recent swelling foreign exchange reserve in China
is not because of the current account surplus, but because of a large
amount of international floating capital flowing into China, speculating
on the rise of yuan, and looking for better returns in emerging economies. The huge foreign reserve is not a blessing but rather a curse for
China as it increases the inflationary pressure. Hence, China is now
accelerating the appreciation of yuan, and at the same time, encouraging its citizens to travel and invest overseas, to reduce the oversupply
of the foreign reserves.

ChINA’S ChALLENGES
China is poised to be a rising power to the United States and the
world in this twenty-first century, yet China itself faces challenges in
the future. China has potential to be a great power, but also the potential to fail and implode. The Communist political authoritarian system,
in particular, is unstable. When the Communist authoritarian system
collapses, the resulting political and economic crisis could dwarf an
economic recession.
China is a huge economy, but with a population of 1.3 billion people, China is still poor; the GDP per capita is low, ranking 94th in the
world. Figure 3.14 shows the comparison between China and the United
States in major indicators that relate to a country’s status and potential.
In the figure, China’s numbers are measured as the percentages of those
of the United States. The indicators include GDP per capita, renewable
water per capita, energy consumption per capita, Environmental Sustainable Index (ESI index), and fertility. China lags substantially behind
the United States in these measures. Given the limited resources per
capita that China possesses, if China continues the current production
pattern at the current growth rate, its resources will be depleted at an
unsustainable rate. Unless China can successfully transform its current
growth pattern, China would hit a resource bottleneck in the near future.
China’s fertility dropped to 1.54 in 2010, and the population will
age quickly in the coming years. This sets up a “demographic time
bomb” for the future. By the year 2050, the dependent ratio would reach
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Figure 3.14 China’s Weakness: China Compared with the United States,
2010 (U.S. = 100)
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80 percent, and the elderly would make up more than 30 percent of the
population. Figure 3.15 shows the projected demographics.
To change its growth pattern from the current labor-intensive economy to one that is more technology intensive, China needs to increase
highly skilled human capital. Yet, the current educational system and
limits on technology do not promote creative thinking, research, and
development, which are crucial for growth. At a time when information
is a key to economic success, the information flow in China is often
censored under the current Communist political system. The Internet
censorship by the filter “Great Wall” often blocks necessary information, from soft science to hard science—an unintended consequence
that impedes economic growth. Scholars and scientists cannot access
information or references that are necessary for research. In addition, China’s education system is corrupted. Under the current system,
rewards and research grants are often allocated based on who has politi-
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Figure 3.15 China’s Demographic Time Bomb
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cal influence or personal connections rather than on merit. As a result,
professors and researchers focus on short-term quick gains rather than
long-term investment and research projects. There is no serious and
effective legal system to protect intellectual property rights; hence,
truly original innovation is discouraged. Currently China’s technology
is much behind that of the United States, but with such an ineffective
or corrupted system as described above, the gap does not seem likely to
close in advanced areas in the near future.
Corruption and inefficiency are rampant in China. Journalist Garnaut describes “corruption in China growing at least as fast as the economy” (Garnaut 2010). Recently, a government audit report showed that
embezzlers stole 187 million yuan, or roughly $28.5 million, from the
Beijing-to-Shanghai portion of the high-speed railway project, resulting in the arrest of Railway Minister Liu Zhijun and his associate Zhang
Shuguang (Beijing Morning Newspaper 2011).

China’s Economy from an American’s Perspective 103
Table 3.5 Income Gap in China
Country
Sweden
Taiwan
United Kingdom
U.S.
China
Brazil

Gini coefficient
0.230
0.330
0.340
0.450
0.469
0.567

SOURCE: Wikipedia.org, originally from U.N. Gini data, 2011.

China’s income gap is widening, frequently causing social and
political conflict and unrest. The Gini index reaches 0.469 for China,
which is higher than most countries in the world (Table 3.5). The Chinese Communist government lacks the legitimacy to rule because it is
not elected by people, and lacks much confidence from the common
people. There is no independent legal system or channel where people
can vent their grievances or trust they will be treated objectively. Hence,
there exists a widespread hatred toward the governments and their officials, causing unrest and protests—there were 220,000 recorded incidents of protest in 2009. Under the current system, China is politically
unstable, and a large-scale protest that topples the government is possible in the future.
Under the Chinese Communist authoritarian system, China lacks
rule of law. The party determines everything, hence impeding not only
creativity and independent thinking but also entrepreneurship. Furthermore, private property is still not protected. An increasing number of
leftist Maoists are now calling for a revolution to expropriate the properties of the newly rich. Hu Jintao has done little to stop the Maoist
leftists, which alarms many private entrepreneurs. As a result, there is
an increasing number of rich or just well-to-do Chinese seeking emigration to the West, and billions of dollars of capital are flying from China
to the United States and other immigration destinations such as Canada
and Australia.
Reformists in the party are concerned about the potentially dangerous situation. In his recent overseas trips, Premier Wen Jiabao called
for political and economic reforms. On the table, he said, is government
transparency, creating an environment where people and the media can
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criticize and supervise the government. However, it is widely reported
that Wen represents only the minority in the party and that the conservatives opposing political reform are dominant.

CONCLUSION
China is a dynamic country, and one should never be surprised when
significant events occur there, good or bad. China is a large economy
with a great momentum, but it is still a poor country in per capita terms
and has many domestic problems. China is dynamic with surprises and
uncertainties. Do not be surprised if in the near future China overtakes
the United States in GDP, makes the most airplanes in the world, or
suffers the fallout of a political uprising that breaks down the system.
In the interest of China, the United States, and the rest of the world, we
hope China can gradually move forward to economic prosperity and
political democracy.
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Winners and Losers in
China’s Economic Reform
Terry Sicular
University of Western Ontario

More than three decades have passed since China began to transform its economy. With this economic transformation has come rapid
growth in both national income (GDP) and household incomes. Widening inequality has also emerged. China’s increasing income inequality
has been documented in numerous studies, including Benjamin et al.
(2008); Ravallion and Chen (2007); Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008);
Wan (2008); and World Bank (2009).
This chapter discusses recent trends in inequality in China, with
a focus on the period from 2002 onward, during which time China’s
government adjusted its economic development strategy to underscore
balanced growth. Prior to 2002, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin,
China’s policies emphasized rapid growth. Growth was indeed rapid,
but by the end of the Jiang era concerns had emerged about sustainability, both politically and environmentally. After Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao assumed leadership in 2002–2003, a new development strategy
was announced that emphasized sustainable and harmonious growth.
The new strategy, referred to as the “Scientific Vision of Development,”
placed emphasis on balanced development and implemented a series of
policies to reduce disparities and protect the economically vulnerable.
Measures adopted included agricultural support policies, social welfare transfers, targeted tax reductions, minimum wage increases, and
increased spending on poverty alleviation.
What happened after the adoption of the new strategy? After 2002
China’s economy continued to grow rapidly; indeed, the size of the
GDP pie roughly doubled by the late 2000s. But what happened to the
distribution of that pie? Did inequality continue to rise, or was it moderated? What happened to poverty levels?
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Economists have long thought that economic development is initially
accompanied by rising inequality, but that eventually forces emerge that
will cause inequality to decline. This “inverted U” relationship between
growth and inequality is called the Kuznets hypothesis, first proposed
by Simon Kuznets (1955). The logic is that initially growth begins in
certain sectors and regions, and the benefits of early growth therefore
go to a small subset of the population, causing inequality to increase.
As development continues, however, under the right conditions, growth
will spread to other sectors and regions. Employment will expand, and
the benefits of growth will be shared more widely. In the long term,
inequality can decline. Rising inequality is therefore not necessarily a
permanent feature of growth in general or in China.
In this chapter I review findings of past studies and present new
evidence on trends in inequality and poverty in China for the period
2002–2007. The new evidence is based on joint research with Li Shi
and Luo Chuliang (Beijing Normal University), and Yue Ximing (Renmin University of China) using nationwide household survey data collected under the China Household Income Project (CHIP). It constitutes
the first systematic evidence on inequality and poverty in China during
the Hu-Wen era.
Overall, we find that as of 2007 China had not yet reached the
Kuznets turning point. The benefits of growth between 2002 and 2007
were not shared equally: richer urban groups benefited more than
poorer, rural groups. Nevertheless, both the poor and the rich saw their
incomes grow, and poverty declined. Thus, some groups have “won”
more than others, but we do not find evidence of many losers.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT
The data used in our analysis come from the four waves of household surveys conducted by CHIP, which collected data for 1988, 1995,
2002, and 2007. These surveys cover urban households (mainly formal urban residents with local urban registration, or hukou) and rural
households. The samples of urban households and rural households
are subsamples of the larger urban and rural household income sur-
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veys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In 2002
and 2007 independent samples of rural-to-urban migrants were added.
When combined with weights, the surveys are nationally representative, but migrants are underrepresented in earlier years of the CHIP
survey. However, migration was fairly modest before the late 1990s, so
the resulting bias is likely not substantial.
We measure income in per capita terms (household income divided
by the number of household members). Income here is disposable
(after tax) income, which includes wage earnings; pension income;
net income from farming and self-employment; income from assets;
in-kind and self-produced income; and transfers and subsidies, minus
taxes. Asset income includes imputed rental income on owner-occupied
housing. Imputed rent is the implicit earning on investment in housing,
parallel to the returns to other assets such as interest earnings on savings
deposits. We follow the literature and calculate imputed rental income
on owner-occupied housing as a rate of return on the market value of
owned housing.

INEqUALITy
Our measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, a commonly used
index of inequality that takes a value between 0 and 1. A Gini of 0
would mean perfect equality—all members of the society have identical, equal income. A Gini of 1 would indicate perfect inequality—one
person has all of the society’s income, and everyone else has no income.
No real society has perfect equality or perfect inequality. The Gini coefficients for actual countries mostly range from 0.20 (very low inequality) to 0.70 (very high inequality).
Figure 4.1 shows income inequality in China measured in each
of the four years of the CHIP survey. For comparability across years,
inequality is measured without including migrants (including migrants
in 2002 and 2007 in fact changes national inequality only slightly).
As reported widely in many studies, inequality rose substantially
between the 1980s and mid-1990s. Factors contributing to rising
inequality at this time included growing regional and provincial income
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Figure 4.1 Income Inequality in China, 1988–2007
0.55
0.497

Gini coefficient

0.50
0.469

0.468

1995

2002

0.45

0.40

0.395

0.35

0.30

1988

2007

SOURCE: CHIP.

differences, a widening gap between urban and rural incomes, income
disparities associated with educational differences, and in rural areas
unequal access to higher-paying off-farm employment.
Between 1995 and 2002, inequality in China remained roughly constant, suggesting that perhaps China had reached the Kuznets turning
point. Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008) provide a detailed analysis of
inequality in these years and identify the emergence of some inequalityreducing factors. Some regions and provinces that had lagged behind
others in the first period began to catch up. Rural off-farm employment
became more widespread, contributing to a decline in rural inequality.
Macroeconomic growth during this period was widely shared. Nevertheless, other disequalizing factors—the urban-rural gap and educationbased income disparities—continued.
From 2002 to 2007 inequality resumed its upward trend. China had
not yet reached the Kuznets turning point. By 2007, in fact, inequality
in China had reached a level that was quite high by international standards. Figure 4.2 shows Gini coefficients for a selection of countries.
In 2007 China’s Gini coefficient of 0.497 approached those of what are
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considered to be high inequality countries such as Mexico and Zambia,
although it was still lower than the extremely high Gini coefficients
found in countries like Brazil and Colombia.
Several factors appear to have contributed to the upward trend in
inequality between 2002 and 2007. Within rural and urban areas, levels
of inequality did not increase substantially; however, the gap between
urban and rural incomes continued to widen. In 2007 urban incomes
per capita on average were 4.1 times rural incomes. This ratio was up
from 3.3 in 2002, which was already high by international standards.
In other countries for which data are available, the ratio of urban to
rural incomes ranges from below 2 in countries like India, Indonesia,
and Malaysia to 2.2–2.3 in the Philippines and Thailand, to over 3 in
countries like Zambia and South Africa. China is at or near the top of
this range.
We have used inequality decomposition by group to calculate the
contribution of the urban-rural income gap to overall inequality. We
Figure 4.2 Inequality: Country Comparisons
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find that in 2002 the urban-rural income gap contributed an already
large 46–47 percent of overall inequality in China. In 2007 the contribution had risen to 51–54 percent.
A second factor contributing to inequality has been household
income from assets and property. During the Maoist era most property
was nationalized or collectivized, and households owned little private
property. In the 1990s major property rights reforms were implemented
that gave households opportunities to own property. These reforms
included the privatization of urban housing, the development of the
urban real estate market, enterprise ownership reforms, and the expansion of stock and financial markets.
In the wake of these and other measures, household income from
assets and property, including imputed rents from owner-occupied
housing, rose to 10 percent of household income in 2002, and further
to 15 percent in 2007. Asset income in China is unequally distributed,
and its contribution to inequality has increased. A decomposition of
income by source reveals that the contribution of income from assets
and property to national inequality increased from 9 percent in 2002 to
20 percent in 2007.
The rise in inequality between 2002 and 2007 implies that some
households benefited more and others less from growth during this
period. Who, then, were the winners and losers? Figure 4.3 shows
growth in household income by decile groups in the population. Each
bar shows the level of income in 2007, measured in constant 2002 dollars. The bottom portion of the bar is the level of income in 2002, and
the top portion of the bar is the change in income between 2002 and
2007, expressed in constant 2002 dollars.
All decile groups, from the poorest 10 percent of the population
at the far left to the richest 10 percent at the far right, enjoyed positive growth in income between the two years. Growth in income of the
poorest decile, however, was much smaller in both percentage and absolute terms than that of the richest decile. Income of the poorest decile
increased by 406 yuan, less than 50 percent of 2002 income. Income of
the richest decile increased by nearly 16,000 yuan, or roughly doubled.
For intermediate deciles, growth in income was correlated closely to
their position in the income distribution.
Figure 4.3 thus shows that all income groups were “winners” during
this period. Yet, some groups benefited more than others. This pattern
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Figure 4.3 Per Capita household Income by Decile, 2002 and 2007
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of income growth across deciles is of course associated with the rising
inequality we have found during this period.

POVERTy: WhAT hAPPENED TO ThE
MOST VULNERABLE?
Changes in poverty levels are an important indicator of the impact
of growth on the distribution of income. Regardless of whether the gap
between poor and rich individuals increases, we care whether welfare
improved for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society.
Poverty can be measured in different ways. Here I present estimates of the poverty head count—the number of people below a poverty line—and the poverty rate—the share of the population below the
poverty line. Studies of poverty in China have used a range of poverty
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lines. The World Bank’s standard poverty line of $1.25 a day (measured
in purchasing power parity prices) is widely used for China and also for
other countries, and we use it in our analysis. Other poverty lines typically yield similar trends in poverty levels over time.
Figure 4.4 shows estimates of poverty through 2002 from Chen and
Ravallion (2008). Both the number of poor and the poverty rate declined
dramatically between the early 1990s and early 2000s. Whereas in 1993
the poverty rate was 40 percent, by 2002 it had fallen to 15 percent. This
dramatic decline in poverty was in part due to economic growth, which
raised many poor above the poverty line, and in part due to a range of
policies aimed at lagging regions and poverty alleviation.
Analysis of poverty using the CHIP data for 2002 and 2007 reveals
that China’s poverty levels continued to decline during the Hu-Wen
period. The CHIP data give slightly lower poverty rates in 2002 than
Figure 4.4 Poverty in China 1993–2002, at $1.25/day
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reported in the Chen and Ravallion (2008) study, but here we are mainly
interested in the trend or change over time. As shown in Figure 4.5,
based on the CHIP data, the poverty rate declined further between 2002
and 2007, from 10 percent to less than 4 percent. Most of this decline is
due to a steep reduction in rural poverty.
China’s success in reducing poverty is outstanding by international
standards. As a consequence of these trends, China has changed from a
high-poverty country to a moderately low-poverty country (Figure 4.6).
Moreover, China’s share of world poverty has declined substantially,
from nearly 40 percent of the world’s poor in 1990 to only 15 percent in
2005 (World Bank 2009).
Figure 4.5 Poverty in China (%), 2002–2007, at $1.25/day
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Figure 4.6 Poverty Rates: Country Comparisons, 2005–2006 ($1.25/day)
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite official rhetoric during the Hu-Wen period emphasizing
shared growth, inequality in China continued to rise during their tenure,
at least through 2007. Factors contributing to the expansion of inequality include further widening of the already large urban-rural income gap
and the emergence of private property, which is distributed unequally.
Inequality in income from property and assets is potentially a hot button
issue, as China’s urban housing reform was not transparent or equitable,
and more generally due to ongoing rent seeking in real estate and enterprise ownership.
China has achieved major progress in poverty reduction. Nevertheless, although fewer people are poor in absolute terms, that is, relative
to an absolute poverty line, relative poverty may be on the rise. If we
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measure poverty in relative terms as the share of the population with
incomes below 50 percent of median income, then we find that poverty
increased from 12 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2007. While this
increase in relative poverty is modest, it indicates that households at
the bottom of the income distribution are falling further behind relative
to those in the middle and top of the distribution. As China’s economy
matures and the number of absolute poor shrinks, relative poverty will
become an increasingly important social indicator.
In summary, we find that China’s economic reforms have had many
winners and few absolute losers. Yet, challenges to China’s harmonious society are ongoing. With development, the target has shifted, and
China’s policies will need to evolve accordingly.
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Changes in the World’s Workshop
The Demographic, Social, and Political
Factors behind China’s Labor Movement
Mary Gallagher
University of Michigan

Labor strikes in southern China in the spring of 2010 awakened
China watchers around the world to the possibility of a new wave of
labor activism in China. The People’s Republic of China has experienced labor strife before. During the reform period alone, the state has
had to deal with autonomous worker organizations during the 1989 student movement; a large but regionally bounded spate of protests against
the state sector restructuring at the turn of the century; and, since 1995,
a steady, inexorable rise in the number of individual workers who sue
their employers each year. In most analyses, however, the Chinese state
is portrayed as adept in reining in challenges to the labor status quo. A
truism is to state that there has yet to be a major labor movement that
spans regional and workplace divisions. Workers may be angry but they
are angry alone, not collectively.
In this chapter, I introduce the general state of labor conditions in
China while highlighting three important contextual changes that have
occurred in the last decade. These contextual changes are important in
understanding the current developments in labor activism and future
potential for greater social instability around the issues of workplace
rights and conditions and employment. The shifts in the demographic,
social, and political context of workers in China have put pressure on
the development model adopted by the Chinese state since the early
1990s, which relies on cheap labor and labor-intensive manufacturing
as key factors in rapid growth. As the foundations for this model diminish, local governments in China are pressured to find new sources of
economic dynamism. If successful, China’s transition away from this
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development model to a more sustainable, consumer-driven economy
will herald China’s arrival on the world stage as the key rising challenger to the United States. There are, however, many roadblocks on
the path to middle- and high-income country status, especially for a
country as large and regionally diverse as China. Labor issues are a key
source of social instability and have been highlighted by high levels in
the leadership as a focal point for policy reform and “stability preservation” policies.

ChINA’S ChANGING DEMOGRAPhIC CONTExT
In the 1990s, it was a surety among economists and foreign investors that China’s rural labor supply was virtually unlimited. Tens of
millions of migrant workers poured into coastal developmental areas
each year looking for the first factory jobs and opportunities to earn
money, gain experience, and better the life chances of their kids, if not
themselves. In 2003, to the surprise of many, there were reports in the
Chinese media of a “migrant labor shortage” (民工荒) in development
zones in China’s south. Although this shortage ebbed during the global
financial crisis and China’s export crisis of 2008–2009, these shortages
began to reappear soon after. Economists also noted that migrant wages,
after a long period of relative stagnation, were growing quickly.
As Yang (2011a), Cai (2008), and Cai and Wang (2011) have noted,
China’s demographic changes since the 1980s have been particularly
beneficial in fueling rapid export growth and industrialization. This
“double demographic dividend” is the result of two different phenomena:
rural-urban migration and an increase in the ratio of the working
population to the dependent population. Both of these phenomena are
reaching critical turning points, leading to greater challenges in export
growth and low-cost, labor-intensive industrialization. Wages are going
up, workers are choosier about employment opportunities, and labor
markets are tightening in these key sectors (Cai 2008).
Rural to urban migration in reformed China began in the late 1980s
as the government relaxed its strict control over internal migration and
residency status through the hukou system. Hukou is the shorthand
term for the broader household registration system, which permits
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administrative control over China’s population. This system, which
was established by the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s, has
connections to earlier forms of population control and registration in
the Republican and Imperial periods, but the Chinese Communist Party
went much further in administrative control over internal migration, in
particular after the Great Leap Forward, 1958–1961, when very severe
restrictions on rural to urban migration were put into effect. The hukou
policy’s constraints on migration meant that disparities between rural
and urban citizens became entrenched and long lasting. Rural citizens
were mostly shut out of employment opportunities in cities. Education
became the one sure path out of rural life. (For a general discussion of
hukou policies and history, see Chan and Buckingham [2008]; Chan
and Zhang [1999]; and Wang [2005].)
The relaxation of migration policies that began in the 1980s and
quickened in the 1990s restarted the process of rural to urban migration,
which is the normal development path for industrializing countries.
Rural migration has increased rapidly since then as many young and
middle-aged rural residents have left their legal residency in the rural
areas to find employment in factories, services, or construction in coastal
cities and development zones. The most recent 2010 census estimates
that there are now nearly 200 million rural migrants in China. However,
many rural citizens still find it difficult to become legal residents of the
urban areas where they live and work. This is especially the case for
those with low education.
China’s growth trajectory has been heavily reliant on this migrant
workforce, and its ability to access this rural surplus labor sets China
apart from other reforming socialist or postsocialist countries. The large
amount of surplus labor in agriculture suppressed the wages of migrant
workers continuously during the 1990s and into this century (Yang
2011b). Migrant workers have also been willing to work in exploitative
conditions, including very long hours, unsafe environments, and
insecure employment. Compared to the urban workers employed in
the collective and state sectors, these workers were pliable, with low
expectations about pay, conditions, and the terms of employment.
Access to this labor pool significantly enhanced China’s ability to adopt
export-oriented industrialization, following in the steps of its capitalist
East Asian neighbors.
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This period of rapid industrialization was also aided by the
changing structure of the Chinese population as the one-child policy
kicked in gradually in the 1970s. Birth rates declined while death rates
also declined as people lived longer. There was an important period
for growth when the ratio of the working population grew relative to
the dependent population. Younger dependents declined faster than
the retired population grew (Wang 2011). This period ended in 2010,
when China’s working population began to decline. Yang (2011a)
calls this China’s “condensed demographic transition.” Compared to
other populous developing nations, China’s demographic changes are
happening faster due to the effects of the one-child policy.
There is considerable debate within and outside China about the
nature of the current migrant labor shortage. Some question how it can
exist permanently when there are still millions of potential migrants
in rural areas (Knight, Deng, and Li 2010). Others note that this labor
shortage coexists with equally dramatic reports of unemployment and
underemployment of college graduates. I deal with the first issue in the
next section. The second issue, on the coexistence of labor shortage and
surplus, should be dealt with here.
China’s labor markets are highly segmented with continuing
institutional barriers to labor mobility across regions and across sectors.
The hukou system is still fundamental in placing barriers between the
labor markets of urban and rural citizens. There are also important
social and cultural expectations about employment that further segment
labor markets. Unemployed college graduates and unemployed rural
migrants rarely compete in the same labor markets. There are some jobs
that urban youth simply do not consider. Conversely, few employers
in labor-intensive manufacturing would want to hire urban youth, who
might not work hard enough or be able to withstand the harsh conditions.
The very rapid expansion of the college educated since 2000 means that
the requisite jobs for the college elite have not grown as quickly as
that elite. Meanwhile, labor intensive manufacturing has grown very
rapidly as China gained membership into the World Trade Organization
and began to attract investment from other Asian countries that used
to export directly to the United States and other developed markets.
Barriers to labor mobility and segmentation based on hukou status and
education level continue to exist in China. These factors help explain
how labor shortages and labor surplus can coexist.
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ThE ChANGING SOCIAL CONTExT OF ThE
“NEW GENERATION” OF MIGRANTS
The one-child policy and the changes to China’s internal migration
policies have also had transformative effects on the social and cultural
characteristics of China’s youngest migrants, sometimes called the “new
generation of migrants” ( 新生代农民工) to mark their differences from
the earlier generation of migrant workers who left rural China in search
of better opportunities after relaxation of the hukou system (Qiao and
Chen 2010). These differences can be related to their status as part of
the first “only child” generation, their better educational opportunities
under reform, and their greater exposure to global youth culture through
technological expertise and access to more sophisticated communication
methods.
Migrant workers born in and after the 1980s are part of a reform
generation that is markedly different in basic characteristics, in political
socialization, and in life experiences from that of their parents. In terms
of basic demography, this generation is the first to be affected by the
strict “one-child” policy that was implemented in the late 1970s. While
in their parents’ generation a family might have several children, even
rural children in this generation generally share at most one sibling.
In urban areas, the majority of children born are only children. Given
their greater importance to the family’s economy and long-term
success, these “little emperors” have been lavished with attention and
opportunity. Even rural children, who do not have the same educational
and economic opportunities of their urban counterparts, have been given
more attention and more protection from hard agricultural labor than
in previous generations. Many rural parents understand that education
is still the key to social mobility for their children. This focus on
education has spared children backbreaking manual labor and allowed
them to focus on their studies. Although rural children do not attain
the same level of education as urban children, they now have much
higher rates of middle school and high school completion. Even when
they move on to labor intensive manufacturing as part of their “going
out” strategy, they are already better educated and better prepared to
make the transition to urban life. These educational characteristics also
indicate the inexperience of post-1980 rural children with agricultural
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work. An All China Federation of Trade Unions study found that 89
percent of migrant workers in southern China did not intend to ever
do agricultural work, and less than 45 percent had ever done it before
leaving home (Qiao and Chen 2010).
The post-1980s generation, both rural and urban, is also markedly
different from their parents in terms of political socialization and life
experiences under socialism. As children of the reform era, they have
little familiarity with the mass political campaigns of the high Mao era.
Their primary years of education and political socialization coincided
with post-Tiananmen China, when economic growth was the major
goal and the Chinese Communist Party emphasized a party open to
all sectors of society, including entrepreneurs. The private sector was
allowed to expand, and the “rule by law” campaign was disseminated in
the media, encouraging people to protect their legal rights. The rural-tourban migration boom is also linked to this time period as China opened
further to foreign direct investment and labor-intensive manufacturing
development zones multiplied across the coastal provinces.
These different demographic characteristics and life experiences
have helped create a new generation of migrants who are challenging
traditional barriers and identities that have existed in China since the
Maoist hukou policy was put into place in the late 1950s. Three main
characteristics of this new generation are worth examining here: 1)
their frame of reference, 2) their long-term expectations, and 3) their
potential capacity to organize their interests and grievances collectively.
As surveys and interviews with young migrants show, young rural
migrants are increasingly better integrated and familiar with global
youth culture and Chinese urban culture. Their frame of reference is
increasingly not what would have happened to them if they had stayed
in the countryside, but what is possible for them as young, aspiring
urban citizens. This change in their reference point (who they want to
become) is, of course, related to their long-term plans and expectations.
Rural migrants to Chinese cities generally do not envision a return to the
countryside, but rather they hope for a gradual personal transformation
from a low status to higher status. These aspirations translate into higher
expectations on the job and some tendency to value work that offers
future opportunity even at the expense of current lower pay. Many
migrants also report distaste of jobs that are too lowly, dirty, dangerous,
or boring. So, in addition to planning a gradual transition to urban
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life, migrants also envision a certain degree of social and economic
mobility. These expectations shape their workplace choices and, over
time, they have become more selective about their place of employment
when possible.
Given this generation’s higher levels of education, better access to
technology, and increased integration into urban culture, there seems to
be greater potential for this generation to articulate collective interests
and to act collectively to press for their interests and rights, vis-à-vis
employers and the government alike. Chinese urban workers have
acted collectively in the past, often organized by work unit, to protest
about state-owned enterprise restructuring. Rural migrants have also
used native-place affiliations and familial bonds to organize, but
these modes of organization have not served them well at their urban
workplaces where divisions between workers of different origins,
dialects, and local cultures can be used by employers to fragment
workers’ collective identity. In the strikes of 2010, observers pointed
to workers’ new ability to organize within single workplaces and to
design institutions to allow for leadership selection and representation.
A collective identity is also being formed in the media and even
in academia with the term new generation and the public attention to
migrant conditions and social discrimination. This external validation
of a collective identity is also a factor in the increased potential for
young migrants’ collective power. These social changes are not divorced
from the changing political context. Since 2003, the party state has been
much more attentive to and worried about the conditions and long-term
development of China’s urbanizing citizens. This is the final context to
which we now turn.

ThE ChANGING POLITICAL CONTExT
In 2003, the rising number of labor disputes, large-scale and
destabilizing migrant workers’ wage arrears problem, and the media
uproar over Sun Zhigang (a rural college graduate beaten to death in
police custody in Guangzhou) redirected the state to focus on migrant
labor issues. There were also a number of positive reasons for the
state’s decision to begin to protect migrant workers’ rights. First, labor
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unrest that had followed the state-owned enterprise restructuring of
1999–2001 had begun to abate, and the state was feeling more confident
about its ability to manage labor unrest through a combination of legal
institutions and party-led direct intervention in labor-capital relations.
Second, as Chinese growth boomed in the first decade of this century, the
central government began to plan a gradual industrial upgrading for the
coastal provinces and a move away from dependence on labor-intensive
manufacturing. Raising wages, expanding protections, and enhancing
employment security were all hoped-for policy consequences, but the
government also aspired to draw new manufacturing investment into the
central and western provinces, and to alleviate some of the imbalances
and regional inequality that had developed alongside rapid growth and
reform.
It should also be noted that in addition to these positive or forwardthinking aspects of the policy shift, the party state was and continues
to be intently interested in preserving political stability. Positive
developments such as increased employment security, new policies for
collective wage bargaining, and enhanced position of the trade union
are all part of an attempt to limit the development of an independent
labor movement that might, in concert with other social forces, pressure
the Chinese Communist Party to share power. When enhanced labor
rights (or effective implementation of rights already on the books) clash
with the imperative of the party’s monopoly on political power, labor
rights have been trumped.

ThE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA: ThE LABOR
CONTRACT LAW
The Labor Contract Law, which was passed in 2007 and went
into effect in 2008, is the paradigmatic example of China’s socialist
party state regaining its interest in enhanced workers’ rights and better
employment security. The period of reform from the 1980s through the
beginning of the current century marked a gradual but relentless assault
on the entitlements and privileges of the urban socialist workforce.
Laws, regulations, and special reform measures, such as state enterprise
restructuring, were constructed to chip away at the “iron rice bowl” of

Changes in the World’s Workshop 127

employment security and extensive social benefits. The Labor Contract
Law, through a supplementary law to the more market-friendly 1994
Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China, signals a shift from everincreasing labor market flexibility, informalization, and insecure work
(Gallagher and Dong 2011).
In contrast to the basic principles of the Labor Law, the Labor Contract Law has enhanced employment security through more stringent
restrictions on (usually short) fixed-term contracts as the foundation of
industrial relations in China. It also is more specific in some of the
penalties for violations, and it grants the trade union more detailed
provisions for collective negotiations. Although most media and academic attention has been on this law, there have been other legislative advances, including the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration
Law (2008), the Employment Promotion Law (2007), and the Social
Insurance Law (2010). In addition to national level legislation, many
localities have responded to the center’s push with local legislation and
regulations of their own. Because the Labor Contract Law’s first year
of implementation coincided with the Global Financial Crisis of 2008,
however, some localities have attempted to use local implementation
to reduce the impact of the Labor Contract Law on enterprises’ operational autonomy and the locality’s ability to attract external investment
(Harper Ho 2009).

ThE JUDICIAL AGENDA: MEDIATION ABOVE ALL
The untimely confluence of a new, well-publicized, more protective law; a global economic crisis of unforeseen proportion; and longerterm trends in rising wages and choosier workers led to an explosion of
labor disputes in 2008, with these high rates sustained into more recent
years. The central government, while committed to the new protections
offered by the Labor Contract Law and other related laws, responded
to this new spike in disputes with renewed emphasis on mediation
and a sustained critique of and departure from adversarial resolution
processes, especially litigation. This renewed interest in mediation is
part of a broader agenda promoting the construction of a “harmonious
society” under the aegis of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a clear
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promotion of alternative models of political and social representation,
away from democracy, pluralism, and freedom of association. While
recognizing the need to promote the protection of workers’ rights, the
party state has no intention of allowing such protection to flow into
other areas of political reform.
Mediation of labor disputes has long been enshrined as one method
of dispute resolution. In the 1994 Labor Law, mediation is a voluntary
first step in the resolution process. In those days, it was expected that
mediation would occur within the enterprise and that the enterprise
trade union would play a critical middleman role in bringing the two
sides to an accepted compromise. With the reform of the state and
collective sectors in the 1990s and the expansion of the private and
foreign sectors, enterprise mediation declined quite dramatically as
workers chose to resolve disputes at higher levels of administration and
enterprises no longer maintained internal institutions that could serve in
a mediating capacity.
The recent revival of mediation has had to go beyond the enterprise,
relying on government and party structures at the grassroots level to
ensure harmonious resolution of labor disputes. This has led to some
significant pressure on the institutions that manage arbitration and litigation (the labor bureaus and the courts, respectively) to provide ample
opportunities and incentives for mediated outcomes. Arbitrators and
judges are encouraged through the evaluation systems to reach high
levels of mediated settlements. When large collective disputes break
out spontaneously at the workplace, the government sends out “stability preservation teams” that use intergovernment and party coordination
to pressure workers and employers alike for a mediated outcome (He
and Su 2010). While legal experts have decried this trend as part of a
larger shift away from “rule by law” (Minzner 2011), the party’s return
to mediation is not surprising given the historical importance of mediation to resolve “contradictions within the people”—an idea important to
Maoist thought (Lubman 1999). It is also a necessary adjustment to the
very rapid growth in disputes wrought by the combination of economic
changes and a rapidly developing legal system that gives workers
impressive rights on paper. As more empowered workers make claims
in the courts and in arbitration committees, the state has responded by
pushing mediation. The continued reliance on mediation and the state’s
ambivalence toward some of the consequences of its earlier decision to
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develop the legal system (more social conflict, more overtly adversarial
modes of resolution) are indicative of the contradictions embedded in
the Chinese system.
Reliance on mediation requires that the local government play a
central role in the resolution of social disputes. It is intended to serve
as a substitute for a more pluralistic opening toward effective collective
representation of labor and capital. Instead of empowering the actors
directly involved in disputes, the state has chosen to implicate itself
directly into the resolution process. By doing so, the state can carefully push for better protection of workers’ interests while ensuring that
worker demands do not grow too strong and threaten the local economy, or morph into political demands that might challenge the Chinese
Communist Party’s hold on power.

ThE INSTITUTIONAL AGENDA: COLLECTIVE
WAGE BARGAINING AND MANAGED INDUSTRIAL
TRANSFORMATION
The Chinese state’s laser focus on “preserving social stability”
(维稳) is always to maintain the political status quo, which allows
the Chinese economy to continue to grow and the Chinese state to
grow wealthier and more powerful. It builds up extremely important
domestic and international legitimacy. But the Chinese state is nothing
if not extremely ambitious. China’s leaders realize that maintaining the
status quo is not enough; stability is the prerequisite for other plans.
In this context of needing to maintain economic growth, but also
to fix long-term problems, such as rising inequality and economic
imbalances, the Chinese state envisions a gradual process of industrial
transformation from labor-intensive manufacturing to high-tech,
capital-intensive manufacturing and research and development. China’s
role as the workshop of the world is a stepping-stone to something more
valuable—as the laboratory of the world, as the R&D center of the world.
At the same time, the movement of labor-intensive manufacturing from
the coastal development zones of Guangdong and Jiangsu to internal
provinces such as Henan, Sichuan, and Jiangxi will begin to alleviate
China’s dramatic regional inequality. It will also make the urbanization
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of China’s rural workers more tractable. Instead of leaving home to
seek out urban areas for employment and opportunity, China’s rural
citizens will have the jobs come to them. China’s new urban citizens
will live in newly created cities as farms become suburbs and suburbs
become metropolitan centers in their own right.
One challenge revealed by the 2010 automotive strikes that has not
been solved by the heavy-handed push for mediation and the new legal
protections is the lack of institutional capacity for labor-capital bargaining around interest conflicts. The vast majority of the nearly 700,000
labor disputes in 2009 are “rights disputes,” when there is a conflict
about the violation of the labor laws themselves. However, Chinese
workers and employers have many disagreements and conflicts about
their interests, such as wage increases, working conditions, quality of
the cafeteria food, or the transportation from workplace to home. Many
of the striking automotive workers in 2010, for example, were motivated by a desire for wage increases that reduced the wage inequality
between Japanese and Chinese workers employed by the same company and between Chinese workers in different plants owned by the
same company. Because in most cases their wages already exceeded the
minimum wage standards for their locality, they had wage demands that
could not be settled through the current process of labor dispute resolution, which can only handle disputes over rights.
Since the 2010 strikes, the government has revived the idea that
China needs a system of collective bargaining and negotiation that
would allow for regular and systematic discussion about wages between
the government, employers, and workers. Such a system, it is believed,
would not only reduce the likelihood of spontaneous workplace actions,
but would also contribute to China’s desire for industrial transformation.
Rising wages will gradually push some employers off the coast toward
China’s central and western provinces, where incomes and expectations
are much lower. The coastal provinces, with higher levels of education,
a developed transportation infrastructure, and well-established ties to
global production networks, will lead China in its next reformist effort,
toward a knowledge economy. Like most development paradigms, this
is a utopian vision, the realization of which is not assured. But it puts
into better context the underlying reasons for the government’s support
for more protective labor laws and the painstaking balance it strives
to maintain between gains for labor (improved working conditions
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and enhanced representation) and social stability, continued economic
growth, and political dictatorship.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to place China’s recent labor activism
into the broader context of China’s development trajectory. As noted in
the three areas discussed above—demography, society, and politics—
recent trends of increased labor activism cannot be explained by any
one dimension, but rather by the confluence of factors that are currently
in alignment. This alignment has widened the political space available
to workers in pushing for new demands. Tighter labor markets have
focused the minds of employers who had grown used to low expectations
and a labor surplus. Political leaders at the top have realized that in
order to rectify the dramatic growth in inequality since the 1980s,
China’s coastal provinces must yield investment to cheaper places
inland. China’s political system, however, has not changed, and there is
no sign of any opening for freedom of association, independent unions,
or a truly worker-led labor movement. The Chinese Communist Party
hopes that it will satisfy the needs and demands of the new generation
of workers, and in doing so make a workers’ movement against the
party itself unnecessary.
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Over the last 25 years, average incomes have risen considerably as
China’s economy has undergone unprecedented growth and dramatic
reductions in poverty. Not all regions of the country have benefited uniformly (Benjamin et al. 2008; Ravallion and Chen 2007) as gaps have
grown between coastal and interior regions and between urban and
rural areas of the country (Kanbur and Zhang 1999, 2005). In addition
to geographic poverty traps that lead to different patterns of income and
consumption growth (Jalan and Ravallion 2002), there are also considerable differences across demographic groups not only in income levels
(Chaudhuri and Datt 2009), but also in the level of coverage by safety
nets and in the risks of falling into poverty (Duclos, Araar, and Giles
2010; Jalan and Ravallion 1999). In particular, the movement of young
rural adults to urban and coastal areas for higher income earning opportunities raises the prospect that older residents remaining in rural areas
are at greater risk of falling into poverty. In general, rural residents lack
access to pension support when they are of retirement age, and must
rely on either their own labor income or support from family members,
even as they age into their 70s and beyond. In rural China, financial support for the elderly remains the responsibility of adult children and is
even codified into laws governing the family (Marriage Law 2001). As
the population of potential care providers continues to shrink as a result
of both China’s demographic transition and the availability of attractive
migrant employment opportunities for the young, many observers have
expressed concerns for the well-being of the rural elderly (Benjamin,
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Brandt, and Rozelle 2000; Jiang and Zhao 2009; Li, Lu, and Feldman
2009; Yao 2006).
In this chapter, I use the 2005 1 percent population sample to document the sources of support for older rural residents, and then present
updated evidence on the rates both at which the rural elderly coreside
with adult children and live in proximity to them. I then provide
descriptive evidence on the extent to which private net transfers from
adult children respond to low income levels of their elderly parents. To
do this, I first introduce a framework for examining how net transfers
respond to elderly income, and then make use of a unique data source
with information on the age and residence location of all nonresident
children of the household. These features of the data source allow us
to reduce one form of bias common in many studies of intergenerational transfers: we control for the size and quality of the transfer network. Given specific concerns over abandonment by adult children, I
examine whether transfer responsiveness varies when an elderly person
has migrant children, and moreover, whether the variance of expected
transfers differs between elderly with migrant children and those who
only have children living nearby.
The descriptive evidence presented shows somewhat higher variance in the predicted transfers to the elderly who have migrant children, which is consistent with concerns that the current and future
elderly may face more uncertainty in their support. Given that migrants
employed in nonagricultural work are frequently in the informal sector, their incomes often are much more risky, thus it is not surprising
that this risk is reflected in transfers to their parents. To decrease risk
to private transfer income, China’s government is currently supporting
new rural pension programs that are designed to reduce these perceived
risks of elderly poverty and to complement existing motives for private
transfers.
Apart from income support from the family, income from own
labor remains the other important source of support for the rural elderly.
Recent research on elderly labor supply provides evidence that China’s rural elderly continue to work well beyond age 60 out of necessity. Recent studies of the retirement decision in rural China suggest
that China’s rural elderly “work until they drop” (Pang, de Brauw, and
Rozelle 2004), and only stop working when physically incapacitated.
Physical labor in agriculture can take a significant toll on the bodies of
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those still working after 60 years of age and raise the likelihood of serious injury. Pension support for the rural elderly can be expected to have
a significant impact on the importance of working into old age, and is
likely to affect the labor supply decisions of the elderly. One benefit of
a rural pension is that it could make retirement a feasible choice, and
thus improve standards of living of the rural elderly.
In this chapter, I document the labor supply patterns of the rural
elderly and show that a considerable share of that population works
well beyond age 70. I examine the effects of both adult child migration
and increasing family wealth on labor supply decisions of the elderly.
The potential benefit that a pension may play in facilitating retirement
is evident as I observe declining labor supply with increases in family
wealth and other sources of income.
The following section of the chapter presents evidence on the
sources of support among China’s rural elderly. It first presents descriptive statistics from the 2005 1 percent population sample on sources
of support for China’s elderly, with particular attention to contrasts
between elderly living in rural and urban areas, and then discusses
implications of changes in living arrangements that underscore concerns that the rural elderly are at increasing risk of falling into poverty.
Finally, the section presents evidence on the responsiveness of transfers
to the income levels of elderly households, with attention to changes in
responsiveness over time. As the rural elderly often support themselves
through work relatively late in life, the following section presents evidence on the determinants of elderly labor supply. In particular, it highlights the relationships between income, health, and migrant status of
children and labor supply of men and women in their 60s and 70s. A
final section summarizes important findings.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT AMONG ChINA’S
RURAL ELDERLy
Major differences exist in the primary sources of support for China’s urban and rural elderly and between men and women from both
groups of elderly. Table 6.1 presents findings on elderly sources of support by location and gender for 2005. Several differences across groups
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Table 6.1 Primary Source of Support for China’s Elderly, 2005 (%)
Urban
Rural
Source of support
Average Male Female Average Male Female
Labor income
13.0
18.4
7.9
37.9
48.5
27.5
Pensions
45.4
56.9
34.6
4.6
8.1
1.3
Dibao
2.4
1.8
2.9
1.3
1.8
0.9
Insurance and subsidy 0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.0
Property income
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.1
Family support
37.0
20.7
52.3
54.1
39.3
68.5
Other
1.5
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
1.7
NOTE: Most significant share of support reported.
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics (2006).

among the elderly are notable. First, although pensions are the single
most significant source of support for the urban elderly, they remain a
very minor source of support for the rural elderly, almost entirely confined to former civil servants and soldiers, and former village cadres.1
In contrast, labor income is a much more significant source of support
for the rural elderly than for the urban elderly, being the primary source
of support for 37.9 percent of the rural elderly. Family support is an
important primary support for both rural and urban elderly households,
but its role for the rural elderly is substantially greater.
Support through antipoverty programs does not figure prominently,
most likely because the rural dibao—a social aid program providing cash assistance to the rural poor—was not an important source of
income support for rural or urban elderly households.2 This finding may
stem from the fact that the rural dibao was still being phased in at the
time of the survey, although policy has shifted in the intervening period
with the approval of rural dibao as national policy in 2007 with a resultant expansion in coverage.3 Also notable is the inability of the elderly
to earn income from property. In contrast to member countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development historically
or other developing countries today, the elderly in China have not grown
old in an environment in which they could accumulate land wealth.
Lack of land wealth limits the ability of the elderly to earn income from
rents and may also limit the scope for encouraging intergenerational
transfers from their children (who would be prospective heirs).
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Looking at sources of support by gender among the rural elderly,
family support is more important for elderly women and labor income
remains more important for men. As shown in Table 6.1, 68.5 percent
of women over 60 report that financial support from family members
is their most important source of support, whereas only 27.5 percent
report that labor income is most important. By contrast, 48.5 percent
of elderly men report that labor income remains their most important source of support; only 39.3 percent report support from family
members. When distinguishing the importance of pension by gender, a
significantly higher share of rural men (8.1 percent) than women (1.3
percent) report that pension income is their most significant source of
financial support. The gap between men and women reflects historical
differences between genders in employment in local government and
the military.
Rural elderly in their 60s are more likely to support themselves
through labor income, whereas those over 70 depend far more on
support from family members. Table 6.2 shows results by age cohort
among the rural elderly and emphasizes the differences in financial support between younger and older elderly people. Younger elderly rely
more on labor income, and a shift starts after age 70. Notably, however,
nearly a quarter of the elderly between 70 and 75 report labor income
as their main source of support. Apart from family support and labor
income, no other source of support for the elderly varies significantly
by age group. Moreover, no other component plays a particularly significant role.
Table 6.2 Source of Support for China’s Rural Elderly, by Age Group in
2005 (share of income in percent)
Age group (years)
Source of support
60+
Labor income
37.9
Pensions
4.6
Dibao
1.3
Insurance and subsidy 0.1
Property income
0.2
Family support
54.1
Other
1.8

60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85+
64.3 45.1 24.4 12.0
4.3
1.7
4.7
5.1
4.7
4.4
3.8
2.6
0.8
1.2
1.5
1.9
2.0
2.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
28.6 46.6 66.9 79.1 87.2 91.1
1.2
1.7
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.3

SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics (2006).
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Evidence on Family Support
Until the last few years, policy on pensions and safety nets has not
focused significantly on the rural elderly because the family was assumed
to be an adequate source of support. Policymakers had assumed the
continued viability of traditional, family-based arrangements for two
reasons. First, family values remain strong in rural areas, and Confucian filial piety continues to sustain family care for the elderly. Second,
any formal public policy response to the needs of the rural elderly may
undermine existing private arrangements. For example, state transfers
to the elderly may crowd out existing transfers from younger family
members.
With regard to the reliance on traditional family values, both policymakers and other observers have in recent years questioned the view
that family support for the rural elderly will be sufficient. Fertility
decline driven by China’s population policies may ultimately lead to
a breakdown of the traditional support system, but conclusions from
research spanning the literature on demography and economics disagree on the likeliness of this outcome. Zimmer and Kwong (2003)
show that more children increase the likelihood that the elderly will
receive support, but current simulation results suggest that declines in
fertility alone will not lead to a collapse of family-based support for
the elderly. Other research has suggested that financial transfers to parents respond to low income and low health status in urban areas (Cai,
Giles, and Meng 2006), but that in rural areas interhousehold transfers
are not often observed because they take the form of labor input into
family farming (Lee and Xiao 1998).4 The following sections provide
empirical evidence on elderly living arrangements and responsiveness
of financial support to low incomes.
Recent Changes to Living Arrangements and the Well-Being of
the Elderly
The share of rural elderly living with their children has declined
rapidly, both in the long term and in recent years. Changes in living
arrangements have been cited most frequently as a reason for concern
for the well-being of the elderly. For example, Benjamin, Brandt, and
Rozelle (2000) note that in rural northern China, over 85 percent of
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the elderly lived in extended households in 1935, but this figure had
dropped to just over 60 percent by 1995.5 The decline in coresidence
with adult children is strikingly evident over the six rounds of the China
Health and Nutrition Survey from 1991 to 2006. Figure 6.1 shows that
in the survey, nearly 70 percent of elderly in rural areas lived with an
adult child in 1991, but by 2006 this share had fallen to just over 40
percent. As elderly parent age increases, the probability of coresidence
with an adult child approaches 100 percent.6
At the same time, a decline in coresidence does not necessarily
reflect a drop in provision of care to the elderly. In-kind transfers, such
as supply of labor on extended family plots, are difficult to pick up in
surveys, yet such transfers often occur both within and across households. Changes in living arrangements reflect the increasing wealth of
families. With increasing resources, coresidence may be unnecessary
in caring for the elderly. Within villages in rural areas, elders and adult
children are typically in the same small group (a sub-village administrative unit) and live in proximity to one another. Given increases in housing wealth in rural areas since the mid-1980s, the trend toward nuclear
Figure 6.1 Living Arrangements of China’s Rural Elderly
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SOURCE: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006).
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families may signal a wealth effect independent of the traditional value
of providing support and care to elderly parents.
In addition, the share of rural elderly with an adult child living
nearby was actually higher. A more important factor may be the proximity of adult children, not whether they coreside. Figure 6.2 summarizes the living arrangements by age cohort from the 2004 Research
Center for Rural Economy (RCRE) supplemental survey and includes
information on children living within the same village as their elders.
Although coresidence with adult children was less than 60 percent during the 2003 reference period among those 60–70 years of age, more
than half the elderly living alone or with a spouse in this age range had
at least one adult child living in the village.7 This finding suggests that
even though coresidence was well below the levels of the 1930s, adult
children were still potentially available to provide care.
Evidence suggests that migration decisions of adult children are
influenced by the well-being of elderly parents. Decline in coresidence
reflects a decline in support for the elderly only if associated with
increased abandonment of the elderly. The rural elderly may have suf-
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ficient support if they are receiving transfers from local or migrant adult
children. Giles and Mu (2007) explore this possibility by conducting
separate analyses using two different data sources. They find a significantly lower probability that a son will work as a migrant when a parent
is seriously ill. Although parental illness has a statistically significant
effect on migration, it does not completely drive the decision to return
from migrant destinations. Depending on the data set and methodology, the effect of illness varied from a 15 percent to 26 percent reduction in the probability that a son would be employed as a migrant, and
this effect was reduced if other siblings remained behind in the village.
Although this level of responsiveness to elderly illness is significant, it
is not absolute. Moreover, elderly who are relatively healthy may have
a much lower standard of living if nonresident adult children who are
migrants are less likely to make transfers to their parents than adult
children who live nearby. In light of these findings, the next section
examines how private transfers respond to low income levels of the
elderly, including whether transfer responsiveness differs with migrant
status of children.
Do Private Transfers Respond to Income of the Elderly?
Two important reasons exist to examine the responsiveness of transfers and transfer levels. First, as China rolls out its national rural pension program, concerns may arise about formal support for the elderly
crowding out transfers from private sources. Second, while evidence
from the risk-coping literature suggests that elderly households with
migrant family members may be less likely to fall into poverty (Cai
et al. 2012; Giles 2006), these findings are average effects and do not
explore how transfers vary with pretransfer household income, nor do
they consider the distribution of transfers and the risks that the elderly
may fall into poverty if transfers do not materialize.
Much early research on intrafamily transfers had used data from
developed countries and focused on efforts to distinguish whether transfers were motivated by altruistic or exchange motives.8 This distinction
is important as it has implications for how transfers respond to exogenous income received by elderly households. If an altruistic motive
dominates, then family members outside the household may respond
to reduced levels of income by providing an offsetting transfer. This
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raises the possibility that any increase in income, as might occur with
a noncontributory pension payment, would lead to an offsetting reduction in transfers into the household. If the altruistic motive dominates,
the transfer derivative (which picks up responsiveness of transfers to
income) will have an unambiguously negative sign and the magnitude
will equal one if increased income perfectly crowds out private transfers. When exchange motives or other motives are more important, then
we are unlikely to observe any crowding out with increased incomes,
and the transfer derivative may not be significantly different from zero.
Policy research examining the motives for transfers in developing
countries has emphasized the importance of allowing both altruistic and
exchange motives to be present at different levels of income. Theory
thus suggests a net transfer function for the elderly:
(6.1) Ti N = ƒ(Ii) + x'i γ + εi ,
where Ti N are net transfers into the household, I i is a measure of pretransfer income, and Xi is a vector of other exogenous variables which
influence levels of transfers into and out of the household (and γ is the
corresponding vector of coefficients on X i). Errors in measurement and
unexplained sources of variation are then represented by ε i . What is
important in this model is that we allow pretransfer income, I i , to have
a nonlinear effect on net transfer responses. Estimating how net transfers, Ti N , vary with pretransfer income is our primary objective, but to
do this we must appropriately control for other factors, xi , that affect
transfers into the household.
Our choice of data source to use for this analysis is driven by concern that omitted variables related to the potential transfer network outside the household could bias estimates of how transfers respond to pretransfer income. This would occur, for example, if the size or quality of
the transfer network was systematically related to pretransfer income.
If number of children or their ability (measured through education) also
reflects unmeasured dimensions of the ability of household members,
then this may well be the case. In addition, knowing whether a household has family members who have migrated, even if in the more distant past, is important for making comparisons across households with
migrant children and those with family members living locally.
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The most appropriate existing data source for the study of transfer
behavior is the RCRE household survey complemented with a Supplemental Survey conducted in RCRE households in 2004.9 An important
feature of the survey is that it enumerated characteristics of former
household members, including their current location and educational
attainment, and this allows us to control for both the size and quality of
the transfer network. Thus, among the regressors influencing the size of
transfers, we include the number of children, which captures the effect
of the potential transfer network size, and average education of children
living outside the household, which proxies for the quality of the transfer network.10
Arguing that f (I i ) may be nonlinear due to a switch from altruistic to exchange motives for transfers at a particular threshold, Cox,
Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) estimate transfer responsiveness using an
approach that allows one to estimate this threshold empirically as well.
Understanding where this threshold is relative to the poverty line or an
eligibility line for minimum living standard support may be important
for thinking about safety net design and could be quite useful. Yet, an
empirical approach that forces f (I i ) to be composed of two linear portions below and above a threshold may also be too restrictive. Earlier
work examining transfers to elderly living in urban China raises doubt
about the viability of the threshold model approach. Cai, Giles, and
Meng (2006) show that the threshold model introduced by Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) leads to a switch from altruistic motives at
less than half the basic needs poverty line for urban China. While this
shouldn’t disqualify the approach altogether, the threshold also failed to
fit the data very well.
Another approach to allowing f (I i ) to be nonlinear is to use a partial linear model for empirical estimation, and then empirically calculate transfer derivatives at different levels of I i . We use the partial linear
model introduced by Yatchew (2003) and implemented for analysis of
transfers in Cai, Giles, and Meng (2006). In this approach, observations
in the sample are first ranked by I i , and then differenced to obtain
(6.2)

∆Ti N = ∆ƒ(Ii) + ∆x'i γ + ∆εi .

Since I i is bounded as the sample size increases, ∆f (I i ) ≈ 0, and Equation (6.2) reduces to
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(6.3)

∆Ti N = ∆x'i γ + ∆εi .

As long as I i and other independent variables are not perfectly correlated, OLS estimation of Equation (6.3) will yield consistent estimates
of γ. In order to estimate the nonparametric relationship f (I i ), we use
the estimated coefficients, γ̂, to calculate
(6.4)

ui = Ti N − x'i γ̂ = ƒ(Ii) + εi .

Assuming that the εi are independent across households and identically distributed, ui converges to f (I i ) for large sample sizes. We then
use locally weighted regression (lowess) to estimate the nonparametric relationship between the response of transfers, f (I i ), to pretransfer
income, I i .11 We also calculate the income-varying transfer derivatives
of f (I i ) as the slope of f (I i ) in the neighborhood of [I i −100, I i + 100].
In Figure 6.3, we show the estimated transfer response, f (I i ), for
different levels of pretransfer income, I i . It is likely that transfer responsiveness from migrants may change as time away from home villages
increases.12 In order to highlight changes in transfer responsiveness
over time, we split the sample into an early period (1995–1998) and a
later period (2000–2003). In each figure, we also separately show how
transfers respond to pretransfer income levels for elderly households
that have migrant children and those that do not. In order to highlight
how transfers respond to income at different points in the income distribution, we draw vertical lines at multiples of an annual nutrition-based
poverty line of 875 RMB yuan per capita, and then report the slopes
calculated at these points in Table 6.3.
Evident in the top panel of Figure 6.3, elderly households found
transfers more responsive to income at low levels in the earlier period
if they had migrant children than if they did not. Indeed, the slope,
or transfer derivative, was not indistinguishable from negative one
for elderly households with pretransfer income below one half of a
nutrition-based poverty line. This suggests that public transfers to the
elderly with migrant children would crowd out private transfers at very
low levels of income. By income levels near the poverty line, however, the transfer derivative was −0.5 for elderly households regardless
of whether or not they had migrant children. Thus, even in the earlier
period, one would not expect private transfers to be crowded out by
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Figure 6.3 Net Transfers Received by Rural Elderly, by Migrant Status
of Adult Children
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NOTE: Vertical lines indicate multiples of a nutrition-based poverty line, which is equal
to 875 RMB yuan per capita in year 2000 RMB.
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010), estimated using data from RCRE Rural
Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network,
Labor Allocation, and Land Use Survey.
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Table 6.3 Estimated Transfer Derivatives for households with Elderly
Residents
Estimates in neighborhood of multiples of the poverty line
Income Households without Households with
migrant children
per capita migrant children
Multiple
(RMB) 1996–98 2000–03 1996–98 2000–03
One-quarter
119–319
−0.84
−0.67
−1.73
−0.63
poverty line
One-half poverty line 338–538 −0.73
−0.57
−1.03
−0.35
Poverty line
775–975 −0.52
−0.46
−0.49
−0.25
Twice poverty line
1,650–
−0.28
−0.35
−0.40
−0.21
1,850
Four times poverty line 3,400–
−0.11
−0.24
−0.31
−0.20
3,600
NOTE: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is
equal to 875 RMB yuan per capita.
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010) estimates based on RCRE Rural Household
Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces and the
matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use Survey.

payments from a noncontributory pension in those elderly households
already at or above the poverty line.
By the later period, we find that private net transfers into households
with elderly residents become less responsive to income for households
with migrant children. This decline in transfer responsiveness holds for
the significant share of households with incomes ranging from half the
nutrition-based poverty line (or 438 RMB/capita) to twice this value (or
1750 RMB/capita), and indicates that any concern about a noncontributory pension crowding out private transfers is becoming less relevant
over time. Indeed, the decline in responsiveness of transfers to low
income raises the possibility that the elderly may be more exposed to
the risk of poverty with increases in out-migration of adult children and
increasing likelihood that migration of children is permanent.
Will Private Transfers Keep the Rural Elderly Out of Poverty?
When we examine the responsiveness of transfers to pretransfer
income above, it is important to remember that the predicted transfer
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levels in Figure 6.3 should be interpreted as expected values, and that
actual transfers will be some distribution around these predicted values.
In order to assess the risk that private transfers are not sufficient to keep
the elderly out of poverty, we use a bootstrap estimation procedure to
estimate the distribution of transfers around the predicted values. In
Figure 6.4, we reproduce the predicted transfers from Figure 6.3 with
confidence intervals added, and we also plot the threshold of combinations of pretransfer income and private transfers sufficient to keep
elderly households above the nutrition-based poverty threshold. This
threshold is represented in each of the four graphs of Figure 6.4 as the
straight line running from the net transfer axis when pretransfer income
is zero to the point on the pretransfer income axis where net transfers
are −500 RMB/capita and the household pretransfer income is just sufficient to keep the household out of poverty. The top two panels show
the range of net transfers for different levels of pretransfer income during the 1995–1998 period for households without and with migrants,
respectively. Comparing the top two figures, note that more of the lower
bound of transfers lies below the poverty threshold for households that
do not have migrant family members. Indeed, during the earlier period,
elderly households with migrant family members appear very unlikely
to have income per capita below the poverty line after private transfers
are included in household income.
Evident in the fourth panel of Figure 6.4, households with migrant
family members are actually at a greater risk of falling into poverty by
the 2000–2003 period. The fact that transfers are less responsive to low
incomes, as highlighted above, suggests that a noncontributory pension
or other support mechanism is unlikely to crowd out private transfers.
Figure 6.4 provides evidence that such a transfer may be useful for
reducing the risk that elderly households will fall into poverty.
In Table 6.4, we summarize the range of transfers at five multiples
of the poverty line. Drawing values from Figure 6.4, evidence summarized in this table suggests that elderly households with pretransfer
income per capita less than one-half the nutrition-based poverty line are
at particular risk of falling into poverty.
The analysis of transfers presented here suggests that a noncontributory pension has the potential to play an important role in reducing the risk of elderly households falling into poverty. While the rural
dibao is intended to assist poor households, it only comes into play
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Figure 6.4 Confidence Intervals for Net Transfers Received by the Rural
Elderly, by Migrant Status of Adult Children
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Figure 6.4 (continued)
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NOTE: Vertical lines indicate multiples of a nutrition-based poverty line, which is equal
to 875 RMB yuan per capita in 2000 RMB.
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010), estimated using data from RCRE Rural
Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network,
Labor Allocation, and Land Use Survey.

NOTE: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is equal to 875 RMB yuan per capita.
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010) estimates based on RCRE Rural Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu,
and Shanxi provinces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use
Survey.
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Table 6.4 Estimated Range of Transfers to households with Elderly Residents, Results for Neighborhoods of
Different Multiples of the Poverty Line
1995–98
2000–03
Pretransfer
Households
Households
Households
Households
income
Portion of without migrant with migrant without migrant with migrant
Multiple
per capita estimated range
children
children
children
children
One-quarter poverty line
119–319
Upper bound
1,356
1,643
1,489
1,655
Mean
948
1,216
1,081
1,071
Lower bound
531
718
664
479
One-half poverty line
338–538
Upper bound
1,155
1,276
1,293
1,484
Mean
811
910
942
953
Lower bound
469
610
601
461
Poverty line
775–975
Upper bound
785
908
1,019
1,381
Mean
517
648
709
821
Lower bound
307
420
473
290
Two times poverty line 1,650–1,850 Upper bound
421
605
701
1192
Mean
212
369
433
615
Lower bound
87
120
216
55
Four times poverty line 3,400–3,600 Upper bound
125
216
259
862
Mean
−48
−137
−7
274
Lower bound
−185
−568
−249
−345
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after a household has been recognized as poor. Lowering the risk that
an elderly household falls into poverty can have beneficial effects on a
range of economic decisions. In particular, by reducing the risk of falling into poverty, it is likely that the incentive for unproductive forms of
precautionary saving are reduced and we are also likely to affect labor
supply and retirement decisions of elderly households.
When considering the results from the four-province analysis of
transfers, one should remember that although poorer areas of Anhui,
Shanxi, and Henan are included in the analysis sample, these provinces are generally considered middle income, and Jiangsu is included
among upper-income coastal provinces. If transfer responsiveness to
low income is also declining among households with migrant children
in poorer regions of China, then a higher share of elderly households are
likely to be at risk of slipping into poverty.

ThE LABOR SUPPLy AND “RETIREMENT” DECISIONS OF
ChINA’S RURAL ELDERLy
Recent studies of retirement decisions in rural China suggest that
rural elderly “work until they drop” and stop working only when physically incapacitated (Pang, de Brauw, and Rozelle 2004). Benjamin,
Brandt, and Fan (2003) find evidence suggesting that the likelihood
of working in agriculture declines significantly with increases in family wealth, raising the possibility that public transfers might facilitate
reduced labor supply of the rural elderly. In China’s urban areas, where
many of the elderly rely on pension support, relatively few elderly continue to work in retirement. By contrast, our earlier discussion noted
that nearly 50 percent of rural men and 28 percent of women over retirement age state that income from work remains their primary source
of support. Because a considerable number of elderly receiving family
support also continue to work, these figures significantly understate the
degree to which China’s rural elderly continue to work after retirement
age.
Even as family wealth and incomes have increased among households in rural China, some data sources suggest that China’s rural
elderly were more likely to work. Evident in Figure 6.5, employment
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Figure 6.5 Employment Status of the Rural Elderly over Time
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SOURCE: Cai et al. (2012) using survey data from RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural
Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use Survey.
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status increases across the age distribution from 1993 to 2003 for elderly
relatives of RCRE panel households.13 Indeed, over this period of rising household incomes, employment rates of the rural elderly increased
at every age. In fact, continued employment of the elderly may be an
important contributing factor to the rising incomes of rural households.
As rural household incomes increase with the migrant employment of
younger adults, older parents remain behind and continue farming the
household land.
Features of China’s land tenure system may contribute to the effect
of child migration on the labor supply of the elderly. Access to land
in rural China has long been the safety net for able-bodied rural residents, but restrictions on the ability to transfer land may also influence
the labor supply decisions of rural residents. The inability to rent land
further reduces the income of an elderly person in retirement, and the
possibility that village leaders will reallocate land that is not kept productive may create additional incentives for older farmers to continue
working household land. Changes in the Land Law enacted in 2002 and
2003 may have facilitated land transfer and presumably may also have
influenced the labor supply decisions of older rural residents.
To examine the possibility that migration of children is systematically related to labor supply decisions of the elderly, Figure 6.6 shows
the share of age cohorts employed by migrant status for men and
women in 1998 and 2003. No systematic relationship between elderly
retirement and migration status of children is immediately evident. At
the same time, however, migration status of children and the labor supply decision of an elderly household resident are both systematically
related to household composition, family wealth, earning ability of
family members, and health status of the elderly person in question.
In order to better characterize the relationship between migration and
retirement and labor supply decisions of the elderly, it is important to
explicitly model the labor supply decision of the elderly while controlling for these other factors.
As a framework for understanding the retirement and workintensity decisions of the elderly, assume that individuals (or households) maximize utility subject to a family budget constraint. The budget constraint is a function of wealth, income, available time, health status, and nonlabor income of household members. From the constrained
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Figure 6.6 Employment of the Elderly and Migrant Status of
Adult Children
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Figure 6.6 (continued)
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utility maximization decision, we conceptualize a general model of
labor supply:
(6.5)

Lits = ƒ(W ith , I wit , I itnw, Hit ,Tit ,xit ,Vit , Djt) ,

where labor supply of individual i at time t, Lits , is a function of household
wealth, W ith , income from work of all household members, I wit , income
unrelated to current work, I itnw , health status, Hit , an individual’s time
endowment, Tit , and a vector of individual and household characteristics reflecting preferences, xit , which include own age and demographic
characteristics of the household affecting preferences. We also consider
the presence of unobserved village institutional characteristics affecting
labor supply, Vit , and province-year dummy variables controlling for
provincewide macroeconomic shocks, Djt . Identifying precise effects
of each of these variables can be complicated by three factors that may
introduce bias into our estimates: 1) some are imperfectly observed;
2) there are functional relationships among some of these variables
(e.g., health status may affect income through productivity, available
time, and available household wealth); and 3) labor supply of an elderly
individual may be simultaneously determined with the labor supply
decisions of other family members. In order to avoid bias in our labor
supply models, we use measures of education, age, and health, which
are the longer-term determinants of income and wealth.
Because wealth (W ith ) and current labor income (I wit ) of a household
are determined by the current and past productivity of household members, we use information on educational attainment and age to characterize productivity. Educational attainment of the elderly themselves is
likely to be associated with lifetime earnings and accumulated wealth of
the household. We use the average educational attainment of other adult
household members to proxy for the value of household labor. Health
status also affects productivity and ability to earn income through its
impact on capacity for work. Elderly who are ill or suffer physical limitations may be unable to provide much labor for farm activities. Thus,
the complete set of proxies for W ith and I wit in the reduced form are the
educational attainment, health status, age and age-squared of the elderly
family member, the average educational attainment of other adults of
the household, and numbers of adults in different age categories.
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The employment status and location of adult children may have
an important impact on the retirement decision. Income earned by the
household may be affected by whether a former resident works as a
migrant in another location or in a nearby location. In particular, the
effect of a migrant child is likely to be ambiguous. On one hand, a
migrant adult child may raise household income through increased
remittances more than the migrant lowers income through lack of work
in agriculture. In this case, we would expect the existence of a migrant
son or daughter to be negatively associated with elder parent labor supply. On the other hand, if loss of work capacity when a child migrates
is not offset by remittances, migration of an adult child may make it
more difficult for an elder parent to retire. Moreover, if residents of a
village stand a chance to lose land if it is not kept productive, then land
tenure insecurity may create an additional disincentive for retirement. A
migrant child will be associated with continued employment of elderly
parents if the unobserved risk of land expropriation represented in Vit
is correlated with factors influencing migration decisions, such as local
poverty rates and lack of off-farm opportunities.
Because it includes good measures of elderly health status, we use
the China Health and Nutrition Survey to estimate a reduced form labor
supply equation:
(6.6) Lits = β1Mit + β2Eitown + β3Eitother + β4ADLit + β5Penit+ x'it γ + Djt + uit ,
where Mit is a dummy variable indicating whether a household has a
migrant adult child. If increased household income through remittances
dominates the effects of lost income from home production and concerns about the risk of lost claim to land, then we would expect the
coefficient on Mit to be negative.14 We expect that higher values of educational attainment of elderly, Eitown, and other family members, Eitother,
will be associated with higher wealth and higher potential income and
should be negatively related to elderly labor supply. Pension income,
Penit , will be negatively related to labor supply as leisure is generally
believed to be a normal good. Finally, we characterize the health of the
elderly using z-scores calculated from the average responses to a set
of activities of daily living questions, ADLit .15 We include a vector of
individual characteristics, xit , which include age and age-squared and
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are associated with own productivity, and demographic characteristics
of the household, which affect preferences.
In estimating different versions of this model, we find that coefficients on each variable vary with gender, and depend on whether a
retirement-age individual is among the young or old elderly. For this
reason, we estimate models examining labor supply on subgroups of
the population. These include younger men and women between 60 and
70 years of age, and older elderly between 70 and 80 years of age. We
also estimate two types of models: binary choice employment models
in which the outcome variable is an indicator of whether the elderly
household member has engaged in productive income-earning activity
over the previous year, and tobit models estimating the number of hours
that the individual worked over the year. We present results of key coefficients for employment models in Table 6.5 and impacts on hours in
Table 6.6.
Not surprisingly, we find that as potential household incomes
increase, the likelihood that an older person is working decreases. This
effect is evident in Table 6.5 from examining the effects of pension
receipt and educational attainment on employment. For each 1,000
RMB per capita received as pension income, the probability that a man
works (whether in his 60s or 70s) falls by 8 percent and the probability
that a woman works falls by 6 percent to 6.4 percent. Own educational
attainment does not have a significant effect on employment of men
in their 60s, but each additional year of education is associated with
a 1.6 percent reduction in the probability that a woman in her 60s is
employed, and a 1.2–1.3 percent reduction in probability that elderly
people in their 70s are working. An increase in the average years of
education of other family members has an even stronger depressing
effect on labor force participation: higher average levels of education
are associated with higher permanent income of the family, and this
facilitates retirement.
Ill health, as represented by increases in the activities of daily living
(ADL) z-score, also lowers the likelihood that an individual engages
in productive activities. Since men are often tasked with more physically demanding jobs in agriculture, it is not surprising that this effect is
stronger for men in both age categories than for women. A one standard
deviation increase in the ADL z-score is associated with an 11 and 8
percent decrease in probability of employment for men and women,

Left Behind in Old Age? 159
Table 6.5 Factors Affecting Labor Supply Decisions of the Elderly,
Linear Model
Dependent variable: engaged in productive activities during the year
Variable
Has migrant member
Years of education
Years of education of other
household members
ADL z-score
Income from pension/
1,000 RMB
R-squared
Observations

Ages 60–70
Men
Women
0.009
0.058
(0.041)
(0.046)
−0.005
−0.016***
(0.004)
(0.005)
−0.017*** −0.020***
(0.005)
(0.005)
−0.113***
−0.079***
(0.029)
(0.026)
−0.083*** −0.064***
(0.012)
(0.012)
0.237
0.287
483
586

Ages 70–80
Men
Women
0.010
0.081***
(0.046)
(0.032)
−0.013*** −0.012**
(0.004)
(0.006)
−0.018*** −0.015***
(0.005)
(0.004)
−0.103*** −0.049**
(0.022)
(0.020)
−0.084*** −0.060***
(0.011)
(0.010)
0.261
0.179
705
818

NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at
the 0.01 level. Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous
round is no longer a household member and has moved outside the home province.
All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of
household members over 60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, children 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year dummy variables interacted with
regions to control for provincewide macroeconomic effects.
SOURCE: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004).

respectively, in their 60s, and a 10 and 5 percent decrease for men and
women in their 70s.
When we examine the effects of migration on elderly labor supply,
we observe positive coefficients for all subgroups. This indicates that
the effects of lost farm income and uncertainty about land tenure likely
dominate the effects of increased income from remittances in labor
supply decisions. Nonetheless, this effect is not statistically significant
for men or for women under 70. Women over 70, however, are 8 percent more likely to continue working (most likely in agriculture) if the
household has a migrant child.
When we examine the number of hours worked in Table 6.6, we find
consistent results. Women over 70 with a migrant child work 411 hours
more during a year, or the equivalent of 10 40-hour work weeks. For
regions of the country planting two crops a year, this would amount to
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Table 6.6 Factors Affecting hours Worked by the Elderly, Tobit Model
Dependent variable: hours worked
Ages 60–70
Ages 70–80
Variable
Men
Women
Men
Women
Has migrant child
44.3
−7.6
199.1
411.2**
(168.6)
(146.3)
(162.1)
(162.7)
Years of education
15.2
−1.5
−27.0*
−14.3
(18.3)
(16.1)
(15.1)
(21.5)
Education of other
−12.3
−53.1***
−40.4**
−45.5***
household members
(19.6)
(16.6)
(18.8)
(16.0)
ADL z-score
−416.9*** −299.9***
−294.4*** −211.6***
(132.7)
(94.8)
(85.1)
(70.6)
Income from
−447.9*** −314.1***
−350.4*** −308.0***
pension/1,000 RMB
(71.1)
(56.7)
(52.9)
(49.0)
Observations
479
586
705
816
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at
the 0.01 level. Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous
round is no longer a household member and has moved outside the home province.
All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of
household members over 60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, children 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year dummy variables interacted with
regions to control for provincewide macroeconomic effects.
SOURCE: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004).

full-time work during the agricultural busy season. Signs of the effects
of education are of the same direction as in the employment models of
Table 6.5, but once employed education itself does not have a strong
effect on number of hours worked.
Number of hours of labor supplied is also very sensitive to health
status and to receipt of pensions. An increase in one standard deviation of the ADL index is associated with a 417-hour reduction in labor
supplied by men in their 60s, and a reduction of 350 hours by men in
their 70s. Women in their 60s reduce labor supply by 300 hours with
a one standard deviation increase in their ADL index, while women in
their 70s reduce hours by 211 hours in response to a similar worsening
in their health. Pension receipt also has a stronger depressing effect on
hours worked by men in their 60s.
The urban elderly are much less likely to work after age 60 than
rural elderly, and the results presented here suggest that any mechanism
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providing the rural elderly with a flow of income in old age is likely to
reduce both employment and hours worked. Were China’s government
to develop a pension system for the rural elderly, it is likely that China’s
rural residents may choose to retire rather than work until they are no
longer able to do so.

CONCLUSION
Whereas the urban elderly receive significant support from pensions, the rural elderly rely primarily on their own labor income and
financial support from their children. More men over 60 rely primarily on their own labor income for support, whereas elderly women are
somewhat more dependent on transfers from family members. Evidence presented on responsiveness of private transfers to income levels
and on the determinants of elderly labor supply suggests that the introduction of a pension system may lead to more security for the elderly
without requiring them to continue working into old age.
Private transfers are responsive to low levels of elderly income, but
they do not perfectly crowd out income from other sources. At levels of
income below the poverty line, transfers from adult children increase as
elderly income decreases. When elderly incomes are at and even below
the poverty line, however, private transfers are not perfectly crowded
out by increases in income. A social welfare benefit that raises incomes
of the elderly will not crowd out private transfers.
Migrant children continue to provide remittance support to their
parents, but the predicted range of transfers suggests growing risk that
low-income elderly may be left in poverty. On average, the predicted
transfer from adult children is sufficient to maintain elderly incomes
above the poverty line. When the range of potential transfers is considered, however, elderly parents with migrant children clearly face more
risk that private transfers will be insufficient to maintain standards of
living above the poverty line.
Elderly with higher incomes are less likely to work, as are elderly
who are in poor health. Elderly with nonlabor income from pensions or
in households with higher levels of education, and thus more incomeearning potential, are less likely to participate in income-earning activi-

162 Giles

ties. If the elderly receive some type of social welfare support, they are
more likely to exit the labor force when over 60.
Elderly in poor health are less likely to work. Declines in health
status associated with decreases in ability to perform daily tasks are
associated with lower participation in work activity and fewer working
hours for those who are still working. Improving the use of the health
care system for preventive purposes may keep older workers productive
and earning incomes for a longer period of their lives. Further research
examining the effects of new rural health insurance programs (under the
New Cooperative Medical System) is warranted to determine whether it
facilitates improved health and work capacity of older workers.
Migration of adult children may have a significant impact on the
work status of elderly women. Having a migrant child in the family
raises the probability that a woman over 70 will still be in the labor
force and, conditional on working, will work more hours in a year. For
men and women under 70, a migrant child has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on participation in income-earning activities.

Notes
The author acknowledges financial support for writing this chapter from two grants
provided by the Knowledge for Change Trust Fund at the World Bank (RF-P116739RESE-TF094568 and RF-P121130-RESE-TF098764).
1. The data were collected before initiation of the national rural pension pilot program in 2009.
2. This finding is consistent with findings in the World Bank’s China poverty assessment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009) using other National Bureau of Statistics data.
3. See World Bank (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of the evolution of rural
dibao and other forms of rural social assistance, noting coverage expansion of
rural I from just over 8 million in 2005 to almost 48 million in 2009.
4. Using other methods, Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2008) find no evidence that
transfers to parents respond to low parent income in Indonesia.
5. Selden (1993) concludes that a transition to the nuclear family imposes a heavy
price on the rural elderly. Living arrangements are thought to be important for
elderly support across East Asia, including Cambodia (Zimmer and Kim 2002),
Thailand (Knodel and Chayovan 1997), and Vietnam (Anh et al. 1997).
6. Two very different conclusions are consistent with evidence of greater incidence
of coresidence with age: the oldest, who are more likely to be infirm, tend to move
in with adult children; alternatively, if coresidence has an effect on the quality of
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7.
8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

care provided, then perhaps only the elderly living with adult children reach old
age.
Coresidence in rural areas of the four RCRE provinces was also somewhat higher
than observed for rural areas of the CHNS panel.
Barro (1974), Becker (1974), and Cox (1987) make important theoretical distinctions highlighting different motives for transfers. Much of the empirical research
in the United States has suggested that intergenerational intervivos transfers are
driven by exchange motives (e.g., Cox and Rank 1992; McGarry 1999) rather
than based on altruistic motives. It is important to remember, however, that in the
United States, the Social Security safety net provides substantial insurance against
poverty in old age, and thus it is not as surprising to find an emphasis on the flow
of resources from older to younger generations.
We use the 1995 to 2003 waves of RCRE’s annual household survey from four
provinces (Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi) in which a supplemental survey
(Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use
Survey) was carried out in collaboration with Michigan State University in 2004.
A detailed description of the RCRE household survey and comparison to other
household surveys conducted in China can be found in Benjamin, Brandt, and
Giles (2005).
Other regressors included among the X’s are age, years of schooling, marital status, an indicator for whether the household has any members in schooling, the
number of household residents, the number of working household residents,
shares of household residents in different demographic categories, numbers of
nonresident family members in different demographic categories, village dummy
variables to control for the local economic environment, and province-year dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks.
Specifically, we use a bandwidth of 0.25 with observations weighted using a tricube weighting function as calculated by the lowess command in Stata. The lowess estimator was developed by Cleveland (1979) and has a benefit over some
kernel estimators in that it does not suffer from bias near the end points.
The Poverty Assessment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009) emphasized that 65 percent
of rural migrants had lived in the current city where they were working for more
than three years, and this duration was significantly longer than reported in a similar survey conducted in 2001.
The information comes from a retrospective work history carried out as part of
a supplemental survey conducted with RCRE in 2004. The supplemental survey
asked about the work history of current and former household residents and their
parents.
It is also important to remember that we do not identify a causal relationship
between migrant children and elderly labor supply. Unobservable factors related
to the family (related to motivation, interest in income, or specific abilities) may
affect both the migration decisions of adult children and labor supply decisions of
their parents.
Bound (1991) has argued that information from ADLs contributes less bias than
self-reported health in models of retirement behavior. In the CHNS, individuals
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over age 50 are asked to rate the difficulty from 1 (no difficulty) to 4 (cannot do at
all) of the following activities: walking a kilometer; sitting continuously for two
hours; standing up after sitting for a long time; climbing one staircase; lifting or
raising a 5-kilogram bag; squatting down, kneeling down, or bending over; bathing yourself; eating by yourself; putting on your clothes; using the toilet. We calculate average responses to these questions for each individual, and then calculate
z-scores over all elderly.
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China in 2049
Zhiwu Chen
Yale School of Management

The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, and its current economic reforms were implemented beginning in 1978 following
the end of the Cultural Revolution. Since then, China has become an
economic powerhouse, neatly timing the advent of globalization and
organized free trade.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine historical trends in, and
the impact of, modern reforms on the Chinese economy; to look at what
is likely to happen to growth, earnings, and savings over the next four
decades; and to compare the Chinese economy to the U.S. economy
over this period of time.

ThE BIG PICTURE
Figure 7.1 shows a likely growth pattern of the Chinese economy in
the coming decades. It depicts three different phases. The initial phase
goes from 2010 to 2016, during which no major shifts in the growth
model of the Chinese economy will likely occur. Growth continues at a
rate of about 8.5 percent per year despite the likelihood that the Chinese
government will implement substantial changes in policies relating
to investments, exports, and domestic consumption that could impact
growth. Although there is much talk in the Chinese media about how
reforms in these sectors will have a negative effect, it is unlikely such
reforms will have much negative impact due to political reasons and
other complications.
It is presumed that, in 2016, there will be a peak of the Chinese
economy in the real term followed by a downturn—the second phase—
of 12 percent in the year 2017. Why a 12 percent decline? This predic-
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Figure 7.1 Possible Future Path for the United States and China
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tion is inferred from the Asian financial crisis that occurred in 1998.
There are many similarities between the current Chinese economy and
the Korean economy during that period. As shown in Figure 7.2, per
capita GDP in Korea rose sharply during the first half of the 1990s only
to drop precipitously beginning in 1997. I assume a similar pattern will
occur in the Chinese economy.
However, it should be noted that other organizations predict continued, steady growth during this period. For instance, the Conference
Board (2012) projects growth at 8.0 percent in 2012, 6.0 percent annually in 2013–2016, and 3.5 percent annually in 2017–2025.
After the setback in 2017, the Chinese economy should resume its
growth—the third phase. When this occurs, beginning in 2017–2018,
the growth rate should be 5–6 percent per year through 2049. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects average annual growth of 5.56
percent for years 2009–2050 (Dadush and Stancil 2009). During this
same period, some analysts predict that the U.S. economy would grow
at 3 percent per year, which is possibly an optimistic prediction considering its unsteady growth rate in recent years. The IMF projects an
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annual growth rate for the United States of 2.7 percent over the same
period.
The resumption of growth should occur due to socially and politically acceptable reforms that commonly take place in any economy,
including the U.S. economy and the economies of other advanced
nations, when hit by crisis. In fact, a looming economic crisis is partly
what spurred the reformers led by Deng Xiaoping to undertake major
political and economic reforms in 1978 just after the Mao-era Cultural
Revolution, during which many people were displaced or lost their lives
or property for proposing political and economic changes. Without
Deng’s reforms, the Chinese economy and society overall would not
have evolved to what it is today.
Even now, China’s economy is heavily influenced by its major
policymakers. Fundamentally, there should be incentives for major
political, economic, and cultural changes to a society. From 1979 to
2009, China’s leaders were prompted to implement reforms in these
Figure 7.2 GDP per Capita for Korea, 1990–2000 (current $)
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areas in order to maintain strong and continued economic growth, and I
predict they will continue this process even after 2017–2018.
As seen in Figure 7.1, in 2049, China’s nominal GDP should surpass the United States’ nominal GDP, under the ceteris paribus assumption that the RMB-dollar exchange rate remains relatively stable over
time. If purchasing power parity (PPP) is taken into account, China’s
GDP is projected to surpass the United States’ GDP in 2027, about 22
years earlier than in the nominal term.

hISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Let us take a historical look at the Chinese economy using Figure
7.3. The per capita GDP of China up until 1950 was almost stagnant
and remained around $500 per annum. From 1950 to 1973, the GDP per
capita per annum increased about 60 percent, and from 1973 to 1998 it
increased by about 300 percent. Furthermore, it continued to grow so
Figure 7.3 China’s per Capita GDP over 2000 years
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that the GDP per capita in 2011 is estimated at $5,184 (IMF 2011). In
short, as shown in Figure 7.3, most of the growth in China’s per capita
GDP occurred in the last 30 to 60 years.
Figure 7.4 provides a more detailed look at the rapid growth in per
capita GDP that occurred recently using PPP-adjusted dollars. Using
this measure, the figure shows that per capita GDP increased by a factor
of 20 times over the period 1980–2009.
Observing income growth and productivity growth together helps
provide a more complete picture of China’s long-term economic progress. Here I focus on the income side, and for comparison I provide a
measure for how much in terms of consumables a laborer earns for a
day’s labor.
Figure 7.5 provides a timeline showing real earnings in terms of
meat and rice. In 1769, a day’s labor earned a typical worker about 3 jins
(China’s unit of weight measurement as equivalent to pounds) of meat;
in 1850 it was around 2 pounds. From then until 1973 a day’s labor
Figure 7.4 China’s Past Growth in per Capita GDP (in PPP-adjusted $)
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earned less than 2 jins. Currently, a typical Chinese laborer earns the
equivalent of about 10 jins of meat per day, which implies that workers
today are about 4 times as productive as the workers before 1973, even
taking into consideration the rising prices. Rice as a measure followed
a similar path, but beginning in 1973, the productivity increase is even
greater, almost 10 times that before 1973.
What has caused such growth and progress in China? Many economists and commentators say it is due to the vast amount of cheap labor
available in China. But, in fact, China’s population has been declining as the share of the global population. In 1830, China had about
40 percent of the world’s population. In 1913, China’s population was
one-third of the world’s population. China now has roughly 1.4 billion
Figure 7.5 Real Earnings per Day for a Beijing Worker
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people, or about 20 percent of the global population. So the argument
that China’s vast and low-cost workforce is the main driving force of
economic growth is well grounded. If such a labor force was available
in the past, why didn’t China experience growth earlier on? In addition,
in 2011 the minimum wage in China was raised in most of the country
by 21.7 percent, making China’s labor force higher paid than several of
its East Asian neighbors (BBC 2011). What is it, then, that propels such
dynamic economic growth in China?
To understand the driving factor of economic growth of presentday China, let’s consider a quote from a book published in Shanghai in
1914, Finance in China (Wagel 1914). The following excerpt, quoted
then in the New York Times, highlighted the threat of China’s economy
to Western economies:
It is often said that the peril of today is not the Chinese behind the
gun, but the Chinese as the manufacturers of guns and of many
other things, equally calling for the highest technical skill. It has
been the fashion of newspaper writers dealing with the development of China to state that the danger to the West lies in the industrial expansion of China, and it is averred that the Chinese, with
their cheap labour and keen aptitude for imitation, competing with
the dear labour and the heavy cost of transportation of the West,
would certainly be able to beat the latter. (Wagel 1914, p. 291)

After the publication of Wagel’s book, Western nations became
nervous about China’s rise because they thought that China would inevitably become economically dominant due to, as Wagel points out, its
cheap labor relative to the West. However, such anxieties were sometimes seen as contributing factors that helped foment the Cultural Revolution, war, and other disruptions in China.
In what way is China different now from its past? Figure 7.6 shows
the correlation between GDP growth and the population of China over
several centuries to 2008.
Going back to 1600, the correlation between population and GDP
growth was almost 100 percent. By 1820, the correlation remained very
high, almost 97 percent. These high correlations were due to the fact that
labor was the primary, if not the sole, factor of production. During that
period, modern technology was practically nonexistent, production was
almost exclusively labor intensive, therefore GDP grew in step with the
population. It wasn’t until the effects of the industrial revolution spread
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Figure 7.6 Long-Term Trends: Correlation between China’s Population
and GDP Size
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to China in the latter part of the nineteenth century that the correlation
declined. Production became more capital intensive, and hence the correlation between population and GDP declined. This decrease continued until after 1950 when it began to increase. The correlation grew
more quickly beginning around 1973 as China began to take advantage
of the trend of globalization and a freer trade environment.
Globalization opened up more of the Chinese economy to international markets mainly due to the establishment of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), whose policies tend to benefit China more than
other economies. This international order of trade that has been encouraged by Western industrialized economies is a key reason for China’s
economic success during the past 30 years.
In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the international order was based on a country’s military power, which implied
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a gunboat-based order rather than a rule-based order. The East India
Company of the eighteenth century is an example of a successful practitioner of gunboat-based order. It maintained its own navy and military
power, facilitating its participation in international trade. Eventually,
technology developed during the industrial revolution in the Western
nations spread to China, enabling it to transition from a gunboat-based
economy to a rule-based economy. Today, rule-based order provides the
basis for the entry of multinational corporations in China such as General Electric, whose army of lawyers help it conduct business.
Gunboat-based and rule-based trade and investment have vast differences in transaction costs. For instance, employing lawyers is less
expensive than maintaining a military force. Therefore, the transaction
costs for trade today are less than during the gunboat-based age. This
allows China to incur much lower transaction costs for trade today and
serves as another reason why its economy is less encumbered and freer
to grow.
Let’s compare the reforms under Deng Xiaoping in 1978 with those
made in the nineteenth century under the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911).
During the Qing Dynasty, Li Hongzhang, a leading statesman, built
military power that allowed China to become economically competitive. Without this power China would not have been able to engage, on
a significant scale, in international trade and investment. On the other
hand, Deng Xiaoping did not have to build military power to compete
for trade. Instead he implemented market-oriented rules and regulations
that attracted foreign direct investment and international trade.
Figure 7.7 shows the per capita GDP of China and the rest of the
world from over 2000 years ago until the end of the twentieth century.
As depicted by the steep slope of the line, China began gaining on the
rest of the world after 1973, when globalization and the reforms implemented five years later began to have an impact.
As Wagel (1914) pointed out, China is sometimes characterized as
having a keen ability to imitate new technologies that were developed
by others, and the gains China has made since 1973 are due to such
imitation. However, there are both pros and cons to this depiction. It is
an advantage when countries only need to imitate in order to be able to
pursue fast growth. However, such growth can also impede incentives
to innovate and to conduct timely institutional reforms, so imitation can
also be seen as a disadvantage.
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Figure 7.7 Per Capita GDP: World vs. China
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Cost-saving manufacturing technologies developed in the twentieth century spread throughout the world in part due to policies implemented by the WTO. China became the major benefactor of this dispersal of technology. Still, there is another factor that helps to explain
the success of China’s economy in the last 30 years: the change in
policies that affect the decision making on resource allocation and its
control. China’s economic policies are formulated in such a way that
they are conducive to fast economic growth despite the fact that there
are some negative side-effects that resulted, such as the dominance of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in certain industries, environmental
degradation, crowding-out of private property to the public sector, and
substandard working conditions.
The rising pace of factor productivity growth can be attributed in
part to overinvestment and the emergence of excess capacity in a number of important industries. China emerged as the world’s largest steel
producer in 1996 when its output reached 100 million metric tons, put-

China in 2049 179

ting it ahead of both the United States and Japan for the first time. The
industry has continued to grow at a rapid pace. This is an example of
the extent of China’s industrialization and serves as just one example
of an SOE that contributes substantially to the growth of its economy.
World Trade Organization membership had an immediate impact
on Chinese economic growth, paving the way for more efficient dayto-day operations of Chinese corporations while reducing the risk
premium investors applied to investment in the country. In addition,
WTO membership established a powerful catalyst for a more serious
approach to economic reform and industrial efficiency. As the benefits
of those changes materialized, China achieved sustainable incremental
economic growth while gradually reducing the risk premium of investment. This significantly cut the discount at which Chinese equities
have traded against global market peers. As a major force driving the
national economy of China, the fast expansion of SOEs has contributed
significantly to China becoming the world’s second-largest economy.

OWNERShIP STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
At the end of 2006, according to government records, land owned
by the government was valued at 50 trillion RMB. At the same time,
there were about 119,000 SOEs valued at about 29 trillion RMB.
Therefore, the combined value of government land ownership plus
SOEs amounted to 79 trillion RMB, which was roughly one-tenth of
comparable U.S. government holdings. A few years later these values
grew due to the expanding economy and land value appreciation. While
at the end of 2006 state-owned assets were roughly 76 percent of the
total national wealth in China, in 2010 that percentage likely declined
to roughly 70 percent of the total national wealth because of the increasing trend toward privatization, particularly in the industrial sector.
Figure 7.8 shows a comparison of total government expenditures
with total household expenditures in China as a percentage of GDP.
In 1952, household consumption was about 69 percent of GDP, pretty
close to today’s household expenditures in the United States, which is
roughly 71 percent of GDP. At the founding of the People’s Republic of
China, the economy was driven by household consumption. Over the
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Figure 7.8 China’s household Consumption vs. Government
Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
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years, during the planned economy period, this consumption declined
so that now it is roughly 36 percent of GDP. Even in the reform period
this share continues to decline. On the other hand, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 16 percent in 1952 to about
30 percent in the 2000s. Government expenditures as a share of GDP
have almost doubled in the last 60 years, while private consumption
expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined.
The government in China also has practically unchecked taxation
power. To introduce a new tax or to raise tax rates, the government
doesn’t have to go through parliamentary debates. The ministry of
finance and state council generally meet together and make new tax
policy. It is somewhat daunting that a few people could simply gather
in a room at the time of their choosing and make decisions that may
alter the tax rates and policies of the world’s second-largest economy.
There is no accountability to the taxpayers. As a result, government
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expenditures as the share of GDP, as the bold line depicts in the figure,
trend upward.
The Chinese government’s budget was roughly 8 trillion RMB in
2010, which is about half of the U.S. annual government budget at the
current exchange rate. But, if we use PPP, the Chinese budget may actually be bigger than the U.S. budget. The main question facing China’s
policymakers is how to spend that 8 trillion RMB. Social groups and
political leaders are both influential in this decision. In China the political situation influences the distribution of resources, including how
the budget is apportioned to different provinces and societies. Public
accountability of the government budget spending is still waiting on
establishment of the democratic institutions in China.
The growing concern among those tracking China’s economy comes
from the fact that SOEs, which were previously focused on manufacturing industries, are entering the financial industry, thereby expanding their influence further into the economy. They are doing so for two
reasons: 1) it is useful for satisfying their own development needs and
assures that they receive the financial support they need to grow, and 2)
some SOEs see value in having a financial license or room for financial
equity growth, and thus hope to profit from undertakings in finance.
However, I believe that these two points, taken either individually or
together, are not sufficient reasons to justify allowing SOEs’ expansion
into the financial domain.

SAVING
It is true that Chinese people generally save more of their income
than people of other nationalities. As Figure 7.9 shows, the gross savings rate as a percentage of GDP rose from around 40 percent in 1992 to
about 50 percent in 2006. However, looking at just the household sector’s savings as a percentage of GDP, there is little variation over that
period of time, staying at about 20 percent, although trending slightly
upward in the 2000s. This relatively steady rate is due mainly to the fall
in the share of household income as a share of national income rather
than a decline in the household savings rate (Prasad 2009).
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Figure 7.9 household, Enterprise, and Government Savings as a
Percentage of GDP, China, 1992–2006
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Savings by SOEs has been more evident. Beginning in 2003, SOEs’
savings rate as a percentage of GDP jumped sharply from about 15 percent to over 20 percent before falling back slightly. The SOEs are not
subject to monitoring by the National People’s Congress or other governmental agencies, and they are not required to redistribute profits or
remit them to the Ministry of Finance. Their profits and increased value
are not translated into consumption since households do not receive
these benefits. The same is true for the sales of land and SOEs themselves, the proceeds of which go to the government treasury. Government saving also increased gradually to about 9 percent from a steady 5
percent seen throughout the 1990s.
Figure 7.10 shows gross savings as a percentage of GDP in seven
other industrialized nations—including the United States—and the
world overall. Note that, over the same period of 1992–2006, the rate
ranges from a low of 13.3 percent (in Canada in 1992) to a high of 33.8
percent (in Japan, also in 1992). The U.S. rate ranges from a low of
14.4 percent in 1993 to a high of 18.8 percent in 1998 (EconStats 2012).
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Figure 7.10 Gross Savings as a Percentage of GDP, Seven Countries plus
the World, 1992–2006
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Therefore, it is apparent that China’s gross savings rate is quite high relative to other large nations, which is one reason why its policymakers
are encouraging domestic consumption, which has not been growing as
fast as GDP, as a means of rebalancing the nation’s growth and reducing
its account surplus.

SUMMARy
China’s economy is mainly investment and export driven as opposed
to being driven by domestic consumption like the U.S. economy is.
Because of that, the consequences are that the economy is too dependent on these sectors. It also finds itself overly dependent on energyintensive industries and insufficiently so on the service sector. Transitioning to a more balanced economy, one in which private consumption
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plays a greater role, will be a challenge for China’s economic policymakers. Because of the political pressure applied by the vested interest
group who benefit from the current policies, there is no incentive for
them to alter policy in order to transition to a more balanced economy.
Other problematic consequences resulting from how China’s economy
has developed include the crowding out of private firms in industries
in which SOEs became dominant players and barriers to legal development and the rule of law in the economy.
Still, the current model for economic growth in China will likely
continue despite recessions and other economic uncertainty worldwide.
In fact, these issues emphasize the importance of a highly coordinated
state-controlled economy, particularly the rising influence of SOEs
through state-owned banks and other financial institutions.
To summarize, the economic benefits accrued as a result of the industrial revolution have been completely absorbed into China’s economy,
as have the benefits from the international movement of investment and
capital. China’s current growth may be attributed mainly to government
sector involvements in the economy. Risks remain, however. These
include being overly reliant on the government-dominated economic
model, the ascending SOEs and the power they continue to amass, an
increasingly tougher environment for private and foreign firms to operate freely in, and the fact that local governments are becoming major
borrowers from banks.
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The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists;
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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